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Case No. 20150417-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea to forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Aim. §78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Defendant was charged with rape. He negotiated a plea bargain in 
which he would plead guilty to a reduced charge of forcible sexual abuse 
and the prosecutor would recommend no prison time. But the prosecutor 
expressly conditioned his sentencing recom1nendation on what the victim 
wanted at sentencing: "Our recommendation is simply that we would 
honor the victim's wishes. If the victim were asking for a prison sentence, 
we' re not bound to not recommend prison. If the victhn is not seeking a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
prison sentence we will not go beyond her request." The prosecutor told 
Defendant that he believed that the victim was not seeking prison time, but 
explained that he had not talked to her since the initial intake and had not 
discussed the plea agreement with her. 
At sentencing, the victim asked the trial court to impose a prison 
sentence. Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that the 
prosecutor had intentionally misrepresented the victim's initial position in 
order to induce his guilty plea. 
Issue: Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea where it is uncontroverted that Defendant knew 
and understood- before he pleaded guilty- that the prosecutor's 
recommendation for no prison time was contingent on the victim's wishes 
at sentencing? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Ruiz, 2013 UT App 
274, ifl2, 316 P.3d 984; State v. Knowlden, 2013 UT App 63, ,12, 298 P.3d 691. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are qiscussed 
as pertinent in the body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary off acts. 1 
Defendant's son and three other friends, including the female victim, 
M.C., partied one night at Defendant's house. M.C. eventually went to 
sleep on a bed in Defendant's basement. She awakened to find Defendant 
on top of her with his penis in her vagina. M.C. jumped up and demanded 
that Defendant get away from her. 
When Defendant talked to investigating officers, he said that he only 
touched M.C.'s shoulder. State investigators performed DNA analysis on 
seminal fluid collected from M.C.'s Code Rexam and found that it matched 
Defendant's DNA profile. 
B. Summary of proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with rape, a first degree felony, Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-402 (West 2015). Rl. Under a plea bargain, Defendant pleaded 
guilty to forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, Utah Code Ann. §76-
5-404 (West 2015). R158-59;R154-55;R147-53. 
At the plea hearing, the prosecutor told the trial court that he had 
spoken to M.C. "initially during intake," and that M.C.'s "first impression" 
1Because Defendant pleaded guilty, the facts are taken from the 
Amended Infonnation and Defendant's "Memorandum in Support of 
Motions to Withdraw Guilty .Pleas, Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and 
Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and Requests." See R159,R306-07. 
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was that "she was not seeking prison at the time and was fairly amenable to 
resolving the case." R364:3 (Addendum A). But the prosecutor added that 
he had been unable to contact M.C. since negotiating the plea agreement 
with the defense. Id. 
The trial court conducted a rule 11 colloquy with Defendant, and, 
after finding that Defendant's guilty plea was both knowing and voluntary, 
authorized Defendant to sign his "Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea" (Statement) R364:7-8; see also R147-53 (Addendum A). 
Defendant's signed Statement set forth the basis for the parties' agreement: 
"In exchange for the Defendant's plea of guilty the prosecution agrees that 
in the event the victim does not affirmatively insist upon the prosecutor 
seeking a prison commitment that the prosecutor will recommend 
probation and no prison." R150. 
Defense counsel also stated on the record that the prosecutor had 
agr~ed to recommend probation "unless the victim affirmatively requests a 
commitment of prison for the defendant's behavior." R364:8. The 
prosecutor affirmed defense counsel's characterization of the parties' 
agree1nent: "Our recommendation is simply that we would honor the 
victim's wishes. If the victim were asking for a prison sentence, we' re not 
bound to not recommend prison. If the victim is not seeking a prison 
-4-
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sentence, we will not go beyond her request." Id. Defense counsel 
concurred: "We recognize the same." Id. 
The trial court asked if Defendant understood that the court was ✓/not 
bound by any such recommendation as well?" Counsel responded, "That is 
correct." Id. The trial court then set a sentencing date, and instructed 
Defendant "to get down to AP&P to get a pre-sentence report." R364:9-10. 
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel moved to continue, filed a 
defense-based sentencing report, and requested an evidentiary hearing. 
R365:2-3 (Addendum B). The defense motions were prompted by receipt of 
the AP&P report. R365:3. The trial court agreed to continue sentencing and 
to hold an evidentiary hearing. R365:6-9. The trial court also allowed M.C. 
to make a statement: 
.... I am asking the Judge to sentence you to two-and-a-
half years in prison, the same sentence you've dealt n1e, the 
prison I've been in waiting for this to be over. I also want you 
to be on the sexual offender's list, so there's a possibility a girl 
might see it and think twice about being in a vulnerable 
position in your presence, even if it is under the pretense of 
partying with your 20-something-year-old son. 
R365:9. 
Before the next hearing, Defendant moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea; he filed a supporting memorandum. See R233-36,323-24,306-19 
(Addendum C). The defense also filed supporting affidavits from-one of 
-5-
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Defendant's attorneys-Larry Long, a defense investigator, and Defendant. 
See R244-273 (Addendum C). According to Long's affidavit, he had 
intended to cross examine M.C. at the preliminary hearing about "her 
consumption of alcohol during the evening," and "her sexual relations" the 
morning of the rape. R246. He had also intended to cross examine M.C.' s 
friend "as to her recollection of all events" and M.C.' s "state of mind." Id. 
But according to Long, the prosecutor told him before the preliminary 
hearing that M.C. did not want Defendant to go to prison. Id. Based on this 
information, the defense waived preliminary hearing. R246-48. Long, 
however, continued to prepare for trial. R248. 
Among other things, Long hired an investigator. Id. The investigator 
spoke with M.C., who allegedly told him that she understood Defendant 
had already pleaded guilty. R248-49. The investigator also told Long that 
M.C. "expressed no anger or vindictiveness against Defendant in her 
conversation but did not mention, one way or the other what punishment 
he should receive." R249. The defense team also 1noved to suppress the 
evidence against Defendant. Id. But before the trial court ruled on the 
motion to suppress, the parties reached a plea agreement. R250-51. As 
noted, in exchange for Defendant's guilty plea to a second degree felony, 
the prosecutor agreed to "recommend no prison sentence be served by 
-6-
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Defendant provided that" M.C. "did not affirmatively insist upon the 
prosecution seeking a prison commihnent." Id. 
According to Long, the defense did not know that M.C. wanted 
Defendant to do prison time until they received the AP&P report. R252. 
Upon receiving the report, Long asked the defense investigator to again 
contact M.C. "to determine whether she had just changed her mind or 
whether she always wished to have a prison sentence served by the 
defendant." R253. The investigator reported that M.C. told him "that she 
always wanted a prison sentence for the defendant and had told the 
prosecuting attorney her desire from the very beginning." Id. 
The investigator's affidavit reiterated information in Long's affidavit, 
and included a defense-prepared transcript of his telephone conversation 
with M.C., where she denied telling the prosecutor that she did not want 
Defendant to go to prison. R256-58,263 (Addendum C). According to the 
h·anscript, M.C. told the prosecutor that the most important thing to her was 
that Defendant be required to register as a sex offender: "I didn't say that I 
did not want him to go prison, I said, 'Well, it's more important to 1ne that 
he's on the sexual offender's list.' That was like-I said that I wanted him to 
serve prison time, but the most important thing to me was that I wanted 
him to go on the sexual offenders list." R263-64. 
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Defendant's affidavit stated his understanding that, in exchange for 
his guilty plea to a reduced charge, the prosecutor "would recommend that 
[Defendant] not go to prison unless [M.C.] insisted that [he] go to prison." 
R271 (Addendum C). 
Based on the affidavits, the defense argued that the prosecutor had 
allegedly intentionally misled Defendant about M.C.'s position on his 
serving prison time. This, Defendant argued, (1) constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct in violation of Defendant's right to due process, see R311-14; 
and (2) rendered Defendant's guilty plea unknowing and involuntary under 
the plea withdrawal statute, Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (West Supp. 2015-16), 
see R314-17. Alternatively, Defendant offered to withdraw his motions if the 
court would sentence him to probation with or without jail time. R317-19. 
Represented by a new prosecutor, the State opposed Defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. R329-33 (Addendu1n D). The State 
argued that Defendant's signed Statement and the change-of-plea hearing 
transcript showed that Defendant's plea was knowing and voluntary, and 
that it had not been induced by any alleged 1nisrepresentation of M.C.'s 
wishes. See R329-333. Both the Statement and the hearing transcript made 
clear that the prosecutor was uncertain what M.C.'s wishes would 
ultimately be, that the prosecutor's recormnendation of no prison was thus 
-8-
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contingent on M.C.' s wishes at sentencing, and that Defendant and his 
counsel understood that. See R332 (citing both R150 and R364:4,10). 
Following argument, the trial court denied the defense motions in a 
three-page "Ruling and Order." R339-341 (Addendum F); see also R366 
(Addendum E). The trial court found that Defendant voluntarily pleaded 
guilty to forcible sexual abuse. R339. In support, the trial court cited 
Defendant's signed Statement, which confirmed "that his plea was 
voluntary." Id. The trial court found that defense counsel also signed the 
Statement, thereby "confirming that the Defendant had read or was read 
and understood [its] contents," and "that the confirmations by the 
Defendant in the Statement were h·ue." Id. The trial court also quoted the 
paragraph in the Statement that explained the plea agreement: 
All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea agreement, 
if any, are fully contained in this state1nent, including those 
explained below: In exchange for the Defendant's plea of 
guilty the prosecution agrees that in the event the victim does not 
affirmatively insist upon the prosecutor seeking a prison commitment 
that the prosecutor will recommend probation and no prison. 
R339 ( quoting R150) ( emphasis added). 
The trial court also found that the prosecutor had earlier "represented 
to Defendant that, as of the thne of the initial intake, [M.C.'s] impression 
was that she would not seek prison time." R340. But the trial court further 
found that the prosecutor told the defense at the plea hearing that he had 
-9-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"not communicated" with M.C. since intake, and that his recommendation 
was '" simply that we would honor the victim's wishes."' Id. The trial court 
found that M.C. made her wishes known at the initial sentencing hearing, 
where she asked the judge to sentence Defendant to prison. Id. 
Based on the above, the trial court expressly rejected that the 
prosecutor had "made a material misrepresentation" that induced 
Defendant to plead guilty. Id. The trial court instead found that the record 
supported only that the prosecutor had represented that, when he spoke 
with M.C. during intake, "she was not seeking prison time," and that there 
was "no evidence that these representations were conh·ary to what the 
prosecutor knew to be true." Id. The trial court thus disagreed that the 
prosecutor's statement amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, or that the 
prosecutor made any intentional, or material misrepresentation of M.C.' s 
wishes in order to induce Defendant to plead guilty. Id. 
For essentially the same reasons, the trial court rejected Defendant's 
argument that his guilty plea was rendered unknowing and involuntary by 
the alleged 1nisrepresentation. Id. The trial court again found that the 
prosecutor made no statements or "misrepresentations, unfulfilled, or 
unfulfillable promises." Id. Rather, the prosecutor explained that M.C. 
"initially did not appear to want the Defendant to go to prison," but that his 
-10-
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recommendation was "contingent on whatever [M.C.] wanted" at 
sentencing. R340-41. The trial court also emphasized that defense counsel 
had "represented" at the plea hearing that Defendant "knew" that the trial 
court "was not bound by the recommendation of the prosecution." R341. 
As further support for its finding of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, 
the trial court found that Defendant had alleged no violation of rule 11 in 
the taking of his guilty plea. Id. 
Defendant moved to clarify the trial court's written ruling. R348-350 
(Addendum G). Defendant argued that there was no support for the trial 
court's "apparent factual determinations" - that the State had made no 
intentional or material misrepresentation about M.C.' s wishes-where the 
State presented no "affidavit, transcript, recording, or other evidence as to 
any prior statements" M.C. "made to the police." R349. The trial court 
denied the motion. See R367:4 (Addendum H). 
The trial court then imposed the statutory prison term: "[T]his is 
unacceptable conduct, and the victim in this case has suffered and will 
continue to suffer a great deal. So, sir, you are before me on a second-
degree felony, and for that you will be sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
for 1 to 15 years." R367:12; see also R356-57 (Addendum H). Defendant filed 
a timely notice of appeal. R358-59. 
-11-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant seeks reversal of the denial of his motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor intentionally misled him 
about M.C.'s wishes on his serving prison time before they reached a plea 
agreement, and that he relied on the prosecutor's initial representation that 
M.C. did not want him to serve prison time when he accepted the plea. 
Defendant argues that the alleged intentional misrepresentation constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct in violation of his right to due process and also 
rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. Defendant also challenges 
the trial court's finding that there was no evidence that the prosecutor 
intentionally misled the defense on the ground that the State presented no 
contradictory evidence. 
All of Defendant's arguments fail. It is undisputed that Defendant 
knew and understood before he entered his guilty plea that the prosecutor 
no longer knew what M.C.'s sentencing wishes would be and that his 
recommendation for no prison was thus contingent on what M.C. would 
say at sentencing. It necessarily follows that M.C.' s initial wishes were not 
mate~ial to the plea agreement. Defendant, therefore, cannot show that any 
1?-1isrepresentation-intentional or not-induced him to enter his plea, let 
alone rendered ~is plea unknowing or involuntary. And, in any event, 
-12-
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Defendant has not shown clear error in the trial court's finding that the 
prosecutor did not intentionally misrepresent M.C.'s wishes. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WHERE IT 
IS UNCONTROVERTED THAT DEFENDANT KNEW AND 
UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PROSECUTOR'S 
RECOMMENDATION OF NO PRISON TIME WAS 
CONTINGENT ON THE VICTIM'S WISHES AT 
SENTENCING 
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor fraudulently induced his guilty 
plea by intentionally misrepresenting M.C.' s pre-plea sentencing wishes. 
Aplt.Br.22-27. He argues that this rendered his plea unknowing and 
involuntary. Id. at 27-33. Defendant begins by challenging the trial court's 
finding that nothing showed that the prosecutor intentionally 
misrepresented M.C.' s initial sentencing wishes. Id. at 20-22. He then 
asserts that but for the alleged misrepresentation, he would not have 
pleaded guilty. Id. at 25-27. Defendant thus argues that the trial court 
-13-
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abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his plea. Id. at 
2-3.2 
Whether or not the prosecutor intentionally misrepresented M.C.'s 
pre-plea sentencing wishes, Defendant cannot prevail because M.C.'s initial 
wishes were not material to the plea agreement. The prosecutor's 
sentencing recommendation was expressly conditioned on M.C.'s wishes at 
sentencing, not on anything she had said to the prosecutor before the plea 
agreement. The record shows that Defendant knew and understood that 
when he pleaded guilty. Defendant, therefore, cannot show that any 
misrepresentation-intentional or not-induced him to enter his plea, let 
alone rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. And, in any event, he 
has not shown clear error in the trial court's finding that the prosecutor did 
not intentionally misrepresent M.C.'s pre-plea wishes. 
2Defendant' s brief has three points. In the first, he challenges the trial 
court's- finding that the prosecutor did not intentionally misrepresent the 
victim's pre-plea wishes. Aplt.Br.20-22. In the second, he contends that the 
prosecutor fraudulently induced his plea, thereby committing prosecutorial 
misconduct in violation of due process. Aplt.Br.22-27. In the third, he 
argues that the prosecutor's alleged misrepresentation rendered his plea 
unknowing and involuntary. Aplt.Br.27-33. Although Defendant couches 
his Points II and III in different terminology, they are really the same 
argument: that the prosecutor's alleged misrepresentation induced him to 
plead guilty and that if he had known M.C.' s true pre-plea wishes, he never 
would have accepteq. the plea deal. This brief will therefore answer both 
points in a single argu1nentbelow. 
-14-
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A. Because the prosecutor's pre-plea representation of the 
victim's sentencing wishes were not material, Defendant 
cannot show that his plea was fraudulently induced or 
unknowing and involuntary. 
A defendant may not withdraw his guilty plea unless it was 
unknowing and involuntary. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6; see also State v. 
Alexander, 2012 UT 27, iJ29, 279 P.3d 371 (plea withdrawal statute "requires 
that, to withdraw a guilty plea, defendant must show that their pleas were 
'not knowingly and voluntarily made'") (quoting section 77-13-6(2)(a)). "A 
plea is not knowing and voluntary when the defendant 'does not 
understand the nature of the constihltional protections that he is waiving, or 
because he has such an incomplete understanding of the charges that his 
plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt."' Alexander, 2012 UT 
27, iJ29 (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645n.13 (1976)). 
Defendant essentially argues that the prosecutor's alleged intentional 
misrepresentation fraudulently induced his plea and that this rendered his 
plea unknowing and involuntary. 
While not controlling, contract principles may be useful in assessing 
whether a guilty plea was knowingly made. See State v. Gladney, 951 P.2d 
247, 248 (Utah App. 1998) ("'Contract analysis has some application to plea 
agreements."). To making a fraudulent inducement claim under contract 
principles, Defendant must show two things: show: (1) that he relied on the 
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prosecutor's pre-plea representation that M.C. did not want him to go to 
prison; and (2) that his reliance on the pre-plea representation was 
reasonable. See Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc.) v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 
P.2d 1274, 1278-79 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting claim of fraudulent 
inducement where appellants did not reasonably rely on Otsuka's 
misrepresentations); Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah App. 1993) 
(rejecting claim of fraudulent inducement absent proof of reasonable 
reliance). 
Because the record here shows that M.C.'s initial sentencing wishes 
were not material to the plea agreement, Defendant cannot show that he 
relied on the prosecutor's representation about them- let alone reasonably 
so-in pleading guilty. First, Defendant always knew that the plea 
agreement had nothing to do with the victim's initially-expressed 
sentencing views, but everything to do with what she would express at 
sentencing. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor expressly stated that his 
recommendation for no prison was wholly contingent on M.C.'s future 
wishes at sentencing because he had not talked to her since the initial intake 
and he was uncertain what her wishes would be by that time. See R364:3,8. 
Indeed, the condition itself made it clear that the prosecutor was unsure 
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what M.C.'s sentencing position was and that he was making no promises 
about what it would be by the time of sentencing. Id. 
The conditional nature of the prosecutor's recommendation was also 
clearly set out in the Defendant's Statement-signed by both Defendant and 
his counsel. See RlS0,152. Added to that, the trial court confirmed that 
Defendant understood that the prosecutor's recommendation was not 
binding on the court. R364:8-9. Finally, both Long's and Defendant's 
affidavits in support of the motion to withdraw the plea reiterated their 
understanding that the prosecutor's recommendation was contingent on 
M.C.'s wishes at sentencing. See R250-51;R271. 
Thus, Defendant unquestionably knew that any sentencing 
recommendation was conditioned only on what the victim would say at 
sentencing and not on anything she might have said to the prosecutor 
earlier. Defendant also knew that regardless of what M.C.' s wishes were at 
the initial intake, the prosecutor was unsure if she would retain those 
wishes at sentencing. By agreeing to the conditional recommendation, 
Defendant assumed the risk that M.C.'s wishes could differ from what the 
prosecutor initially said they were. Thus, Defendant could not have relied 
on the prosecutor's representation of M.C.'s initial wishes in deciding to 
plead guilty. 
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But even if Defendant had relied on the prosecutor's representation, 
any reliance was umeasonable. See Otsuka, 937 P.2d at 1279 (rejecting claim 
of reasonable reliance where appellants' "obviously knew Otsuka could not 
timely deliver an Otsuka MRI machine" before signing "amended lease 
agreement"); Despain, 855 P.2d at 257 (rejecting ex-wife's claim that she 
reasonably relied on ex-husband's representations before signing quit claim 
deed where evidence supported trial court's finding that her reliance was 
umeasonable). On this record, the most that Defendant could hope for was 
that the prosecutor's impression of M.C.'s wishes when he spoke with her at 
intake would re1nain consistent with her wishes when she appeared at the 
sentencing hearing. 3 
3To the extent that Defendant cites Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963) and progeny to support his prosecutorial misconduct allegation, his 
reliance is unavailing. Brady recognizes a due process violation when the 
prosecution suppresses favorable material evidence to induce a plea. See, 
e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2nd Cir. 1998) ("The 
defendant is entitled to make [ the decision to plead guilty] with full 
awareness of favorable material evidence known to the government."). But 
Defendant does not claim that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory 
evidence to induce his plea. See Aplt.Br.20-33. He claims at most that the 
prosecutor intentionally misrepresented the victim's pre-plea sentencing 
wishes. But, as stated, those earlier wishes were not a term of the plea 
agreement-only her unknown future wishes at sentencing were. Thus, 
Brady is inapposite. 
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Finally, even if Defendant could show that his reliance on the 
prosecutor's representation was reasonable, he ca1mot show that it rendered 
the plea unknowing and involuntary because, again, M.C.'s pre-plea 
sentencing wishes were not a term of the plea agreement, let alone a 
material term. As explained, the prosecutor expressly conditioned any 
sentencing recommendation on M.C.' s wishes at sentencing. The 
prosecutor made it clear that he did not know what those wishes would be, 
which is why he made his recommendation conditional. And, as explained, 
Defendant understood the condition. 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), is 
unavailing for the same reason. In Copeland, the record was unclear as to 
"what recomn1endation the State promised to make." Id. at 1274. The Utah 
Supreme Court thus vacated Copeland's sentence and remanded to the trial 
court to "determine the exact recornmenda tion promised by the State, 
defendant's understanding of that promise, and whether the State fulfilled 
its promise." Id. at 1276. But here- as the trial court found- there is no 
ambiguity about the conditional nature of the prosecutor's sentencing 
recommendation, Defendant's knowledge and understanding of it, and the 
prosecutor's fulfillment of his promise. See R340-41 (finding "prosecution's 
reco1nmendation remained consistently contingent on whatever the victim 
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wanted," "Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea," and 
defense counsel "represented to the Court that his client knew the Court 
was not bound by the recommendation"). 
In short, because the plea was not conditioned on M.C.' s initial 
sentencing wishes as represented by the prosecutor, any misrepresentation 
as to those wishes could not be material to the plea agreement. Defendant 
therefore has not shown that any n1isrepresentation-intentional or not-
either induced him to enter his plea or otherwise rendered his plea 
unknowing or involuntary. 
B. Defendant shows no clear error in the lTial court's findings 
that any misrepresentation of the victim's initial sentencing 
wishes was unintentional. 
Defendant's arguments also fail because he hasn't shown that the 
prosecutor intentionally misrepresented M.C.' s initial sentencing wishes. 
Indeed, the trial court specifically found that the prosecutor did not 
intentionally misrepresent "the nature" of M.C.'s "wishes" before the plea 
hearing: 
R340. 
Rather, the prosecutor represented that, at the time he spoke 
with [M.C.], she was not seeking prison time. There is no 
evidence that these representations were contrary to what the 
prosecutor knew to be true. 
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Defendant challenges these findings because-according to him-
uncontroverted defense evidence shows that M.C. "always desired a prison 
incarceration for" Defendant. Aplt.Br.21. Defendant asks this Court to 
remand for additional findings or for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the 
alleged conflict. Aplt. Br.22. Remand is not warranted because - as 
explained- the prosecutor's alleged misrepresentation was not material to 
the parties' plea agreement. It is also not warranted because Defendant has 
not shown any clear error in the trial court's findings. 
Again, the prosecutor's recommendation was expressly contingent 
only on what M.C.'s wishes would be at sentencing and Defendant 
understood as much. See R364:3,8; R150;R250-51; R271. The condition itself 
signaled to the defense that the prosecutor did not in fact purport to know 
the victim's wishes and that those wishes could very well end up being 
prison time. If the prosecutor had truly intended to mislead the defense 
about M.C.' s wishes to induce a guilty plea, it made no sense for him to 
condition his recommendation for no prison time on M.C.'s then unknown 
wishes at sentencing. See id. 
And while Defendant proffered a transcript of a telephone exchange . 
between a defense investigator and M.C. suggesting that M.C. told the 
prosecutor she wanted Defendant to go to prison, Defendant presented no 
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direct evidence that the prosecutor deliberately misled the defense about 
M.C.' s wishes. At most, M.C.' s statements in the telephone transcript 
suggest that the prosecutor merely misunderstood her priorities when he 
spoke with her at intake. See R262-265. For example, M.C. denied telling 
the prosecutor that she did not want Defendant to go to prison, but she 
acknowledged that she told the prosecutor that the most important thing to 
her was that Defendant be required to register as a sex offender: "I didn't 
say that I did not want him to go prison, I said, 'Well, it's more important to 
me that he's on the sexual offenders list.' That was like-I said that I 
wanted him to serve prison time, but the most important thing to me was 
that I wanted him to go on the sexual offenders list." R263-64. 
Given that M.C.' s biggest concern was that Defendant register as a 
sex offender, it is understandable that the prosecutor focused on that 
con~ern. See R364:3,8. But, again, the prosecutor's condition alone makes 
clear that the prosecutor was making no representations as to what M.C.'s 
wishes would be at sentencing. The transcript thus fails to establish clear 
error in the trial court's finding that the prosecutor did not intentionally 
mislead the defense about M.C.'s wishes. See Steinberg v. Community 
Housing Services-Capitol Villa, Ltd., 2014 UT App 102, iflO, 326 P.3d 673 
(recognizing "existence of conflicting evidence does not give rise to clear 
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error as long as evidence supports the trial court's decision" ( quotation and 
citation omitted)). Because Defendant has not shown clear error in the trial 
court's finding, his claim fails for this reason as well. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on January 26, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Ass stant Attorney General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Slectror.ically recorded on January 5, 2015) 
THS COURT: All right, so we're ready, then, on the 
State of Utah vs. Robert Magness --
MR. ?ARSONS: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: -- case No. 131903746. Could I have 
appearances, please. 
MR. PARSONS: Yes, ma'am. William Parsons and Larry 
Long together with Robert Magness. 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. 
MR. MAY: Thaddeus May on behalf of the State. 
THE COURT: All right, and my understanding was that we 
were going to have a little bit m~re --
MR. MAY: We were going to take evidence, your Honor, 
and we did have witnesses that were prepared to do so. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, however there's been a 
change in plans? 
MR. PARSONS: Well, there's been a plea offer made in 
the meantime, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PARSONS: We have negotiated at length, and we have 
reached a resolution. 
THE COURT: All righc, then. So are you prepared, then, 
to proceed on that today? 
MR. MAY: We are, your Honor. The only aspect of the 
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resolution that's not technically prepared is the State does 
not have an Amended Information. We will e-file that. We can 
proceed by interlineation. The proposed resolution is that 
he's presently charged with rape. We will be pleading to a 
which is a first-degree felony. He will be pleading guilty 
6 to a forcible sexual abuse under 76-5-404, which is a second-
7 degree felony. 
8 THE COURT: All right. 
9 MR. MAY: The State will file within 48 hours that 
















of the elements of the crime. 
THE COURT: All right, is this done with the alleged 
victim's 
MR. MAY: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MAY: She's been contacted twice by the State since 
the offer of this, since we've discussed (inaudible) the case. 
She's made no response to my attempts to get to her. Her phone 
does not work. When we met initially during the intake, her 
very first impression of the case was actually she was not 
seeking prison at the time and was fairly amenable to resolving 
the case, and not had any prior (inaudible). Since that time 
has not communicated with the State at all, although we've made 
multiple attempts to contacc her. 
MR. PARSON: I think the factual statement will clarify 
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that to some degree, your Honor. I would represent that --
MR. MAY: H€:r wishes are not being cut out of this 
resolution. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. PARSONS: I would represent that the victim and the 
perpetrator in this case were so drunk that neither of them 
knew what was going on or the context. 
THE COURT: I apologize, my computer is being extremely 
slow. Thank you. So was there a preliminary hearing or was 
there a waiver? 
MR. MAY: It was a waiver, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Then anything else 
you wish to put on the record, then? 
MR. MAY: We will as a part of this when we state the 
actual resolution, I believe. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, then, so Mr. Magness, you 
have a plea form there that you've reviewed with your attorney? 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you have any question about those rights 
that you're giving up by going forward today? 
MR. MAGNESS: No. 
THE COURT: If you'd just step forward to make sure 
that you're on the record, sir. Thank you. 
MR. l'-'.1AGNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Thank you. You understand that you're 
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MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that you're entitled to 
go to trial in front of impartial jurors? 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You understand that it's the State's burden 
to prove all the elements of the charge against you and that 
you don't need to prove anything? 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You also understand that you can make 
witnesses come forward, you can put on evidence, and you can 
testify yourself in your defense? 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, so you're giving up those rights 
among others by going forward today? 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, and you understand that what's 
been represented is that you be pleading guilty to a second-
degree felony? 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You understand that a second-degree felony 
~ould result in 1 to 15 years at the Utah State Prison, in 
addition to fines and surcharges? 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is restitution an issue as well? 
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MR. MAY: Your Honor, I don't know that there would be 
a large amount, if it's an issue. I think that there could be 
counseling costs, but I don't know for a fact. That is just 
out there. 
THE COURT: All right, but you under --
MR. MAY: It is not part of this resolution. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PARSONS: There is nothing in the record that would 
indicate at this particular point. 
MR. MAY: Right. 
THE COURT: All right, but you understand, sir, that if 
there is a claim for restitution, that that would be something 
that you would be responsible for as well? 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, are you thinking clearly today? 
MR. MAGNESS: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: You have to answer with a "yes" or a "no," 
sir. 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of anything 
that might impair your ability to make a good decision? 
MR. MP..GNSSS: No. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that when you enter a 
plea like chis it really limits your ability to make any sort 
of appeal? 
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MR. MAGNESS: (No verbal response). 
MR. ?ARSONS: Answer affirmacively. 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, do you have any questions before 
we proceed? 
MR. MAGNESS: No. 
THE COURT: All right, could I have a factual basis, 
please. 
MR. MAY: Yes, your Honor, on April 12t~, 2012 in Salt 
Lake County the defendant did touch the breast, genitals area 
of the victim, MC, and did so without her consent. He also did 
so with intent to gratify his sexual desire. I believe that 
establishes the elements. At the time the victim was over 14 
years 0f age. 
MR. PARSONS: That is what we have so indicated in the 










THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Magness, you 
heard the description of what occurred. It is that an accurate 
description as to what occurred? 
MR. MAGNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, then, sir, to the charge of 
forcible sexual abuse as a second-degree felony, how do you 
plead? 
MR. MAGNESS: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Court finds that you're knowingly and 
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voluntarily entering into the plea, and you can go ahead and 
sign that plea form. 
(Defendant signing document) 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. ?ARSONS: Your Honor, may we make a statement on 
the record relative to the basis for the agreement? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
~R. PARSONS: Yes, it is anticipated, your Honor, 
that in exchange for this guilty plea, that as the prosecution 
has heretofore indicated to the Court that unless the victim 
affirmatively requests a commitment of prison for the defend-
ant's behavior, that the prosecution in this matter will recom-
mend no prison time, and will recommend probation in some form. 
MR. MAY: That is correct, your Honor. Our recommend-
ation is simply that we would honor the victim's wishes. If 
the victim were asking for a prison sentence, we're not bound 
to not recommend prison. If the victim is not seeking a prison 
sentence, we will not go beyond her request. That recommend-
ation, however, does not bind the State in any way as to jail, 
that it would be see~ing in event, regardless of (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. PARSONS: We recognize the same. Thank you. 
THE COURT: You also recognize that the Court's not 
bound by any such recommendation as well? 
MR. PARSONS: That is correct, and so -- we have so 
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explained to our client. 
THE COURT: All right, and so do you anticipate, then 
a pre-sentence report? 
MR. PARSONS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, and does your client, then, 
waive the maximu~ time for sentencing? 
MR. PARSONS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, so we'll have AP&P do a pre-
sentence report. Remind me, then, as Mr. Magness is out on 
do we --
MR. PARSONS: He's out of jail. 
THE COURT: Okay, he's out on bond, right? 
MR. PARSONS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right, so, Mr. Magness, so you're 
waiving the maximum time, because the next sentencing date we 
have -- would you anticipate a special set or you don't 
MR. MAY: No, your Honor, I don't believe so. 
MR. PARSONS: I don't believe so, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right, so March 2~ at 9 a.m.? 
MR. PARSONS: May we just check, Judge, please? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. PARSONS: Judge, that should work just fine. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: Okay, so March 2~ at 9 a.m., but in the 
meantime, sir, you'll need to get down to AP&? to get a pre-
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1 
2 
sentence report. So you'll -- and it's a two-step process. 
Basically you down and you pick up your packet and you make 
3 an appointment for a followup. So you'll need to get to AP&P 
4 probably not today, but if not today, tomorrow, to pick up 
5 your packet to begin that process, all right? So that's your 








MR. MAGNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right, any questions about what we 
expect from you in the meantime? 
MR. MP..GNESS: No. 
THS COURT: All right, so you make sure you take care 
13 of thac with AP&P, and then we'll see everyone here on March 2~ 
14 at 9 a.m. 
15 MR. PARSONS: Thank you very much, your Honor. 










MR. MAY: Thank you. 
MR. PARSONS: May we be excused, Judge. 
MR. MAY: Yeah, may we briefly approach, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
(Discussion at the bench off the record) 
THE COURT: Okay, fine. Thank you. 
MR. PARSONS: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right, we will see you, then, in March. 
(Eearing concluded) 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
ss. 
I, Wendy Haws, a Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my direction 
from the transmitter records made of these proceedings. 
That I have been authorized by Beverly Lowe to prepare said 
transcript, as an independent contractor working·under her 
license as a certified court reporter appropriately authorized 
under Utah statutes. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and contains 
all of the evidence and all matters to which the same related 
which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the outcome 
thereof. 
That certain purties were not identified ir1 the record, and 
therefore, the name associated with the statement may not be 
the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 21 st day of May 2015. 
My commission expires: 
January 12, 2016 
Wendy Haw~ CCT 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
Signed: 
Beverly '1.,owe, CCR/CCT 
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If l have waived my lights to counsel, I certify that r have read this statement and · 
· that l understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which lam 
(j pleading guilty (or no ~nfest). l also understand my rights in this case and other cases 
and the consequences of my guilty (or no contest) pfea(s). 
If I have not waived my li~ht to counsel, my attorney is L • LO ...J "j 4-,J i'J Wi'."'\ , ~:, 0 <:fi 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statemen~ my rights, and the consequences 
~ of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) .. 
Jury Trial: f know that I have a right to a speedy and public 1rial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I y.,ill be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses: I know that if I were to 
have a trial 1 a) I wourd have the right to see and observe the witnesses who tesfified 
. --. . ags-Jns.tJll.~ ~!Jg-:. t>l.11J.Lc!!"tQf!.l~Y1 p~mY.self _if.I._Y!r:~<=:<111:J._ri.g.Jlt to c:!!:!_?~p_meyl w~uld • 
have the opportunax to cross-exam me aU of the wimesses who tesfified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses: f know that if f were to have a trial, J could call 
witnesses if f chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the 
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If r could not afford to pay for the ~ 
witn~ses to appe~, the State wouJd pay thos·e costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination: I know that ff [ were 
to have· a trial, J would have the right to testify on my own behalf_ l also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against 
myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could 
not hold my refusal to testify against me~ · . 
Presumpf;ion of innocence and burden of proof: I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest)1 I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of 
the charged crime(s). If f. choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead Rnot 
guilty, R and my case will be set fur a iriaL At a biaJ. the State would have the burden of 
proving each element C?f the charges(s) beyond a reasonable doubt If th£? trial is before 
a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror woufd have to find me 
guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption· of 
innocence and will be admitting ihat I commrf:fed the crime{s) stated above. 
Appeal: I know that under the Utah Constitution, if 1 were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford 
the costs of an appeal, the state would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am 
giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I pfead guilty (or no contest). I understand 
that if I wish to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal wtthin 30 days after 
my sentern;;e is entered. 
. . .. 
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I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up 
all the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.. · 
Consequences of Enfering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties: I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for 
each crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). 1 know that by pleading guilty 
(or no contest) to a crime that canies a mand~ory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to 
ser.ving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison 
· . term, fine, or both.... . 
I know that in addition to a fine, an ninety percent (90%} surcharge wiJI be 
imposed_ I also know that I may be ordered to make resfif:ution to anyvictim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restif:ufion that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as 
part of a_ pJt?.a .?!Qr~~nt 
Consecutive/concurrent prison tenns: I know that ifihere is more than one 
crime involved. the sentenpes may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or 
they may run at the same fime (concurrently). I know that I may be.charged an 
additional fine_ for each crime that I plead to. l also know that if I am on probation or 
pa·ro[e, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or 
which I have plead guilty ( or no contesf)1 my guilty ( or no contest) plea(s) now may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now 
pf ea ding guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the Jaw requires 
the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court 'finds and states on the 
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea agreement My guilty {or no contest) p[ea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result 
of a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. Alf the promisesl 
duties and provisions of the plea agreement if any, are fully contained in this 
statement, incf uding those explained below: · 
H $. r..1-A.--'7 C H •"-- ::b::-s- .J) e=-~ b ~..,.. S" f I~ () ;::. ~ {:':, k 
J 
.o~'S~-\:.orJ tf?=j~f ~ ~,...i i--€ ~t:.=-, ~ v)-~ ;-,'-.:- ~€ s 
t 
N D T A-FF4,2..1'--tA::h'-v e ( 1 .' ~s·;-.;, T V f O J ~ f "--OS~ 4TJ '1--- :F'F-(? k.~ e,._ 
r~ ~ 0 t'"' lQ ,-..A..-": !±~-, ~~ f"-tl ~ ~ ~ t,.U~ '\. ,"¼ C() J\-.. ~"'];, 
tk\) J, ,z;-:c:, ~J µ ;;, . ::E f .._ "$ 0 ,J • 
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.. · 
Trial judge not bound: l know that a·ny charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the 
charges for sentenclng, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting 
attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me 
as to what they believe fue judge may do are not bfnding on 1he judge. · 
rmmigrafion/Deporf:ation: I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, 
my plea(s) today may. or even will, subject me to deportation under United States 
immigration laws and regulations, or otherwise adversely affect my immigration stafus
1 
which may include permanentJy baning my re-entry into the United States_ I 
understand that ff I have questions about the effect of my plea on my immigration 
status, l shoufd consult with an immigration attorney . 
. , 
. . . 
Defendant's Certification ofVoiuntariness 
~- - ... -
I am entering this plea of my own free wiII and choice. No force. threats or 
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest)_ 
No promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me .. 
I have read this statemen~ or l have had It read to me by my attorney, and i 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this statement but I do not wish to make 
any changes because all of the statements are correct 
I am satisfied with-advice and assjsfance of my attorney. 
/~ . I am J .) years of age. I have attended school through the / '2.. grade. I can 
rea:d and understand the English language. lf I do not undersiand English, an 
interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead 
guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants 
which impair my judgment 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable 
of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of 
any mental disease, defect. 9r impairment that would prevent me from understanding 
what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
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I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty ( or no contest) plea(s}, I 
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced .. 
I understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea 
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest I will 
only be allowed to withdraw my pfec:J if I show that it was not Imowingiy and · ··· 
volunf:i:!rily made.. I undersfand that any challenge to my plea{s) made after 
sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in litre 78, 
Chapter 35a,. and Rule 65C of :the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure_ 
Dated this .S: day of_.:f:_A,;J..=-.., ____ • 20 IS: 
oit'o"fks~[foRE ~ 
,:- ... 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that ( am the attorney for f?o b f9..., MA:=} tvt;; Sf" • the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it 
to him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understarfds 
the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent To the best of 
my knowledge and belief. after an appropriate investigation. the elements of the 
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly 
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
ATTORNEYFQRDEFENDANT 
Bar No .. "2-S-3 '>-
Cerfificafe of Prosecuting Attorney 
[ certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
(<I> h ~ V'-t, .-.J ~ f , defendant. [ have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and 
find that the factual oasis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the 
offense(s) is true and correct No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to 
encourage a plea has been offered to defendant The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on 
fue record before fhe Court There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence 
would SUP.port the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the p[ea{s) is/are 
ente~ and that the acceptance of fhe plea(s) would serve the public interest 
~~ 
'='"pR::-o=-s:::-=E::=--C"""""'.'.Zl~~:-:-'.-:'~---:-O-RN-~-~~=====-00152 
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Order 
Based on the facts set forth in tile foregoing Statement and the cerfffications of 
the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court 
witnesses the"signatures and finds the de~ndanfs guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are _ 
freely, knowingly, and vofunfarify made. 
IT JS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to 
the crime(s} set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this ! day of _ ___,a.J_~ ____ _. 
10/10 felony plea- cd 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
NOTICE 
Case No: 131903746 FS 
- ---- ROBERT- MORGAN-MAGNESSr-----
Defendant. 
--------- --:--- Judge: ----ELIZABETH A HRUBY-MILLS--
PRESENT 
Clerk: susanp 
Prosecutor: MAY, THADDEUS J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s); LARRY N LONG 
Date: 
WILLIAM B PARSONS III 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 2, 1959 
Sheriff Office#: 92630 
Audio 
Tape Number: CR W35 Tape Count: 3:53-4:02 
CHARGES 
1. FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/05/2015 Guilty 
Defendant waives the reading of the Information. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
January s, 2015 
The Judge orders Adult Probation and Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence report. 
Change of Plea Note 
Defendant pled guilty to Count 1 as charged in the Amended Information. 
The defendant is advised that this offense may be used as an enhancement to the 
penalties for a subsequent offense. 
Counsel represent to the Court that a resolution has been reached. The State agrees 
that they will not recommend a prison sentence if the victim is not requesting prison. 
The State also represents to the Court that the victim is aware of the resolution 
and in agreement. 
Printed: 01/06/15 14:14:02 
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Case No: 131903746 Date: Jan OS, 2015 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/02/2015 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: THIRD FLOOR - W35 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: _ELIZABETH _ _A_ HRUBY.-MILL$ _________ _ 
Date: 
B ELIZABETH A HR 
y ' . 
ST .ti"." P ~J.~&OLAtJ 
Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative aids and 
services) should call Third District Court-Salt Lake at (801)238-7500 three days prior 
to the hearing. For TTY service call Utah Relay at B00-346-4128. The general 
information phone number is (801)238-7300. 
Printed: 01/06/15 14:14:02 
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SIM GILL, Bar No. 6389 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
THADDEUS MAY, Bar No. 11317 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (385) 468-7600 
-·-1N THETHIRD.DISTRICTCOURT~-sALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, ST ATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS 
DOB: 08/02/1959, 
AKA: 
4290 W PASKAY DR 






Screened by: THADDEUS MAY 




Case No. 131903 746 
The undersigned Deputy District Attorney upon a written declaration states on 
information and belief that the defendant, ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, committed the 
crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1 
FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE, 76-5-404 UCA, Second Degree Felony, as follows: That on or 
about April 12, 2012 at 4290 West Paskay Drive, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant did, \Vhere the victim was 14 years of age or older, touch the anus, buttocks, or any 
part of the genitals of another, or touch the breasts of a female, or otherwise took indecent 
liberties with the actor or another, with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any 
person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desires of any person, without the consent 
of the other, regardless of the sex of any participant. 
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
D HAMILTON, J AVERETT, SHANTEL BILLINGS, M.C., A COWAN, MORGAN 
MAGNESS, P PLESE, M SILLER, 
DECLARATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE: 
·--··· --- ·----------·Your Declarantbases~this Information-upon-the-following:---------~-------------·-----------·---------------- - ----- --• 
The statement of M.C. that on April 12, 20 I 2, she was asleep at 4290 West Paskay Drive, Salt 
Lake County. M.C. states that she went to sleep with her friend in a bed downstairs. M.C. states 
that when she woke up her friend's father, defendant ROBERT M. MAGNESS, had his penis 
inside her vagina. M.C. states that she jumped up and told the defendant to get away from her. 
The statement of West Valley Police Officer D. Hamilton that he an-ived at the above address 
and spoke to the defendant. The defendant states that he only touched M.C. on the shoulder. 
The statement of Pilar Shortsleeve, a Chief Forensic Scientist with the State of Utah Crime 
Laboratory, that she was able to complete a DNA analysis on evidence collected from M.C. 's 
Code Rexam. Seminal fluid located on the anal/perianal swabs matched the DNA profile for the 
defendant. 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
SIM GILL, District Attorney 
Isl Thaddeus May 
Deputy District Attorney 
5th day of January, 2015 
KRH /DAO# 13007593 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-705 
(2008) I declare under criminal penalty of the State 
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the 
best of my belief and knowledge. 
Executed on: 1/5/15 
---~-------
Isl Thaddeus Mav 
Declarant 
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IN THE THIRD JUD:CIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
~ ---- ORIGINAL 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, 
D~fendant. 







JUN - f 2015 
l'ALT!.AK~~y 
Sentencing Hearing !J;-_____ ~f.-..~Vh--.,..,_J... 
Electronically Recorded en '-C)C•l9'trr;C~ 
March 2, 2015 
BEFORE: THE HONORP.BLE ELI ZABE:TH A.. HRi.J3Y-MILLS 
Third Dist=ict Court Judge 
Fer :he State: 
.n.?PEARANCSS 
Thaddeus J. May 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
111 East Broadway, Suite 40C 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (385) 468-7600 
For the Defendant: William B. Parsons III 
Lar:ry N. Long 
1 Lakeview 
Stansbury Park, Utah 84074 
Telephone: {801)466-6311 
Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT 
1771 South Califo=nia Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
'.:'el e p ho r: e : ~ S O l i 3 77 - 2 9 27 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on March 2, 2015) 
(The inaudible portions in this tra~script are due to 
the inferior quality of recording provided.) 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
MR. PARSONS: Good ~orning, Judge. No. 61, Magness, 
M-a-g-n-e-s-s. 
THE COURT: ~hank you. 
MR. MAY: Thaddeus May on behalf of the State. 
THE COURT: All right, so this is case No. 131903746. 
MR. ?ARSONS: Hay I approach, your Honor. 
THE COIJRT: Certainly. 
MR. ?ARSONS: Well, I'll just give it to the bailiff, 
dccume~ts for the Cour~. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Are these things that the Seate 
has been provided? 
MR. PARSONS: Yes, I spoke to Thaddeus this morning, 
and he's received elec:ronic copy. 
MR. MAY: It was e-filed yesterday. 
MR. PARSONS: Yeah, we only filed them yesterday. We 
just go~ the report. 
T~E COUR!: Oh, in fact, last night; is that correct? 
MR. PARSONS: Yeah, that's right, Judg~. 
THE COURT: All right, so it's a motion to continue and 
:hen a defense based sen:encing report, it looks like? 
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MR. PARSONS: That's right. Motion to continue, your 
Honor, if I may. It is b~sed upon the fact that we're entitled 
by statute to ~hree days-- three business days, having received 
the AP&P report three business days prior to today's hearing, 
we did not. We haven't had the opportunity of, accordingly, 
addressing all of the issues contained therein. There are some 
material issues assoc~ated wi:h the report, AP&P's report that 
I would need to address. 
I am also asking for an evidentiary hearing for 
sentencing purposes, and we have submitted a Utah sentencing 
alternatives defense base report which we would very much like 
co hav~ the Court read before the Co~rt considers sentencing. 
Accordingly, for those reasons we would ask that we continue 
this ~atter fer a s~or: term. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. May? 
MR. MAY: I don't know about the delay i~ the reception 
of the pre-sentence report, your Honor. I'm not certain what 
it shows. It was filed in the Court's docket. (Inaudible) the 
State has reviewed can't really a~swer that response, 
not knowing. 
The other request by the defense the State would 
object to, we've had plenty of time to prepare for today's 
proceedings. The is here. I can't understand what if 
anything would it prcfit this to be filed on a Sunday, the day 
before sencencing, provided (inaudible) notice for the or the 
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State. We have (inaudible) statement. 
This case is already an old one. If there are errors 
or alleged factual discrepancies in this report, defense 
Counsel can clearly state them. They can be considered on 
~he record at present. The sentencing, Judge, is (inaudible) 
sentencing based on the reasonable, reliable and relevant 
information. That should be the governing standard for your 
Honor co consider. 
The AP&P report is not a mandatory document. There 
~as been no defense -- no defects or deficiencies cited. I 
don' L kno,-.: the point of the hearing other than to dr-ag out 
:his process f~rther. 
MR. PP.R.SONS: Has nothing to do with dragging it cut, 
your Honor. A short term co~tinua~=e for p~rpcses of being 
able to allow the Court to review the sentencing alternatives 
-chat we have 
THE COURT: Why did I just get that last night? 
MR. PARSONS: You just got it last night, Judge, because 
we only received the -- Wednesday night is when the AP&P report 
came ~o us. We're entitled to (inaudible). We're entitled. 
THE COURT: All right, so this is just in response to 
the pre-sentence report? 
MR. PARSONS: Yes. Yes, your Honor. 
THE COU~T: It's nc•t an independent recommendation? 
MR. PARSONS: Yes, your Honor, and in accordance with 
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that, so is our motioc to continue the sentencing. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure -- wait, so was 
MR. PARS0!-1S: (Inaudible) short: term why you just 
received che motion also, the short term. The limited amount 
of time we've had since we received the AP&P report is why you 
just received the motion as well. 
THE COURT: I see, thank you. 
MR. PARSONS: I only received it from the co-Co~nsel. 
It didn't even come to me. : never (inaudible). I'm the one 
who would have tried the case. The nature of the -- again, the 
na~ure of the charge is sufficiently severe that the defendant 
is entitled to all of the due process {inaudible}. Thst's all 
we're asking. 
MR. MAY: Your Honor, I know the question the State 
has, and I did not check the docket this morning, but when 
does the do8ket show that that pre-sentence report was filed? 
It's not whether -- when Mr. Parsons received the report as a 
co-Counsel. It's whe~ the document has been filed. 
THE COURT: We have it ha~i~g been fi:ed on the 25:h of 
February. 
MR. MAY: Which is the 
correc:, T~esday of last week? 
COURT CLERK: Wednesday. 
THS COCRT: Wednesday. 
it's Tuesday, is that 
MR. !?ARSONS: I: i: was (ina'Jdible) ---
-5-
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MR. MAY: Wednesday, Th~rsday, Friday. 
MR. PARSOKS: No, Friday, Saturday. Thursday and 
Friday. You do not count the beginning. You count the day 
THE COURT: Okay, I'm going to allow the concinuance so 
I can review that. However, if the if the wishes to speak 
today, if she wants to come back, that's fine, too; but I'm 
willing to hear from ttat to avoid any inconvenience to her. 
MR. MAY: Your ~oner, I believe she does wish co address 
the Court today; is that correct? 
MC: Yes. 
MR. MAY: She has made the trouble of coming, too, so--
THE COURT: Okay, well, let's go ahead with allowing 
her to speak at this time. 
MR. PARSONS: Ne problem. Then we should set the date 
at this tiIT'.e? 
THE CO~RT: ~e can do ~nat. How about we have you back 
on -- and you asked for an evidentiary hearing; is that --
MR. PARSONS: Yes, I would like to be able to present 
witnesses. 
THE COURT: All right, so you're asking for a special 
setting? 
MR. PARSONS: Yes. 
THE COURT: How long do you anticipate needing for that? 
MR. PARSONS: An hour arid a half. 
!/:R. 1-:AY: Your Hono:-, I ,;uess the State has sorr.e 
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inquiry as to what this evidentiary hear~ng (inaudible). It's 
a novel approach, in che State's mind. I'm not understandi~g 
why there's the necessity. The~e's no error noted so far in 
the pre-sentence report. 
?HE COURT: So ~ow what witnesses would you antici-
pate cal.ling? 
MR. PARSONS: I'm going to call the private investigator 
that worked in our behalf. I'm going co call Dr. Mahea who 
prepared the report concerni~g the defendant's behavior. Those 
are a minimum, as well as the defendant and perhaps his son. 
MR. MAY: I guess, your Honor, the State .,,ould simply 
remind the Court none of the above is required, and all of the 
above included in the defense case (inaudible) report that sits 
on ycur Honor's d~sk !i~audible). 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. We can have you back 
on :-1arch 16t• at 1: 30. 
MR. PARSONS: That's grea~, Judge. 
MR. MAY: Your iicr.or-, the State -- the S'tate' s prosecu-
:or is being ~eassigned that date, and I don't want my replace-
ment to walk completely blind into this matter. If we can come 
back in two weeks so t~at he can be brought ~p :o speed a~d be 
prepared (inaudible). I'm being reassigned to the West Jordan 
and I don't believe I can be here for that. 
THE COURT: All right, so come back when? 
MR. MAY: If we could come back a week from then, at 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
least, so that Mr. Flater, who's going co be my replacement 
in the Special 's Unit will be able to be brought up to speed 
3 on this !;latter. 
4 MR. PARSONS: We' re accc:,mmodating, We don't have any 





















THE COURT: No. Is that what you're asking for? 
MR. MAY: I think that or two -- I said one or two 
weeks. Thac's one week, but that's -- either way. 
THE COURT: Would it -- two weeks would be the 16 th • 
That's the date I gave. ~ 
MR. !.(AY: Two weeks from tr.e 16tr,_ So the 16-::i is the 
date that the State 
THE COURT: Oh, I see. I gotcha. That would be the 
first day of :he change. 
MR. MAY: Right. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. PARSONS: The 30tt is fine, Judge. That's what he--
THE COURT: Well, I was working on my calendar, which 
had c1. v a .i . .l ab i l i t y on the a f t er noon o f the 1 6 u: • 
MR. ?ARSONS: Sure. 
COURT CLERK: We can do it at 3: 30 on th,2: 30 th • 
THE: COURT: Sc 3: 30 on March 3Qtt,. 
MR. ?ARSONS: That also is fine, Judge. 
MR. MAY: Just so the Statg understands what to expect 
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on that date, we anticipate the :aking o! evidence frore defense 
witnesses in addition ~o the actual sentencing, or is the State 
going to take -- or is the Court going to take evidence and 
sentence it at a later dace? 
THE COURT: I anticipate going forward with sentencing 
on that dace. 
MR. ?ARSONS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, then. So -- but we'll hear from 
the witness now? 
MR. MAY: Correct. 
TEE COURT: All right, thank you. Okay. All right, so 
Mr. Magness, if you would step over her~, please. 
MC: I don't ~now how appropriate this is ~ow, since I 
was expecting him to be sen:enced, bu: I'1c just going to --
THE COURT: You're welcome to come back on that date 
as well. I just don't want ycu to be inconvenienced. 
MC: I just want to say what I have to say and then 
lenve. 
ru~ COURT: Okay. 
MC: Robert, you have hurt me in such a de~p way, I 
wonder if you can even comprehend what you have done. I want to 
know why ycu did this to me. I have done nothing to you. You 
took something precious to me, DY piece of mind, and a piece 
of my spiri~, and I wa~t i: back. It ~as not yours to take. 
Along wi~h your Fenis, you put ~ear, discrust, pain 
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and a hollowness inside of me, and I am here to give it -- to 
retu=n it to you. I d0~'t know what happe~ed in yo~r life or 
what makes you thin~ you have the right to do this to somebody, 
but you do not. It seems you have lost your decency and human-
ity at some point, and perhaps you should spend the rest o! 
your life locking inside of the uglin~ss you've created and 
figuring o~t how to re~ove it so you are not destroying the 
lives of other people. 
As far as what I believe should be dealt to you, I 
am asking the Judge to sentence you two-and-a-half years in 
prison, the same sentence you've dealt me, t~e prison I've been 
in waiting fer this to be over. I also want you to be on the 
sexual offenders list, so there's a possibility a girl might 
see it and think twice about being in a vulnerable position 
in your presence, even if it is under the pretense of partying 
with your 20-something-year-old son. 
Even though I have not seen you in over two years, 
you have still been a presence in my life. After this, you 
are not. I hope you never do this again; and if so, may karma 
and the universe have its way with you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. All right, with chat, then, we 
have our new date, and I will see you :hen. Thank you. 
MR. MAY: Thank you, Judge. 
MR. PARSONS: Thank yo~, your Ho~or. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 




I, Wendy Haws, a Notary Public in and for the State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my direction 
from the transmitter records made of th8se proceedings. 
That I have been a~thorized by Beverly Lowe to prepare said 
transcript, as an independent contractor work~ng under her 
license as a certified court reporter appropriately authorized 
under Utah statutes. 
That :his transcript is full, true, correct, and contains 
all of the evidence and all matters to which the same related 
which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the outcome 
th'=reof. 
That certai:-l parties were not identified in the record, and 
therefore, the name associated wich the statement may not be 
the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 21s: day of May 2015. 
My commission expires: 
January 12, 2016 
tfondy Ha~ CCT 
NOTARY ?:.JBLIC 
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LARRY LONG (# 1989) 
L. LONG LA WYER, INC. 
341 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 322-4666 
E-mail: llong@l lon!.!lawver.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, 
MOTION FOR LEA VE TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
AND STAY SENTENCING 
PROCEEDINGS 
CASE No. 131903746 
JUDGE: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, by and through his 
counsel of record, Larry Long, and pursuant to Utah Code§ 77-13-6(2), hereby respectfully 
requests leave of the Court to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charge of forcible sexual abuse, 
under Utah Code§ 76-5-404, a second degree felony, as entered on January 5, 2015. The 
Defendant requests 30 days to prepare and file a Memorandum of Law and Authorities in 
1 
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support of this Motion. The Defendant needs this time because one of his material witnesses 
required to substantiate the facts surrounding the basis for this Motion is out of the country. 
The Defendant further requests that this Motion serve as a basis to stay the sentencing 
hearing currently scheduled for March 30, 2015, at 3:30 PM. 
BASIS FOR MOTION 
The Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the charges in this case after lengthy negotiations 
under which the Defendant and his legal counsel were assured that the alleged victim would not 
ask the Court to sentence the Defendant to prison. This was a critical element of the negotiations 
and the basis for why he agreed to the plea bargain. However, after the Defendant entered his 
plea of guilty in this case, the alleged victim personally appeared and beseeched this Court to 
sentence the Defendant to prison. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-l 3-6(2)(a) provides that "[a] plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn [ifJ ... it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." The Defendant will provide 
evidence in his forthcoming Memorandum of Law and Authorities that will show that his plea 
was not knowingly or voluntarily made because he was unduly and unlawfully misled into 
accepting the plea agreement. Accordingly, the Defendant respectfully asks that sentencing in 
this case be stayed until this matter can be fully briefed and the Court has an opportunity to rule 
on this Motion. The Defendant anticipates that he can complete and file the Memorandum of 
Law and Authorities within 30 days from the date of filing of this Motion. 
2 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day ofMarch, 2015. 
Isl Larry Long 
Larry Long for 
L. LONG LA WYER, INC. 
Attorney for Defendant 
3 
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713 
CRAIG S. COOK, PC 
3 645 East Cascade Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Phone: (801) 485-8123 
E-mail: kiskaa@att.net 
Attorney for Defendant 
TN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COtJRT 
IN A ND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ST ATE OF UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
l.'.il ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED IvlOTION FOR 
LEA VE TO WITH.ORA W GUILTY 
PLEA, REINSTATE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING, AND REINSTATE ALL 
PRIOR FILED MOTIONS AND 
REQUESTS 
Case No. 131903746 
Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS 
COfvIES NO\V the defendant Robert Morgan Magness by and through his 
attorneys Craig S. Cook, Larry Long, and William Parsons III and respectfully 
¼lb request leave of the Court to withdraw his guilty plea to the charge of forcible 
sexual abuse (Utah Code Section 76-5-404) as entered on January 5, 2015. In 
addition'j Defendant requests that this Court reinstate a preliminary hearing to give 
Defendant the opportunity Lo cross-examine vvitnesses and to evaluate the evidence 
of the prosecution. Finally~ Defendant requests that all prior motions and requests 
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made by defense counsel prior to the entry of the guilty plea be reinstated and ruled 
upon by this Court. 
Defendant bases these requests upon Section 77--13-6(2) U.C.A. and upon 
the United States and Utah Constitutions as to due process oflaw and all other 
applicable rights of trial by jury. 
The legal and factual basis for these requests is contained in the 
accompanying Memorandum and Affidavits. 
In the alternative, Defendant is willing to withdraw these motions in the 
event the Court elects to impose probation with or without jail time. 
DATED this 10th day of April 2015. 
S/Craig S. Cook 
CRAIG S. COOK 
Attorney for Defendant 
Notice has been served upon counsel of record in the above-listed case by 
electronic notification in accordance with U.S.C.P. S(BIAi). 
Isl Craig S. Cook 
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713 
CRAIG S. COOK, PC 
3645 East Cascade \Vay 
Salt Lake City: Utah 84109 
Phone: (801) 485-8123 
E-mail: kiskan(matt.net 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P]aintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA, REINSTATE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING, AND REINSTATE ALL 
PRIOR FILED MOTIONS AND 
REQUESTS 
Case No. l 31903 746 
Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS 
COivfES NOW the defendant Robert Morgan yfagness by and through his attorneys 
Craig S. Cook~ I .an-y Long, and William B. Parsons, JI] and submits the following memorandum 
in suppoti of the contemporaneously filed motions. 
ST A TEl'vfENT OF FACTS 
The following Statement of Pacts is based upon the Affidavits of Shawn Kane} Larry 
Long, and Robert Morgan tvfagncss that are attached herein. In addition, Defendant bas attached 
the transcriptions of a hearing held on January 5, 2015 and March 2~ 2015. 
Defendanl was charged with first-degree rape resulting from an incident that occu1Ted at 
his residenee on Apri I 12) 2012. The complainant was employed at a local bar and was 
acquainted vvith the defendant and his son. She along \;vith defendant's 8011 and nvo other 
vi individuals went tn Defendant's residence in the early morning hours to party. They consumed a 
1 
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large quantity of hard liquor and other forms of alcohol. It was during her overnight stay at his 
residence that the alleged rape occurred. 
Defendant retained attomey La11y Long to represent him in this matter. Mr. Long 
evaluated the csse and concluded that Defendant had a valid defense concerning the consent of 
the complainant and the fact that all parties were totally intoxicated lo a high level even when the 
police arrived. Mr. Long planned to use the preliminary hearing to extensively examine the 
complainant ancl the other pa11icipants as to all the facts and circumstances of that morning 
including their consumption of alcohol and sexual activity. 
On June 6, 2013 the matter was set for a preliminary hearing. Prior to the hearing, 
however, Mr. Tad May, the Deputy District Attomey, met with the complainant and her 
girlfriend. Afterwards~ Mr. May approached Mr. Long and Defendant and expressly told them 
that lhe complainant did not want Defendant to go to prison. Mr. May said that perhaps a plea 
agreement could be reached in the future. 
From Mr. Long's vast experience as a criminal defense attorney, he informed the 
defendant that it would now be unwise to conduct a preliminary hearing to cross examine the 
complainant ba~ed upon her statement that she did not want Defendant to serve time in the 
prison. Mr. I ,ong informed the defendant that should he examine her it would be highly probable 
that she ,:vould change her attitude and become hostile against him and would seek prison 
incarcei-ation. Upon this advise, Defendant elected to waive his preliminary hearing. 
Becau~e no plea bargain had been offered to \-Ir. Long, he immediate]y began to 
undertake a defense of the defendant by arranging to have William Brad Parsons III join the 
defense term, and by filing various motions and requests. He sought and received an order to 
turn over all DNA and clotJJing for independent examination and sought a motion to suppress 
2 
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some of the stalements made by the defendant to the an·csting officer on the basis that the 
defendant had not been properly Mirandized. Additiona1 motions and requests \\'ere made that 
\.Vere all opposed by the Distdct Attorney's Office. 
Mr. Long also-employed private·investigator Shavv·n Kane to assist him and Mr. Parsons 
in preparation for trial. In January of 2014 Mr. Kane telephoned the complainant and 
interviewed her as to her version of what had occurred that morning. She told Mr. Kane that she 
was surprised that the questions were being asked since it was her understanding that the 
defendant had already entered a guilty plea and that she would only have to testify as to his 
sentencing hearing. Mr. Kane advised her to speak with the prosecutor to clarify the status of the 
case. He did not inquire as to her feelings for Defendant's punishment. 
Nearly a year later on January 5, 2015 an evidentiary heating was scheduled as to all of 
the pi-ior dcfem:c motions and 1·equests. Mr. Parsons and l'vfr. Long met with Mr. May 
immediately prior to the hearing to discuss a potential plea bargain. At that time Mr. May stated 
he \vould agree to reduce the charges from a first-degree rape to a second degree forcible sexual 
abuse charge. He once again emphasized that the complainant did not want the defendant to go 
to prison and that he would even recommend no prison time to the court tmless she affirmatively 
insisted for a prison commitment. 
Accordingly, the defendant executed a "Statement of Defendant in Suppo1i of Guilty Plea 
and Certificate of Counsel". He impliedly \Vithdrew the score of motions that were the subject 
matter of the original hearing. 
During a dialogue between thjs Court and counsel the following conversation occm1·ed: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MAY: 
All right, and is this done with the alleged victim's-
Correct. She's been contacted twice by the state since lhe offers, 
since \.Ve:ve discussed resolving the case, she:s made no response 
3 
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to my attempts to get response, her phone did not work. \Vhen we 
met initially during the intake, her very first impression of the case 
was, actua]ly~ she was not seeking prison at the time and was fairly 
amenable to resolving the case. And I had (unintelligible) prior. 
Since that time~ she has not communicated with the state at all 
although we made multiple attempts to contact her. 
And l think the factual statement wHJ. chu-ify that to some degree, 
Your Honor, I would represent that-
Her wishes are not being cut out of this resolution 
1 would represent that the victim and the perpetrator in this case 
were so drunk that neither of them knew what was going on in the 
context. (pp. 4-5, Tr. of Jan. 5, 2015). 
At the end of the proceeding, the following statements were made: 
:V!R. PARSONS: 
iVfR. \1.A Y: 
As it is anticipated, Your Honor, that in exchange for this guilty 
plea, that is Mr.-the prosecution has heretofore indicated to the 
Court that unless the victim affirmatively requests a commitment 
of prison for tJ1e defendanfs behavior, that the prosecutor in 
prosecution in this matter will recommend no prison time and wil1 
recommend probation of some form. 
Thar s correct Your Honor. Our recommendation is simply that 
we would honor the victim's wishes. Jf t11e victim were asking for 
a prison sentence! we~re not bom1d to not recommend prison and 
the victim is not seeking a prison sentence. That's not her request. 
That recommendation, however, does not bind the state in any way 
as to jail, that would be speaking in any event regardless of the 
recommendation. (Id at pp. 10-11 ). 
Mr. Long and Mr, Parsons advised the defcndanl lo accept the plea bargain on the basis 
that it gave him a highly probable chance of being placed on probation and serving only county 
jail time instead of a much longer prison sentence. They informed the defendant that because the 
complainant was not hostile and did not seek his prison incarceration that it was highly probable 
that the APP would also recommend probation in conjunction with the recommendation of the 
District Attorney. They further informed him that the Court would likely take inlo account his 
4 
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complete absence of any sexual criminal history of a ~imilar nature and would favorably view 
the complainant's request to not send him to prison. 
ln preparation for senlencing, the defendant cooperated with APP, which was preparing a 
report for this Court. In addition, he participated with a private company called Utah Sentencing 
Alternatives in order to give this Corn1 the defense perspective of a sentence recommendation. 
In addition, the defendant was regularly attending sex therapy sessions relating to sexual 
aggression and was refraining from the use of alcohol or other substances. 
/\PP sent its recommendations to this Court and to Mr. Long on Februa1y 25~ 2015. To 
Mr. Long's and Mr. Parsons~ complete surprise APP recommended imprisonment. Mos1 
surplising, however, was the victim impact statement. The report stated: 
MC $laid she has been dealing ,:vith the consequences of this crime now for three 
yea.rs and feels it is appropriate the defendant be required to feel and understand the same 
coi1sequences in the form of incarceration. She feels it is appropriate for the defendant to 
serve at least two years in prison for what he has done so he can also feel the real 
consequences of his actions as she has the past three years. MC said she plans to be 
pl'esent at sentencing and would like to address the Court if allowed to do so. 
The APP repo11 was the first indication to the defense team that the complainant was 
seeking a prison term contrary to the representations made hy the Deputy District Attorney. 
Accordingly, the defense requested that the sentencing be delayed because the defense team 
received the repo1t late and it needed additional time to evaluate what to do in light of this 
devastating rccnmrncndation. 
On ~vfarch 1: 2015 Mr. Kane easily contacted the complainant at the same number that he 
had talked to her previously~ some fifteen months prior. This was in sharp contrast to the claims 
of iV1r. May that she was unreachable. She informed him that she always wanted a prison term 
for the defendant and also wanted to make sul'C tha.l he ,:vould be on a sex offender list. She stated 
that 1v'lr. \fay was aware of her desire when she last met with him. She expressed great hostility 
5 
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toward the defendant contrary to the picture painted by the Deputy District Attorney tlu·oughout 
the prosecmion pedod. See telephone transcript attached to Shawn Kane Affidavit. 
On Ivfarch 2, 2015, the date originally set for the sentencing, this Court granted a 
continuation in order to aflow the defense team to evaluate the APP report. The complainant was 
present in the courtroom and asked to speak. A p01tion of her statement was as follows: 
As far as what I believe should be done to you, I'm asking the judge to sentence 
you two-and-a-half years in prison, the same sentence you've dealt me. A prison I've 
been in, waiting for this to be over. 1 also want you to be on the sexual offender list. (p. 
12, Tr. March 2, 2015). 
Thus, the intent of the defense team and the defendant of entering into t11e plea bargain 
was completely overridden by the revelation that the complainant was in fact very hostile and 
vindictive against the defendant and sought a prison term for him in complete contradiction to 
the reprcsenL1tio11s made by the Deputy Distlict Attorney during the span of the prosecution. The 
complainant, instead of being an asset to defendant as antjcipated from the representations of the 
Deputy District Atto111ey, was instead, a tl'emendous liability who significantly influenced the 
APP recommendation, foreclosed any recommendation by the District Attorney for a probation 
recommendation under the plea agreement, and presented herself to the court in a very emotional 
and adverse manner. 
Bosed upon the material misrepresentation as to the complainant~s prison desires towru·d 
defendant, the present :'vfotions are made. 
ARGUivlENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OF THE DEJlUTY 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN MIS.RE.PRESENTING THE 
DESIRES OF THE COMPLAINANT VIOLATED 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND CAUSE.D 
HilVI TO FOREGO HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL nv JURY. 
6 
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The 1,;tah Supreme Court in Utah v. Hay1 859 P.2cl 1 (Utah 1993) enunciated the duty of a 
prosecutor to provide informalion to the defense. The Court stated: 
The prosecution :s responsibility is that of a "minister of justice and not simply 
that of an advocate, • which includes a duty "to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice and that gui]t is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. n A 
criminal ttial is more than a contest between the prosecution and the defense; it is a 
search for the truth. 
ln Berger v, United States~ 295 U.S. 78 (1935) Justice Sutherland explained prosecutorial 
misconduct to niean :(overstepping the bounds of that propriety and faimess which should 
characterize tlic conduct of such an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense." 
In the instant case, the Deputy District Attorney Mr. i\fay either intentionally 
misrepresented the desires of the complainant as to punishment for the defendant or was grossly 
negligent in failing to ascertain her real feelings. This misrepresentation caused the defendant to 
waive his right to a preliminary hearing because he did not want to alienate what seemed to be a 
forgiving complainant. As such, therefore, he gave up his constitutional right to cross-examine 
the complainant and to cha1le11ge tht! sufficiency of the evidence in the criminal prosecution. 
"The prosecutor has a special duty not to mislead; the government should, of course, 
never mnke affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be the truth." United States v. 
Univer.<.ita, 298 F.2d 3 65 (2d Cir. 1961 ). The government cannol properly, either explicitly or 
implicitly mischaractcrize information that it has. A prosecutor cannot make knowing tL~c of 
false evidence by misrepresenting the nature of non-testimonial evidence. 1\Jiller v. Pare, 386 
U.S. t ( 1967). 
The continued misrepresentation of the desires of the complainant induced Defendant to 
later give up his right to a jury tiial and to enter a pica bast:d on the false assurnption that the 
complainant would be favorable to him by not seeking a prison term. This po.sitive attitude 
7 
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would be reflected in the APP report, the recommendation of the prosecutor, and any testimony 
before the sentencing court. "When specific guarantees of the Oill of Rights are involved, the 
Supreme Court has taken special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way 
impermissibly infringes upon them. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). 
It is well settled that the "Brady Doctrine" provides that suppression by the prosecution 
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 
material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady v. 1vfa,y/and, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The 
prosecution's violation of Brady can render a dcfendanfs guilty plea involuntruy. United States 
v. Wright. 43 F.Jd 491 ~ 496 ( 10111 Cir. 1994). "In the context of an attack on the validity of a 
pica, evidence i8 considered material \.\:here there is a reasonable probability but for the failure t.o 
produce such in formation the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have 
insisted on going to trial." U11;1ed Slates v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998). This same 
ptinciplc is applicable here. 
fn the instant case the prosecutor made several representations lo induce the defendant to 
give up his right to a jury trial. First, the chargeable offense \:\'as reduced from a first degree 
offense to a second degree offense; second, the prosecutor agreed to recommend no ptison time 
provided the complainant did not "affinnatively insist on the prosecution seeking a p1ison 
commitmenf'; third, the prosecutor affirmatively stated that the complainant did not desire 
Defendnnt to serve a prison sentence and that her wishes \Vere in compliance v,:ith the plea 
agreement. 
Al3 stated in the filed Affidavits, this plea agreement was most]y attractive because by 
reducing the offense from a first to a second degree, it gave the defendanl the opportunity to 
eliminate any prison sentence. However: this could only occur if the complainant was 
8 
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cooperative and did not demand prison incarceration pursuant to the victim rights statutes. The 
defense attorneys knew that if this occum:d the defendant would have a high probability of 
probation (with county jail time required) because a non-vindictive complainant wou1d 
significantly influence the APP report, the recommendation of the prosecutor: and the sentencing 
court. 
As evidenced by the Affidnvits, jf the prosecutor merely offered to reduce the charge 
from a first to a second, the defense team may not have accepted it. \\1hile the range of years is 
certainly rnuch greater for a first than a second, the estimated time used by the Board of Pardons 
for this pmiicular offense would be approximately the same under either charge. It was only the 
inducement of knowing tl1at the complainant did not seek prison time that caused the defendant 
to give up his constitutiona1 rights including a trial hy jury. 
The prosecutorial misconduct by the prosecutor in misrepresenting and misleading the 
defendant deprived him of due process and made his guilty plea invo1untary. Therefore, under 
constitutional law Defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea, for a reinstatement of the 
preliminary hearing, and a reinstatement of all of the motions and other matters that were 
pending prior lo the entry of the guilty plea. Thi~ ruling will allow the defendant to be restored 
to his position before the Deputy District Attorney made the misrepresentations and to prepare 
for a trial by jury. Utah v. Gent1:1,,, 797 P.2d 456 (1990). 
POINT ll 
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRA \V 
HIS GUILTY PLEA UNDER SECTION 77-13-6(2)(A) U.C.A. SINCE 
THR RECORD SHOWS THAT THE PLRA \VAS NOT 
KN0,1/INGLY OR VOJ .. UNTAJULY MADE. 
9 
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Section 77-13·6 lJ.C.A. states: ,:A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon leave of the comi and a showing that it ,;,,,1as not knowingly and voluntarily mac.le." 
Defendant 111aintains that under the circumstances of this case his guilty plea \\1as not "voluntarf' 
under controlling case law. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) extensively 
dealt wilh the "voluntariness of a plea." The Courl cited a U.S. Supreme Com1 case that stated: 
A. plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including 
the actual value of any commitments made to them by the court, prosecuto1', or his own 
counsel. must stand w1less induced by threat (or promises to discontinue improper 
harassment): misrepresentation. including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises, or 
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to 
the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribe). Brady v. United States, 397, 742 ( l 970). 
(Emphasis added). 
The Court then cited a Federal 4th Circuit case in \Vhich the defendant was told he could 
receive a prison sentence of 90 years--- when in fact the maximum sentence was 55 years. 
Defendant pleaded guilty so as to receive no more than a 25~year sentence. The 4th Circuit "held 
this misinformation vitiated the voluntariness of the plea because Lhe benefit of the defendant's 
bargain had been grossly exaggerated. The defendant was therefore not aware of the true value 
of the state's agreement.', Hammondv. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975), 765 P.2d at 
1278. 
In Cop<!land, the defendant was promised by the prosecutor to be placed in a sex 
offender program at the Utah State Hospital rather than prison incarceration. Based upon that 
reptesentation defendant pied guilty. However, the sentencing judge had no power at that time 
to commit him [O the hospital rather than the prison. The Coutt concluded that the promise was 
illusory and permitted the defendant to withdraw his guilt plea. 
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In State v. Norris, 57 P.3d 238 (Utah App. 2002) the trial court and the prosecutor 
promised the defendant that he could pursue a clairn for vindictive prosecution on appeal, but 
neither the court nor the prosecutor could fulfill that promise since the trial judge never entered a 
final order disposing of the defendant's vindictive prosecution claim and thus it could not be 
raised on appeal. The Comt of Appeals held that because the defendanfs "pleas were not made 
voluntarily with full knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty, the defe11dant must be 
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea." 57 P.3d at 240. 
The initial misrepresentation caused Defendant to waive his right lo a pre1iminary hearing 
whjch wa~ critical to his defense if the complainant was hostile and desired blood. Later:- in 
exchange for Defendant waiving his right to trial by ju11', the prosecutor agreed Lo reduce the 
charge by one degree. The handwritten statcm.cnt under the category "Plea Agreement'~ added 
an additional incentive: "ln exchange for the defendanf s plea of guilty the prosecution agrees 
that in the event the victim does nol affirmatively insist upon the prosecution seeking a prison 
commitment then the prosecution will recommend probation and no prison." 
At the time the plea agreement was entered into the prosecutor had misrepresented that 
the compla111ant did not want Defendant to serve a prison sentence. It was therefore presumed 
by Defendant and his counsel that only in the unlikely event that complainant changed her mind 
wot1ld the prosecution not recommend probation and no prison term. In fa.ct, hO\-vever, the 
condition was completely meaningless since the complainant at that very moment \Vas insisting 
upon prison for the clefondant. The plea agreement~ therefore, was illusionary and while 
defendant nnd his counsel believed there was a high probability that the prosecu1or would honor 
Lhis promise. in fact. there was next to no probability based upon the complainanfs strong desire 
to punish Defendant by prison incarceration at the very moment the document was signed. 
11 
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In addif ion, the prosecutor's misrepresentation of Lhe complainant's desires not only 
affected the recommendations of the prosecutor but would also affected the APP report and 
possibly this Court when the complainant spoke so forcefully on March 2, 2015 demanding that 
Defendant be sent to prison. These repeated misrepresentations throughout the course of the 
prosecution created a false belief that probation was achievable if the defendant agreed to give 
up his right to a jury trial nnd plead guilty to the second-degree offense. Once again, this belief 
was also illusionary since the ship had already sailed, the bell had already rung, and the email 
had already been sent. dooming the probabWty of probation while al the same time eliminating 
Defendant's constitutional rights under our jmy trial system. 
It is clear that Mr. May either intentionally misrepresented the complainant's position, or 
was grossly neg) igent in making the representations because he had no idea what the 
complainant actually \vanted. Critically: the defendant had no means of !mowing what the 
alleged victim wanted and therefore had to fully rely upon Mr. May's representations in deciding 
\Vhether or not lo enter the guilty plea. 
Thus~ the critc1ia for Section 77-l3-6(2)(A) have been folly satisfied and Defendant is 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea and to proceed to llial. 
POINT III 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS COURT JN ITS DISCRETION 
CHOOSES TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT TO PROBATION, 
WITH OR 'WITHOUT JAIL TIME, DEFENDAl~T 'WILL \VITHDRA W 
HIS 1\:fOTIONS AND ACCEPT THE PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENT. 
Rule 11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any recommendation as to 
sentencing is not binding upon the corn1. (h)(2). It is well established that a court is not bound 
by any recommendations from any source but has complete discretion to sentence a defendant in 
accordance with the applicable statute. Slate v. TJwrsron, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1989). See also 
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State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992~ 995 (Utah 1978)("aftcr conviction, the penalty to be imposed is an 
entirely separate proposition to be detcnnincd by the court as a matter of law.") 
Defendant's counsel would urge this Court t.o closely examine the facts and 
circumstances of this case as wel1 as the sentencing recommendations from both the APP and the 
Utah Sentencing Alternatives. Counsel also would submit tha.t the latter has correctly evaluated 
the conduct of the defendant in light of the many factors used Lo determine a fair and proper 
sentence. 
Here! the defendant has no prior history of sexual assault but docs have a long history of 
alcohol and substance pro bl ems. It is undisputed that all of the participants in the pa·rt), at his 
house were heavily intoxicated throughout the moming and up until the police officers anived. 
The defendant did not seek the companionship of the complainant but ,:vas merely 
residing in his home when the group decided t.o come over lo continue their partying. There was 
no premeditation on his part to\vard t.he complainant and, if anithing, this could be tem1ed a 
crime of spur of the moment opportunity rather than premeditation. There was no violence on 
Defendant's pa1t against the complainant. In fact, the only violence was directed at him when 
complainant hit him in his glasses. 
The defendant has voluntarily submitted himscl f to sex offender treatment with Dr. Juan 
Mqjia. He has demonstrated a record of sobriety spanning thirty months and has agreed not to 
nse or possess alcohnl or to frequent establi~hments where alcohol is the primary item for sale. 
Defense counsel submits that Mr. ivlngness is an appropriate candidate for probation with 
or withnu1 nddit.ional county jail time imposed regardless of the recommendations of APP and 
the desire of the complaintant. 
13 
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fn the event this Court chooses to sentence Defendant to probation rather than to a prison 
sentence. Defondant will withdraw all present motions attacking the guilty plea and prosecutorial 
misconduct and will willingly comply with all requirements imposed by this Com1. 
CONCLUSTON 
Based upon the preceding arguments and authoiities, Defendant asks this Court to grant 
the relief requested. 
DJ\ TED this 10th day of April, 2005. 
s/Crai g S. Cook 
Craig S. Cook 
Attorney for Defendant 
Notice has been served upon counsel ofrecord in the above-listed case by electronic 
notification in accordance with lJ.S.C.P. S(B I Ai). 
/s/ Craig S. Cook 
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713 
4W CRAIG S. COOK, PC 
3645 East Cascade Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Phone: (801) 485-8123 
E-mail: k i ~k~:i~1(ii''Jit.n '-'1 
Attorney for Def end ant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




vs. Case No. 131903746 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Being duly sworn and under penalty of law the declarant hereby declares 
and states as follows: 
I. I am over 18 years of age and attest to the veracity of the statements 
~ made herein. 
1 
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2. I am a licensed Utah attorney and have been practicing for over 45 years. 
I have undertaken the defense of numerous defendants who have been accused of 
similar offenses as claimed in the instant case. 
3. I was first contacted by defendant Robert Morgan Magness in April of 
2013 and asked to enter an appearance to defend him in this prosecution for 
violation of Section 76-5-402 U.C.A. first degree felony rape. I entered my 
appearance on April 22, 2013. 
4. My preliminary investigation revealed that the complainant in this case 
together with a friend, the son of Defendant, and another male had been drinking 
and partying at a bar in which the complainant worked. After the bar closed, the 
four decided to go to Defendant's home to continue to drink and party. 
5. Upon arriving at Defendant's residence all of the participants including 
Defendant continued to drink and party throughout the early morning hours. 
6. During the late morning around 9:00 a.m. the alleged sexual assault 
occurred against the complainant. When officers arrived at the residence they 
noted that the complainant, her female friend, and the defendant were all 
intoxicated in various degrees. 
7. Based upon this investigation I determined that Defendant had a 
legitimate defense as to whether or not the complainant had consented to sexual 
2 
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intercourse or whether Defendant believed she had consented in light of both of 
their impaired conditions. 
8. A preliminary hearing was scheduled for June 6, 20 I 3. It was my 
intention at this hearing to thoroughly probe the complainant as to her memory and 
to her consumption of alcohol during the evening. I also intended to thoroughly 
cross-examine the complainant as to her sexual relations on the morning in 
question with Defendant's son prior to his going to work that morning. Finally, I 
intended to question the complainant's girlfriend as to her recollection of all events 
and the state of mind of the complainant during the timeline that the rape allegedly 
occurred. 
9. On the date of the preliminary hearing-June 6, 2013, I observed Tad 
May, the Deputy District Attorney assigned to this case, consulting with the 
complainant and a female companion. 
10. Mr. May then left the two females and approached me to discuss the 
case. He specifically told me that the complainant informed him that she did not 
want the defendant to go to prison. 
11. In my experience, this was a significant revelation. I have found that 
when the complainant or alleged victim to a sexual assault desires no prison tim.e 
for the a1leged perpetrator that a much better result will occur with the defendant 
than if the complainant seeks maximum punishment and retribution. 
3 
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12. From my experience I have found that a complainant who is not 
vindictive will greatly assist a defendant in a sentencing proceeding since the 
prosecuting attorney and the APP representative will give a much more favorable 
recommendation towards reduced punishment or parole. In addition, I have 
observed that a complainant who is not vindictive v"ill also influence a sentencing 
judge to impose a much less severe sentence. 
13. On the other hand, I have observed throughout my career that a 
vindictive and determined complainant who seeks maximum punishment towards 
an alleged perpetrator will almost always increase the sentence and punishment 
that an alleged perpetrator receives upon conviction or upon pleading guilty. This 
is especially true with the current victim advocacy law and representation. 
14. Upon hearing this revelation that the complainant did not seek a prison 
tern1 against Defendant I completely abandoned my desire for a preliminary 
hearing. My experience has taught me that if a complainant is favorable to my 
client then it is very harmful for me to put that witness on the stand and cross 
examine her as to very personal and sensitive issues. Such cross-examination will 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15. I discussed this new information with my client and advised him that the 
preliminary hearing should be waived. He agreed and I informed the court that we 
would waive the preliminary hearing in the matter. 
16. Mr. May stated that a plea bargain to a reduced charge may be possible 
in the future but that he was not prepared to do so at the time. 
1 7. Since no plea agreement had been reached I believed that it was 
necessary to prudently continue in the defense of Defendant as to matters that did 
not directly affect the complainant and her attitude toward Defendant. I requested 
the court, for example, to order discovery of the DNA evidence including clothing 
of the alleged victim in order to allow my experts to verify the conclusions of the 
State lab. On December 16, 2013 the Court entered an Order granting discovery of 
DNA and clothing evidence. 
18. In order to continue the defense of my client I employed private 
investigator Shawn Kane to assist me in preparation for our defense. On January 
10, 2014 Mr. Kane telephoned the complainant and spoke with her concerning her 
version of the events which occurred that night. I informed Mr. Kane to be very 
gentle with the complainant and to only try to obtain her version of the facts in 
case it was necessary to go to trial. Mr. Kane gave me a summary of her state111ent 
including her version of the facts relating to consent. He informed me that the 
complainant believed that the case had been settled with Defendant taking a guilty 
5 
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plea based on her conversation with Mr. May during the prior preliminary hearing 
date. tvfr. Kane informed me that he told her that she should gel in touch with the 
prosecutor to clarify the status of the case since he was not at liberty to discuss it. 
Finally, he reported to me that the complainant expressed no anger or 
vindictiveness against Defendant in her conversation but did not mention, one way 
or the other, what punishment he should receive. 
1 9. Since no plea agreement had been reached or discussed with Mr. May, I 
retained Mr. \1/ilUam B. Parsons, III to assist me in any forthcoming trial in the 
matter. It was my intention to thoroughly protect the interests of Defendant in case 
it was necessary to go to trial but I was hopeful that the matter could be settled in 
I ight of the attitude of the complainant. 
20. On January 30, 2013 Mr. Parsons moved to suppress statements of the 
defendant as well as all evidence gathered in conjunction therewith as fruit of the 
poisonous tree. ln addition, Mr. Parsons moved to reinstate the preliminary 
hearing in order to be ab]e to examine two witnesses that were discovered by the 
private investigator Ivir. Kane, and were not listed on the original discovery 
documents supplied by Mr. May. 
21. :Mr. Parsons also filed a supplemental discovery requesting copies of the 
digital audio recordings of all interviews with witnesses and the supplemental 
narrative by Officer Siller. 
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22. On February 14, 2014 Mr. lviay, on behalf of the State, objected to 
Defendant's motion to reinstate the preliminary hearing arguing that the two new 
,;vitnesses discovered by the defense did not justify a preliminary hearing 
reopenmg. 
23. Mr. May also opposed the defendant's motion to suppress Defendant's 
statements, Defendant's requests for a bill of particulars, and objected to the 
designation of a defense expert witness. 
24. During this period ohime it was the intent of myself and Mr. Parsons to 
continue to provide a vigorous defense in preparation of a trial should the need 
occur. However, based upon the representation of Mr. May as to the attitude of the 
complainant we were hopeful that a settlement could be reached. 
25. This Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to rule on the various 
matters that were still pending. While originally requesting such a hearing in 
March it was continued for various reasons until January 5, 2015. 
26. Both Mr. Parsons and myse1 f were fully prepared to argue all the 
various matters that were still pending before the Court in order to protect the 
constitutional rights of our client in preparation of a trial. However, ]V[r. May 
approached us and proposed that a plea agreement be reached in which the first 
degree felony \Voulcl be reduced to a second degree felony-forcible sexual abuse, 
and that the prosecutor would recommend no prison sentence be served by 
7 
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Defendant provided that the complainant did not affirmati,·ely insist upon the 
prosecution seeking a prison commitment. 
27. Mr. l\,fay informed this Comt on the record that the alleged victim had 
been contacted by the state since the initial preliminary hearing meeting but that 
she had made no response and that her phone did not work. He stated, "When we 
met initially during the intake, her very first impression of the case was, actually, 
she was not seeking prison at the time and was fairly amenable to resolving the 
case." Based upon this representation Mr. Parsons and myself suggested to the 
defendant that he accept the plea agreement which he did. 
28. At this time I realized that we were giving up all the previous defenses 
and discovery requests that had been made during the last year but felt that the plea 
bargain was in the best interest of my client especially believing that the 
complainant would not seek a prison term against my client thereby resulting in a 
favorable recommendation by the prosecutor and APP to this Court at the time of 
sentencing. Because probation with jail time was an option to a second degree 
offense but not a first degree offense, I felt there would be a good chance for my 
client to avoid a lengthy prison sentence under either a first or second. 
29. An amended information was filed by J\11r. May on January 5, 2015 
reducing the charge to forcible sexual abuse. 
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30. Because my client did not have any prior criminal history involving 
sexual abuse I wish to supplement any report by APP with a report prepared by 
Utah Sentencing Alternatives, a company I have used extensively to evaluate 
defendants such as Mr. Magness. I believe that the APP would give a favorable 
report of Mr. Magness in light of the complainant' attitude against a prison 
sentence and wanted to supplement its findings with that of the Utah Sentencing 
Alternatives report. The report of Utah Sentencing Alternatives recommended 3 6 
months probation, 270 days in jail, completion of a sex therapy program and 
several other requirements. 
31. On February 26, 2015 I received a copy of the APP presentence 
investigation report and was totally shocked at what I sm:v. The report 
recommended a prison sentence. The victim impact statement recited an interview 
with the complainant that stated, "She feels it is appropriate for the defendant to 
serve at least two years in prison for what he has done so he can also feel the real 
consequences of his actions as she has the past three years." Such a statement was 
completely contrary to all prior representations of Ivl r. May. 
32. On March 1, 2015 Mr. Parsons and I filed a Motion to Continue 
Sentencing based on the surprise contained in the APP report together with the 
inadequate time to examine it. We also filed the Utah Sentencing Alternatives' 
9 
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report recommending probation with 270 days in the Salt Lake Counly Jail. This 
Court granted a continuance of the sentencing hearing until March 30. 
33. Because of this shocking revelation contained in the APP report I 
instructed my investigator lVfr. Kane to attempt to contact the complainant to 
determine whether she had just changed her mind or whether she always wished to 
have a prison sentence served by the defendant. Mr. Kane contacted the 
complainant with no difficulty and transcribed her conversation where she stated 
that she always wanted a prison sentence for the defendant and had told the 
prosecuting attorney her desire from the very beginning. 
34. Based upon this information Mr. Parsons and I determined that we had 
been seriously mislead by the prosecutor into entering into a guilty plea based upon 
his claim that the complainant did not seek a prison term for our client. We believe 
that we had been deceived into giving up Mr. Magness' constitutional rights to 
confront witnesses during the preliminary hearing as well as to implement the 
various requests and motions that we waived at the time the guilty plea was entered 
as well as all of the constitutional rights that go with a trial by jury. 
3 5. Accordingly, on Iviarch 26, 2015 we filed a Iviotion for Leave to 
Withdraw the Guilty Plea and Stay Sentencing Procedure proceedings. This Court 
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36. In reviewing the facts and circumstances of this case as stated in the 
preceding paragraphs of this Afiidavit, there is no doubt in my mind that I would 
not have recommended that my client plead guilty even to a lesser offense knowing 
that the complainant was hostile and vindictive and would undoubtedly cause him 
to receive an unfavorable report by APP and an unfavorable recommendation by 
the prosecuting attorney as well as testifying before the Court in the sentencing 
hearing. It is my belief that the evidence in this case creates a reasonable 
probability of acquittal based upon the incapacitation of the complainant and the 
defendant on the morning of the incident and that, in any event, my client's total 
time served at the Utah State Prison for this offense, if convicted, will be 
approximately the same time under either a first degree or second degree 
conviction. I believed that it was the best course of action to seek probation with 
jail time based upon what I thought would be a forgiving complainant as described 
by Mr. May. 
Under penalty of pe1jury under the laws of the State of Utah, I, Larry Long 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 10th day of April, 2015 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713 
CRAIG S. COOK, PC 
3645 East Cascade Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Phone: (801) 485-8123 
E~ma.i I: ldskaa@att.net 
Attornev for Defendant 
,I 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
~ STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AFFIDA VlT OF 
SHAWN KANE 
Case No. 131903746 
ROBERT MORGAN J\lfAGNESS, Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 




Being ditly sworn under penalty of law, the declarant hereby declares and 
states the following: 
1. I am over 18 yea.rs of age and can attest to the veracity of the 
statements made herein. 
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2. I am the owner of Kane Consulting, Inc. which is a licensed private 
investigation service located in West Bountifrll, Utah. I am a 
member of the following organizations: ASIS, PACSCO, 
UACDL, NCISS, and PIAU. I was chah111an of the DPS PI 
hearing and licensure board from 2008 to 2014. 
2. I was retained by attorney Lany Long to assist him concernit1g the rape 
charges made against his client Robert Morgan Magness. 
3. On Friday: January 10, 2014 l contacted the alleged victim by telephone 
using the phone number that was contained in the police and court records. 
4. I explained that I \Vas an investigator for the defense and requested that 
she provide me infonnation as to what occun-ed on the night of the charged critne. 
She gave me a detailed description of her version of the events including her 
employment at the Good Spirits Bar that led to her meeting of Defendant, a regu]ar 
customer, as we] I as his son Shawn. She described how after her shift ended, she 
and her girlfriend together with Shawn and another male went to the residence of 
Defendant in order to drink and party. 
5. She described the events that night and the following mo111ing when 
Defendant allegedly sexually assaulted her whi1e she was sleeping in the basen1ent 
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6. She inf011ned me that in her mind the defendant had already entered a 
guilty plea based upon her conversations with the prosecutor at the hearing she last 
attended. She stated that the prosecutor told her that she would not need to testify 
unless she wanted to go to the defendant's sentencing hearing to say something 
about hm:v he should be punished. 
7. I advised her at several times in the conversation that she should contact 
the prosecutor to clarify the status of the case. 
8. 1 did not have any further contact with the alleged victim until March 1, 
2015. l was asked by attorney Lan·y Long to try to contact her, once again, in 
order to clarify the time frame as to whe11 she first Jet it be known that she wanted 
the defendant to serve time in prison . .I contacted her on the same phone nu1nber 
that I had previously used in my January 2014 call. 
9, I recorded the conversation with the alleged victim so that a complete and 
accurate record could be made. I have reviewed the transcript dated March 26, 
2015 of this telephone call and believe that it accurately reflects the conversation 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Utah, I, Shawn Kane 
hereby s\venr that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and 
understanding. 
...-t,q: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this JD~:. day of April, 
2015 in -·r-·~t:~ ~ ~ r' S~ Cou_ nty, Utah . 
••• 1..,..-:....: ..... ✓.-l----·---
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1 
IN THE THIRD .TTJDIClAL DJSTIUCT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKJ!: COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF CTAH: 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, 
Defendant. 
CASE ~o. 131903746 
TRANSCRIPTION OF MARCH 1sT, 2015 
TELEPHONE TNTERVIE\V 
JUDGE: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-t\·11LLS 
COMES NOW, the Defendant and offers this transcription taken from the recording of a 
telerhone interview between Shawn Kane. a private investigator, and M. C., the victim in this 
case, which t0ok place on .l'vlarch 15\ 2015. This Transcription \-vas prepared by Aaron A. 
Crabtree::, lmv clerk. for I ,arry Long. 
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1 A P P E A R A N C E S 
2 S1-JAWNKANE 
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1 PROCEEDINGS 
2 MR. KANE: 
3 Melissa: can you hear me OK? 
4 M.C.: 
s Yeah, I can hear you. 
6 MR. KJ\:-lE: 







11 Oh~ go ahead. 
12 M.C.: 
13 l just wanted to clarify. So you are working on behalf of Robe1t, right? 






Correct. So, l'm a I icensed private investigator here in the state of Utah. I ,:vork-
rv1. c.: 
Wait, why would l want to talk to you? 
MR. KANE: 
Oh, no, unclerstnndable. I work for attorney Larry T ,ong. You and I ac.tually spoke two years ago. 
20 M. C.: 
21 Yes, I'm acrually upset about that because 1 \l\'as a little bit confused a') to like who I was talking 
22 \Vtth. 
~ 23 MR. KANE: 
00262 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 Oh, sorry, sorry. I Lry and explain up front: and sometimes people aren:t- don't completely 
2 understand, so, ·cause again I have to be transparent, and so you <lon:t have to talk to me. I'm 
3 not- you know, l can't force you to talk to me, anything like that. You don't. ha\·e to. J just- the 
4 attorney asked me to ask you n question about, you had talked to that adult probation & parole 
S officer. 
6 YI. C.: 
7 Yes. 
8 MR. KANE: 
9 Ho1d that thought I forgot her name . .Jennifer. 
10 I\·1. C.: 
11 Yeah. 
12 MR. K.I\NF.: 
13 And there was a question: .Jennifer Murray asked you a question, and then the attorney had a 
14 question. I say t'the attorney,'' sorry, Larry Long had a question about prison. And so1 initially, 
15 and I'll explain kind oft.he question and then- initially, when this whole thing stalied and you 
16 had spoken wit.h the district attorney and the prosecutor - lhat. would be Thad May - at a hearing 
17 they believe you said that you did not want Robe1i to go to prison. 
18 J\,J. C.: 
1.9 No, r didn,t say that. 
20 :V[R. KANE: 
21 Ok. 
22 ivt. C.: 
23 I didn't say that l did not want him to go lo prison. I said, HWcll, it's more important to me that 
Page 4 of 8 
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1 he:s on the sexual offenders list." That was like- I said that 1 wanted him to serve prison time: 
1ifi 
2 but the rnost important thing to me was that [ wanted him to go on the sexual offenders list. 
3 MR. KANE: 
I.} Ok. So you- just to ctarify, so J know: you do want him on the sexual offenders list. 
5 :M.C.: 
6 Yes. 
i..J 7 MR. KANE: 
8 /\nd, at the time, did you want, ·when you talked to him, did you want him to go to prison too? 
9 M.C.: 
10 Yes: r felt like be deserved some time in prison. 
11 MR. KANE: 
12 Ok. Alright. And that- I just wamed to double check, 'cause there was some confusion from the 
l3 attcm,eys' side, and not your attorneys but Larry Long and the paperwork that came in, in 
14 making sure that he had the con·ect information, that when you talked to the .. talked to Thad 
vjg 15 ~1ay-
l6 M. C.: 
17 Yeah. 
18 MH. KAKE: 
I 
19 Did you say you ,vanted Robert to go to prison? And then, ~•·hen you taJked to Jennifer \tf urphy, 
20 did you also t01l her you \Vanted him to go to prison too? 
21 .\tl. C.: 
22 Yes. l said the- I said essentially the same thing to her. 
23 MR.KANE: 
Page 5 of 8 
00264 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 Ok. Ok, and thars all 1 ,,._1as trying lo clarify. I do appreciate you, you know, at least talking to 
2 me and letting me know on that. And so, that- that was just truly it. They wanted clarification on 
3 that Just to- to double check and clarify if you wanted him to go to prison and also be on the 
4 sexual off enders registry. 
s M. C.: 
6 1'111 planning on going there. tomoITow, and maybe you could help me \;vith a question. Docs it 
7 stai1 at 9 AM? 
8 1v1R. KANE: 
9 1 beHeve it does, yes. At the- as far a~ I know it does start at 9AM~ yes. 
10 M. C.: 
11 Ok. 
12 MR. KANE: 
13 Yeah. So. lfyou are planning on attending, J.'d probably get there maybe about 8:30~ 8:45. You 
1.4 know, if you are planning on attending. That way, you can, for you. 
15 M. C.: 
16 Well basically I just wa11t to say what l have to say and then leave. You know. 
17 l'vlR. KAN'E: 
18 Ok. ;Cause, it might- it might start directly at 9 o,clock, but it'5 planned io. And so. 
19 M. C.: 
20 Ok. 
21 MR. KANE: 
7.2 Yeah. Ok, wclI thank yout and l do appreciate you calling me back. 
23 IV1. C.: 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Aaron Crabtree, clerk for Larry Long, do hereby Certify: 
8 That this transcription is an accurate representation of a telephone 
9 interview which took place between Shawn Kane, a private investigator, and M. C., the victim of 














WITNESS MY HAND this 26th day of March, 2015 
·~.CL;RK 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
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CRAfG S. COOK, Bar No. 713 
~ CRAlG S. COOK, PC 
3645 East Cascade Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Phone: (801) 485-8123 
E-maH: k h=drna<'q),a.tt.net 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COT.JR.I 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF Ur AH, 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS 
vs. Case No. 131903746 
ROBE.RT MORGAN 1VIAGNESS, Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Being duly swom and under penalty of law the declarant hereby declares 
and states as follows: 
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2. Jam 55 years old and have lived my entire life in Salt Lake County. 
\Vl1i]e I have had many problems with alcohol and substance abuse I have never 
been involved in a sexual assault matter. 
3. Upon being charged and anested, I researched various defense attorneys 
and concluded that Larry Long was experienced in this type of case and had a very 
good reputation for representing his clients. 
4. At the time 1 retained Jvfr. Long he infonned me that the entire case 
would evolve a.round the question of consent and the credibility of the complainant 
versus my credibility in light of the extreme intoxication that occun-ed in my house 
that morning. 
5. On June 6, 2013 I accompanied l\tfr. Long to the Sa.It Lake County 
Courthouse to observe the prelinunary hearing scheduled in my case. Mr. Long 
1nformed me that it would be necessary to thoroughly cross examine the 
complainant and her girlfriend as to all the facts and circumstances tl1at night 
including their alcohol consumption and sexual acts. I felt bad to have to put these 
girls through such examination but believed Mr. Long that it would have to be 
accomplished in order to protect my rights. 
6. \.Vhile waiting in the vestibule l witnessed Mr. Tad May, the Deputy 
District Attorney, consulting with the complainant and her girHiiend. He then 
joined me and ~vfr. Long. Mr. May info1111ed us that the comp]ainant did not \,Vant 
2 
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me to go to prison. He said that it may now be possible to enter into a plea bargain 
where I might not go to prison. I was ve1-y happy to hear this news. Mr. Long then 
stated that he advised me that ,ve should waive the preliminary hearing because to 
VI proceed would greatly alienate the complainant and 111.ay make her hostile 01· 
antagonistic toward me when she was asked questions about drinking and sex. I 
agreed that we should waive the preliminary hearing because of this new 
info1111ation. 
7. For the next year and a half Mr. Long kept me informed as to what was 
happening. He said that until a plea agreement had been reached we must assume 
that we would be going to trial and that he wou]d be filing al) the necessary 
~ motions and requests to protect my interests and to gather evidence on our behalf. 
He also received my approval to hire Mr. Brad Parsons, III to furtber assist hi111 in 
prepating for a possible trial. He still expressed hope that the District Attorney 
would agree to a plea bargain in light of the complainant's positive attitude. 
8. On January 5, 2015 T attended a proceeding in the Salt Lake County 
Court for the purpose of bearing the various motions and requests that Mr. Parsons 
and Mr. Long had filed. \1/hile waiting for the couit to start I witnessed .Mr. Long, 
Id> Mr. Parsons and Mr. May confen-ing for quite a long time. :rvfr. Long and Mr. 
Parsons then came to me and informed me that TVfr. 1'.1ay had agreed to reduce the 
charge to ·forcible sexual abuse which was a second degree felony and not a first. 
3 
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They also said it would be likely that I would not face any prison time because Mr. 
?vlay had expressly confirmed with Mr. Long and Mr. Parsons that the complainant 
in this case did not want me to go to prison. I figured she knew that both of us 
shouldn't have been so drunk that 1110111ing and that it was an unfortunate incident 
that should be forgiven if I spent some time in jail. 
9. They told me that the prosecuting atton1ey would recommend that I not 
go to prison unless the complainant insisted I go to prison. However, my atto1neys 
thought it was very improbable that this would happen in light of Mr. May's st-rong 
assurance that she did not want me to serve thne in prison. I was also told by :Nfr. 
Long and 1vfr. Parsons that I would be giving up all of my constitutional rights to 
contest this charge against me. They believed, however, that there was a very good 
like1i.hood that while I may have to serve time in the county jail I would not have to 
serve time at the State Prison based upon the circumstances of the night, my prior 
favorable record, and the positive attitude of the complainant. I agreed that I 
,vou]d \\'aive my right to a trial and plead guilty. 
10. During the hearing with the court I again heard Mr. May state that the 
complainant did not \:Vant a prison term for me even though he had been unable to 
contact her for several months. Based upon his statements I felt very good about 
my decision 10 enter into a guilty plea. in this case. 
4 
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11. During January and February of this year I felt very relieved but still 
apprehensive about my sentencing. I spoke with the lady from the parole 
department and told her my whole story. I attended the various classes Mr. Long 
~ had set up for me concen1ing sexual problems and also discussed in detail n1y life 
with the private company he hired to do an evaluation on me. He informed me that 
the private company thought that I should be placed on probation but should have 
to serve time in a county jail for over 250 days which I thought was okay 
compared to prison. 
12. ln the last part of February Mr. Long ca11ed me and told me he had very 
bad ne\:\'S. He informed me that the complainant had told the parole department 
~ that she wanted me to go to prison and. that the parole department had 
recommended that I go to prison under my p)ea . .I was very upset to hear this and 
cou 1 d tell that Mr. Long was also very upset. 
13. Later Mr. Long infonned me that his private investigator had talked to 
the complainant who said that she had always wanted me to go to prison fi:01n the 
very beginning. I was very upset to hear th.is as was Mr. Long. He informed inc 
that now my chances for going to prison was almost a sure thing because the 
vj prosecuting attorney was not obligated to recommend county jail time, the parole 
department had already recommended prison, and the complainant wanted to speak 
to the judge about her desire to send me to prison. 
5 
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14. Mr. Long informed me that he would never have recommended that I 
plead guilty had he known this was really her attitude and because I listened to :t\.fr. 
Long for his advice 1 would not have done so ifhe had recommended again.st it. 
Under penally of perjury under the laws of the State of Utah, I, Robert 
Iviorgan Magness hereby s_wear that the foregoing is true and co1Tect to the best of 






St"BSCRfBED AND SWORN to before me on this 10th day of April, 2015 11J 
i11 Sa!r Lnke County~ Utah. 
i.l?_i_· ~::f :'.;\· · ,.::; ·.·: • ·:··••··-. :·, -::~)).· . .::~·· :i 
, ... ·· .. : .• :, ...... ~ , 
. . .... :: ~,~·· : )' ~ 
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SIM GILL 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
AARON FLATER, Bar No. 9458 
Deputy District Attorney 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STA TE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
Robert Morgan Magness, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA 
Case Nos. 131903746 
JUDGE HRUBY-MILLS 
The State of Utah, through its counsel, SIM GILL, Salt Lake County District 
Attorney, and Aaron Flater, Deputy District Attorney, hereby submits this Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and respectfully r~quests 
that this Court deny Defendant's motion. 
PREFACE 
The practice of law is an honorable practice in which honorable men and women 
diligently labor. For the most part those that work within the profession treat each other 
with courtesy, civility and dignity. The Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility 
state, "Lawyers shall not, without an adequate factual basis, attribute to other counsel or 
the court improper motives, purpose, or conduct. Lawyers should avoid hostile, 
demeaning, or humiliating words in written and oral communications with adversaries. 
Neither written submissions nor oral presentations should disparage the integrity, 
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intel1igence, morals, ethics, or personal behavior of an adversary unless such matters are 
directly relevant under controlling substantive law." For those reasons the State was 
disappointed to read that the attorneys for the Defendant accused an esteemed colleague 
of intentional misrepresentation or gross negligence when there is simply not a factual 
basis to make such accusations. Throughout the case the prosecutor represented honestly 
what his understanding was and at worst may have misunderstood the victim's desires 
when he first met with her. This certainly does not make him guilty of intentional 
misrepresentation nor gross negligence. The State asks the Court to not consider the 
personal attacks on the character of the prosecutor and focus on the record as a whole of 
the court proceedings. 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 5, 2015, Robe11 Morgan Magness (Defendant) entered a plea of guilty 
in this case to the charge of Forcible Sexual Abuse. The Defendant now moves this 
Court to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. For the reasons noted below, the State 
respectfully requests that this Court deny the Defendant's motion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE THE PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY ENTERED 
Recent Utah case law addresses when cou11s may allow Defendants to withdraw 
guilty pleas. In State v.Velarde the Utah Supreme Court clarified that Rule 11 governs 
the taking of guilty pleas, but not their withdrawal. 2015 UT App 71, ,~ 8-9 
Although rule 11 provides guidance for the entry of guilty pleas, any attempt to 
withdraw that plea is governed by statute. 11 State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ~ 19, 279 
2 
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P.3d 371. Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(a) provides in pa11 that a "plea of guilty ... 
may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made." "This statutory standard mirrors the showing necessary for 
defendants to prove that their pleas are unconstitutional." Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ~ 19, 
279 P.3d 371. 
In Velarde the court further clarified that the existence of a factual basis for a 
guilty plea "shall be determined by examining the record as a whole." Utah R. Crim. P. 
11 (!). The record as a whole includes "transcripts of the plea hearing, the 
circumstances surrounding the case and including the plea affidavit. State v. Velarde, 
2015 UT App 71, fl~ 8-9 (citations omitted) See also State v. Trotter, 330 P.3d 1267, 
1270 (Utah 2014). 
In State v. Ferretti the Court rejected a Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea 
in part because the plea affidavit explicitly outlined the elements, the State's burden to 
prove them beyond a reasonable doubt if the case proceeded to trial, and the factual 
basis for the plea. 2014 UT App 224, PS (Utah Ct. App. 2014). 
In this case the record as a whole indicates that the Defendant entered his plea 
knowingly and voluntarily. Defendant, with the advice of counsel, signed a Statement of 
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel confirming that his plea 
was voluntary, not coerced. See Statement of Defendant in Suppo11 of Plea. His attorney 
also signed the Statement confirming that the Defendant had read or was read and 
understood the contents of the Statement and that the confirmations by the Defendant in 
the Statement were true. On the bottom of the fourth page of the Statement it states that 
"All the promises duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained 
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in this statement, including those explained below;" Those words are followed by the 
handwritten~language, "In exchange for the defendant's plea of guilty the prosecution· 
agrees that in the event the victim does not affirmatively insist upon the prosecutor 
seeking a prison commitment that the prosecutor will recommend probation and no 
prison." See Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea at page 4. Explicit in 
those words is the understanding that the victim may be asking for a prison commitment. 
Implicit in those words is the understanding that the state was not aware of what the 
victim's position on sentencing would be. 
The discussion about a potential prison recommendation was further clarified in 
open com1 on the record. According to the transcript provided by defense counsel, the 
Defendant's own attorney said, "the Prosecution has heretofore indicated to the court that 
unless the victim affirmatively requests a commitment of prison for the defendant's 
behavior, that the prosecution in this matter will recommend no prison time and will 
recommend probation of some form." See Transcription of Evidentiary Hearing page I 0 
lines 16-19. Explicit in that statement is the understanding that the victim may request 
prison. Implicit in that statement is the understanding that the State was not aware of 
what the victim would request. The prosecutor explained further that the State's primary 
focus was to "honor the victim's wishes." During that hearing the prosecutor explained 
that although the victim did not initially request prison time, he had difficulty contacting 
her and was not aware of what her position was. See Transcription of Evidentiary 
Hearing page 4 I ines 14-19. ~ 
Because it was made very clear to the Defendant that there was a possibility that 
the victim would recommend prison, he cannot now say that her recommendation of 
4 
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prison makes his plea unknowing or involuntary. Defendant got the benefit of a bargain. 
His charge was reduced from a first degree felony to a second degree felony. Together 
with that bargain he assumed risk that the victim would recommend prison, that AP&P 
would recommend prison, and the risk that the Court is not bound by any 
recommendations from anyone. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State submits this Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, and respectfully requests that the Court deny 
Defendant's Motion. 
DA TED this 24th day of April, 2015 
SIM GILL 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ISi Aaron Flater 
Aaron Flater 
Deputy District Attorney 
MOTIONS: 
Notice has been served upon counsel of record in the above-listed case by electronic 
notification in accordance with URCP 5(b )( 1 )(A)(i). 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ORIGINAL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 131903746 FS 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, 
Defendant. 
Fil~D. DiSTHiCT C•XffiT 
Thlrn Judl~cl D:Ctrict 
Oral Argument 
Electronically Recorded on 
April 27, 2015 
JIJN - 1 2015 
BEFORE:: THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS 
Third District Courc Judge 
For the State: 
A?PEJI.RANCES 
P.a:::-on W. Flater 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (385) 468-7600 
For the Defendant: Craig Cook 
Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT 
William B. ?arsons III 
Larry N. Long 
1 Lake·.;iew 
Stansbury Park, Utah 84074 
Telephone: (801)466-6311 
1771 South California Avenue 
Pro~o, Utah 84606 
Telep:10ne: {801) 377-2927 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on March 2, 2015) 
THE COURT: Okay, we're back on the record in the matter 
of State of Utah ~s. Robert Magness, case No. 131903746. Could 
I have appearances, lease. 
MR. COOK: I'm Craig Coor. for the defendant. 
MR. LONG: Larry Long for the defendant. 
MR. PARSONS: William Parsons. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. FLATER: Aaron Flater for the State. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you; and Mr. Magness is 
here as well. All right, so I've reviewed the opposition filed 
by the State. So I have read everything. Is there anything 
else I sho~ld know? 
M?.. :;:-r.r.-rrP. · , don't thir:k so. 
MR. COOK: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: AlJ right, Ro no one wishes to make oral 
argument, then? 
MR. COOK: Oh, yeah. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
MR. COOK: Right. 
THE COURT: Now will be the time. 
MR. COOK: Your Honor, if! can sit down, I have a bad 
back right now, and standing up --
THE COURT: That's certainly -- and we're clearly 
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picking you up on the record, so that's fine. 
MR. COOK: Okay, fine. If it please the Court, I'm 
Craig Cook, representing the defendant in this matter related 
to this guilty plea. Just on a couple of procedural matters, 
as the Court knows, we just received the memo from the State 
today at 2 -- one at 2 o'cloc~, and I read ic basically like 
:he Court. So, you know, we may have been able to do a little 
more depth reply had we had time, but anyway that's how it is. 
The important thing is I think, your Honor, is that 
there is no counter affidavits filed by the State. So I think 
for purpcses of our motion today we have to assume that all of 
our tacts are true. Then the legal ramifications, of course, 
would be decided; but I think the facts as we state them will 
have to be assumed as given, basically. 
So going over ~his case in the chronological crder that 
it occur=ed, on April 12:h, 2012, this was when the incident 
occurred in the defendant's home involving the complainant. 
It was an overnight party of drinking, and the next morning is 
when the alleged assaul~ occurred. 
The defendant hired Mr. Long. He began representing 
him. On June 6, 2013 a preliminary hearing was scheduled, 
and at that time, as stated in the affidavits, Mr. Long was 
prepared to thoroughly cross examine the complainant and her 
girlfriend and some other witnesses possibly as to what had 
happened on that night or :hat morning. 
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Prier to going into the preliminary hearing, however, 
the Mr. May of the District Attorney's Office approached 
Mr. Long and the defendan~ and said the complainant has decided 
sr.e d,:.:es not ·.-,ant cl,~fcndarit to go t.o prisor:, .;,nd she's sort of 
optimistic that something can be resolved. We are, too. 
Upon hearing that news, that she was not vindictive, 
Mr. Long a~d the defendant decided to waive the preliminary 
hearing, based on Mr. Long's experience that if you do have 
a favorable complainant in a case like this, if you put them 
o~ the stand in a preliminary hearing and cross examine them, 
t~~t ~hat could well ctange their disposition. So they chose 
~c~ ~o -- not to nave a prelim~nary hearir.g, based upon that 
representation that she would be -- she did not want him to go 
:c prison. 
During the remainder of January, they filed -- there 
was no plea agreement made. Mr. Long filed various motions for 
DNA evidence and suppression of evidence and things like this; 
and in January 2014 his investigator Mr. Shaun Kane spoke to 
~he complai~ant, who -- :o find out exactly what her version of 
the story was, and he was told that she basically said, "Well, 
I thought it was already over. I thought we'd already -- he'd 
already pled guilty, because I was told all I would have to do 
:-1ow is go to Court and talk to tr.em about the sentencing." 
So Mr. Ka::e said, "Well, you need to talk to the 
District Attorney. I don't know what's going on, but that's 
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not my knowledge of the case. So chat was it for that. Ic 
went on again for another year with various motions being 
p!."esented to the Court. Then finally in January of 2015 all 
these various rr,otions and n1otions to suppress and di f fe!."ent 
things were before the Court on an evidentiary hearing; and it 
was at this time that the -- Mr. May approached Mr. Long again, 
and co-Counsel, and suggested that a deal could be struck. 
At that point, they -- he represented that he was 
willing to go to a second-degree felony on the assumption that 
the victirr. did not want the defendant to go to prison. Once 
again he said, "Yes , I ' m sure she does n ' t 1r1 ant him to go to 
prison, and we're very confident of this." 
So on the record, as we quot~d in our memora~dum, 
there was a colloquy between the Court and the Co~nsel, and 
the :o~rt specifically asked about t~e victim, and he said, 
"Well, the victim doesn't want him to go to prison.u Based 
upon that representation, a plea agreement was struck where 
it was stated that the prosecutor would represent -- would 
.recommend probation as long as the complainant did not wish 
him to go co prison. So u~der that scenario it was assumed 
by everyone that she did not want him to go to prison. That's 
why Mr. Long and the defendant agreed to waive -- basica:ly all 
rights to a jury trial and plead guilty. 
Then Mr. tt,agness went. to CGLmS•:? ling. He's been going 
to counseli~g. He's been unde=going alcohol rehabilita~ion and 
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various other programs. He did his AP&P interview. He went 
before a private company hired by Mr. Long, this other company, 
and you k~ow, he was very cooperative in every respect. 
So in February of 2815, just a couple of rnonths after 
this, suddenly the AP&P =eport co~es in and it's very negative. 
It says tha: they recommend that Mr-. Magness go to prison, and 
that the cornplainan~ wanted him to go to prison, wanted him to 
at least serve three years, based upon what she had suffered. 
So the quotation in the pre-sentence report was very 
vindictive. You know, she wanted revenge, basically, for what 
she believed he had done to her. So this was the fi=st indica-
tio~ that :he defense had that there was a problem with this 
representation of her -- of her desires. 
So tz·,en on !•~arch pt, 2015 l~r. Kane, the investigator, 
contacted the complainant and spoke with her on the phone, and 
we have a transcrip: of that in the file. Basically she said 
she had never said she didn't want him to go to prison. She 
wanted him to be on the sex registry list, but she always 
want~d him to go to prison based from the very beginning. 
So, you kno~, from her statement on that phone conver-
sation, it's obviously in conflict with what Mr. May said in 
his various representations to defense and to the Court. On 
April lO t ", based on that, we filed a motion to set aside the 
guilty verdict and-- or ~he guilty plea and to reopen basically 
the entire case. 
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So we have cwo grounds, essentially, really I guess 
it's all basically the same; but our first foremost ground is 
prosecutorial misconduct. The State raises the question about 
civility with lawyers and treating Counsel of the side fairly, 
which we of course believe in; but in ~his particular case, you 
know, we have an obligation to defend our client. A prosecutor, 
you know, has a very high duty to disclose things that maybe a 
civil attorney would not. I mean, the Brady -- the whole Brady 
rule of disclosing evidence and not misrepresenting things. 
So, you know, we hate to do i ... 
- ·-, you might say, ;....,,,.. .... ....... 
it's something that has to be done. In this case there was 
clearly a -- either an intentional misrepresentation or a 
completely gross negligent effort on the part of Mr. May to 
find out the intent of this -- of this witness. 
Because of that, they conveyed this information to 
Mr. Long, which seriously modified the defense of this case. 
The main -- the main element to begin with was the waiver of 
the preliminary hearing. That is a very important feature in 
a case like this because of the ability to cross examine the 
complainant, find out the whole history of what happened that 
night, the friends. 
It is a very critical thing for a defendant to be able 
to do; and had it not been for this representation they would 
not have waived it. They would have proceeded and obtained, you 
know -- whether they would have obtained valuable information 
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now is not known, but they certainly didn't obtain anything 
because they weren't able to. 
Secondly, after the various motions and efforts for 
discovery and suppression, all that was given up, too, because 
of the fact that the plea agreement was entered into. Therefore 
all of these various defenses which may have had an effect on 
the defense, again we~e waived on the very assumption that she 
was favorably going to not re::ommend or didn't want prison. 
So this was another mctiva~ion which made him give up 
all of his rights to jury trial, to all the discovery, every-
thing else. It was based simply on the assumption that when a 
complainant in a case like this is vindictive, there's a much 
higher probability of nc -- no prison, as opposed to prison on 
a second-degree felo~y. They were very confident, based upon 
Mr. May's representation to the Court, that this would be the 
case. 
The State argues, "Well, they knew it could change,u 
you know, that it was conditioned upon the fact that it could 
change. She may change her mind or whatever; but at the very 
time this representation was ~ade, she had already adamantly 
decided she wanted him ~o go to prison. So it was not a matter 
of changing. It was a matter that it was completely opposite 
of what everyone lncluding the Court had decided. 
I've kind of -- I kind of have an analogy. If you 
have a plea bargain saying the prosecutor woi..:ld recommend 
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probation if the Jazz lost the NBA finals, that's one thing; 
but if you say they .,.,ould reco:r:mend probation only if tt:ey 
win the NBA finals, that's another thing. That's essentially 
what happened here, the complete change of what the defendant 
believed were the facts occurred by this misrepresentation or 
gross negligence, however you want to say it. 
So we quoted, I think, cases, your Honor, that shows 
that this type of behavior is critical for a defendant to be 
able to rely upon the integrity of the prosecu~ion, and it 
would be no different :han had the prosecutor informed the 
defendant that they found a gun that they hadn't actually 
found, or that chey didn't find a gun that they had found. So 
it goes to the very thinking of the defense ~earn based upon 
what the prosecution is obligated to correctly and adequately 
report. 
The second part of the argument, but which is really 
tied into this, is the statute itself, which is 77-13-6, which 
says that a plea can be overturned if it was not voluntarily 
or knowingly made. It's the same thing we were just talking 
about. As tha Supreme Court said in several cases, if you have 
an illusory promise that soreething can occur, then you're not 
actually ~ulfilling the bargain that you're making with ~he 
State. 
We've cited seve~al causes in which the defendant 
believed something would occur, and it didn't occur because 
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of various impossibilities or misrepresentations. We believe 
that's the same situation here, that had they known that the 
defendant -- o.:- the complainant v,as goir1g to recom.'Tiend prison 
very ve~effiently as she did to the Court when she made her 
stateme~t, this deal would not have been made because there 
was just toe much co lose to not be able to go to trial. 
So basically that's our second argument. Then the 
third, as we said here, is that what we're -- the basis of the 
bargain was to try to 9et the State to recommend probation; and 
you know, if the Court chose to just follow your own recom --
your own feeling without the .recommendation of the prosecutor, 
then -- and actually give a probacion sentence, then we would 
withdraw :hese motions, because that would then give us che 
benefit of ~he bargain that we expected. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. FLATER: Are you ready for the response, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, I am. 
MR. FLATER: Okay, than~ you. Your Honor, I think a 
lot of this discussion scrt of just ~uddies the water. The 
important analysis here is what happened at the time defendant 
entered his plea. He's asking for the Court -- for leave of 
the Co~rt to withdraw his guilty plea. 
His claim is that he didn't enter his plea knowingly 
and volun~arily. So the most important analysis is to look at 
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what happened when he did in fact enter his plea. There were 
at least two different ways in which the agreement between the 
defendant and the S~ate was put on the record at that time, and 
which indicated what the agreement was. 
5 The first way that was put on the record is the state-




















icate of Counsel. In that document on page 4 at the bottom 
of that document, it indicates that the entire promises and 
agreements of the plea agreement are fully contained in the 
statement. 
It says, "In exchange for the defendant's plea of 
guilty, the prosecution ag:ees that in the event the victim 
does not affirmatively insist upon the prosecute~ seeking 
a prison commitmer.t, that the prosecution will recommend 
probation and no prison." 
As pointed out in the in the memora~dum, there's 
two understandings that are clear from those words. No. 1 was 
that the victim may come to Court and request prison. No. 2, 
that the prosecutor was not aware of what the victim's position 
would be, that the defendant wasn't aware of what che victim's 
position would be. In fact, it was an unknown at that time 
what ~he position of the victim would be. 
That was clarified orally, as well, on the record, 
in the transcript provided by the defendant. His own -- his 
own attorney indicated essentially the same -- the same agree-
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ment and the same understanding was that the prosecution had 
indicated chat unless the victim affirmatively requests a 
commitment of prison for the defendant's behavior, that the 
prosecution will recommend no prison time, and will recommend 
probation of some form. 
Those same words indicate the same understanding. 
No. 1, that the victim may in £act come to Court and request 
prison; and that the State was not aware of what the victim 
would request when she came to Court. The prosecutor further 
explained that the State's primary focus was just to honor the 
vi ct i rn ' s w J. s n es . 
Altho~gh he hadn't -- and during t~at same hearing the 
prosecutor explained that although the victim didn't initially 
request prison time whe~ he met with her chat he had difficulty 
contacting her, and wasn't aware of what her position was. 
I guess at this point I would take just a moment to 
address a couple of things raised by defendant with regards to 
~hat. He indicates that because his investigator was able to 
contact the victim and ascertain that she did in fact want 
prison, and as she indicated frcm the beginning, that Mr. May 
is somehow guilty of intentional misrepresentation to the Court 
o= gross negligence for failing to explain or understand what 
the victim's position was, in a transcription of the phone call 
~hat Mr. Kane had with the victim, was provided to the Court as 
well -- and I don't dispute any of the -- any of the facts or 
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the transcription of that phone call. It ap?ears that it was 
probably -- for purposes of this hea=ing I won't dispute it --
i: appears that the victim indicated that her primary concern, 
even when she was speaKing to Mr. Kane, was that he be on the 
sex offend~r registry. 
If that was in fact also comr,1unicated to M::-. May, 
that her primary concern was that he be on the sex offender 
registry, he may very \l-1ell have understood he!" to mean "That's 
my focus. That's my gcal. I want hirn to be on the sex offender 
registry," he may have misunderstood, or she may have not fully 
co~nunicated to him that she also, i~ addition to that, wanted 
a prison commitment. 
He believes, and it's clear based on the prosecutor's 
sta~ements from on the r~cord, that he believed that she didn't 
want that. If there was a misunderstanding, I would submit 
to the Court that it ~as essentially a misunderstanding that 
Mr. May and the victim may have misunderstood one another, but 
I believe that's exactly why Mr. May wasn't clear on what the 
victim ?r:anted. 
That's exactly why he stated the agreement on the 
record :he Hay that it was s-::ated. That the victim may come 
to Court and ask fer p~ison; a~d he's not going to obligate the 
State to go contrary to the victim's wishes, because that's 
what she may want to do. So because he was unclear of that, he 
made the decision to ~=ticulate -- a~ticulate it in s~ch a way 
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to protect the victim's rights and opportunity to come to Court 
and ask for prison. 
It was clear that che defendant understood as well 
that r.hat was just a recommendation from the State, from the 
victim, from ar.ybody else. The Court could do whatever it 
wanted to do; and in fact, AP&P can do whatever it wants to 
do. The Adult Probation and Parole pre-sentence report that 
was submitted to the Court also made a prison recommendation. 
I wo~ld ask the Court to take judicial notice that the Adult 
Probation and Parole reports frequently make recommendations 
wholly independent of what victim's desires are, what the 
State's recommendat:ions are. They make their own independent 
reconunendat ions. 
It appears in this case that the defendant just took a 
calculated risk. He got the benefit of the bargain, a second-
degree felony. Was hoping that the victim wouldn't show up 
and wouldn't come to Court and wouldn't recommend prison. If 
there was negligence I submit that the defendant also shares 
some -- some blame in failing to ascertain what the victim's 
wishes were before the plea; because it was clear that the 
State could recommend prison if :hat's what the -- if that's 
what the victim wanted. 
The defendant has shown that he's capable of contacting 
the victim and interviewing her and ascertaining her wishes. 
If he wanted to make it absolutely clear before the sentencing, 
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he had the opportunity and the right to contact the victim to 
attempt to determine her wishes before he entered his plea. He 
chose not to, and made that calculated risk. 
Now that he made th~ risk and entered his plea and 
admitted his guilt, there's ~o legal -- legally sufficient 
reason for him to withdraw his plea. The plea was made k~ow-
ingly and voluntarily and with a calculated risk; and now he 
has to face the consequences of his decisions. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Cook, anything 
further? 
MR. COOK: Yes, just a brief reply, your Honor. Well, 
I guess for starters we could say that the representa~io~s 
made by Counsel are fine and good, but we have no affidavit 
cf Mr. May as to any of these statesents whether they -- what 
actually occurred from the from his point of view. His 
suppositions I don't think can really be taken in this case 
to contradict what actually are in these affidavits. 
Secondly, I think the colloquy in the Court during the 
during the guilty plea is very important, because it isn't 
quite as nebulous as Counsel would say. The -- Mr. Parsons 
-- he quoted Mr. Parsons, who said t~at "It's understood the 
prose:::utor will recommend no prison time and Hill re:commend 
probation." 
'I'h(::n Mr. May says, "That's cor.rect, your Honor. Our 
recommendat.::..on is sinply that we would honor the victim's 
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wishes. If the victim were asking for a prison sentence, 
vie' !'e not bound to not recommend prison, and the victim is 
not seeking a prison sentence. That's not her request. That 
reco.mrner1dation does rwt bind the State in any way as to jail." 
Then he goes on. 
·So he specifically says that's not her request, and 
she is not seeking a prison sentence. So it was not just a 
"Well, we're not quite sure what she's going to do." It was 
very -- a very powerful statement to the contrary. 
Secondly, the transcript of the phone conversation 
where Counsel is saying, "Well, he-- she may have been confused 
or not really pointed out she wanted prison" is again not quite 
accurate. In the -- in the questioning Mr. Kane says that 
basically that they -- he wanted to clarify whether Thad May, 
the prosecutor at a hearing, believed you to not want Robert co 
go to prison. This is on page 4. 
She says, "No, I didn't say that." Mr. Kane says, 
"Okay," and she says, "I didn't say that I did not want him 
to go to prison. I said, 'Well, it's more important to me that 
he's on the sexual offe~der's list.' That was like -- I said 
that. I wanted him to serve prison time, but the more important 
thing to me was I wanted him to go on the sexual offender's 
list." 
Then later he says, "At this time did you want -- did 
you want him co go to prison?" "Yes, I felt he deserved some 
-16-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 











prison time also.u You know, she repeatedly says it throughout 
this interv~ew she ~anted him to go to prison. So I don't think 
there cou!d be a misunderstanding. It seems q~ite adamant she 
wanted him to go to prison. 
Now, the fi~al question here is, you know, what were we 
-- what were we bargaining for. Tte representation, again, I 
mean, aside from the guilty plea, ~~ich is the State's focus, 
we're also focusing upon the preliminary hearing, and the 
waiving of that right, and the waiving of the trial itself. 
That occurred long before the guilty plea. 
11 By this rep.:::·esentation of she is -- she is wanting 
12 probation, she does not want him sent to prison, this affected 
13 the defense of this case substantially, and cost them the 
14 preliminary hearing. So t~is go~s tc the prosecuccrial mis-
15 conduct, aside from the question cf the guilty plea and the 
16 language of the guilty plea. 
17 When you add the language of the guilty plea, where 








the people basically saying, you know, we believe that she 
r.o, they didn't say "believe" -- we }:now she does not want the 
prison time. 
As far calling, I think it's quite risky for a defense 
attorney to be calling a witness in an ongoing case to find 
out what she desires. I ~hi~k tha: wo~ld be very, very risky. 
It's o~e thing tc ask for the faces. I~'s another thing to ask 
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what she wants, or to go into:: when there's no -- nc guilty 
plea. The only reason they did inquire about that was because 
of the representations made in the AP&P report that completely 
contradicced Mr. May. 
So we believe, your Honor, in summary, that there 
is sufficient grounds to reinstate the firs~ -- the original 
charge, allow a preliminary hearing to go forth, allow all the 
discovery that was omitted to continue, and to set this matter 
for :rial, and of course set aside the guilty plea unless, of 
course, the Court would grant probatior.. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. One of the -- one of 
the issues :'m i1aving with regard to che defense's request here 
is -- is knowing all along that the Court's not bound by any of 
this rec:immendatio:1. 
MR. COOK: That's true. 
TEE COURT: In fact, :hat's a specific part of the 
colloquy that I thought was interesting that no one made 
reference to. 
MR. COOK: Yes. Well, and I think -- I think that's 
certainly a relevant thing, but you know, it is-- nevertheless, 
you sort of-- you're expecting certain thi~gs. Although you're 
not bo•.md by the prosecutor's recommendation, you assume under 
the facts that he's going to r:1ake a favorable recommendation. 
You're not bound by the AP&P, buc you assume that the victim is 
goi~g to give a favorable impression. 
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You're not bound by her representations, but you know, 
all these things combine to ma~e it so that a defendant is 
still optimistic that something is going to happen based upon 
a set of facts that isn't present. Even though they know you 
can do this, it's a whole different scenario when you -- when 
you have a very vindictive claimant as opposed to a very 
cooperative or a very forgiving one. 
THE COURT: But despite all of that, when after 
M~. May did his colloquy and -- well, his putt~ng on the record 
on June c; :.r. - , just to make sure everybody was clear, I went back 
ar:d I said, "Well, you understand the State that the Court's 
not bound by any of this?u Because every time he made a repre-
sentation and the defense made representatio~s, I reminded 
everybody it doesn't matter; the Court's not bound by it. So 
everybody's on notice. 
MR. COOK: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Mr. Parsons, "That's correct, as we have so 
explained to our client." So everybody was clear clearly on 
~otice that that was the situacion. So that's what I'm having 
a hard time overcomi~g that 
MR. COOK: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: -- because we specifically discussed that 
the Court's going to do whatever it wants to do based on this 
info. 
MR. COOK: Sure, but t~e difference is thac we're --
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they're counting on a 90 -- a r.igh probability of something 
occurring, er the basis to make that plea, and now the proba-
bility is completely switched. At the time they made this 
agreemer.c, the victim or complainant was adamant of him going 
tc prison, which was completely different than what was repre-
sented. 
Granted, che Court cannot go by the recommendations or 
not, bu~ you know, they were under the mistaken belief that it 
would be a favorable recommendation that would be favorable to 
the Court. In fact, it was a done -- it was a dead deal at the 
time it was signed because she didn't she wanted him to go 
to prison and would continue to want him to go to prison. So 
there was no chance of a recommendation from the prosecutor. 
Even chough the Court does have discre:ion, we lest that chance 
to influence the Court by the prosecutor's recommendation. 
THE COURT: Dees the S:ate have anything further, since 
I allowed defense additional 
MR. FLATER: Your Honor, I have the same -- the sarne 
issues and the same -- and the same problem. The defendant was 
aware, No. 1, that the victim ~ight come to Court and ask for 
prison. No. 2, that the State in turn might come to Court and 
ask for prison, recommend prison. 
In fact, the Sta::e hasn't even made a sentencing 
reco~nendation yet. I think a lot of what they're complaining 
about, as far as I know, I don't believe the State's even made 
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come to Court and made her recorrJnendation. It was clear that 
even before he entered his plea that she may do that, and she 
may come in and ask for prison. 
5 No. 2, that the pre-sentence report would -- could 




















not bound by any of those recommendations. The defendant, 
knowing all of those things, still chose to go ahead and enter 
his plea. He took a calculated risk, hoping that the recom-
rnendations would be favorable. They were not. It seems like 
buyer's remorse now. He wants to back out because he doesn't 
believe that the recommendations are beneficial to him. So he 
wa~ts to back out of the plea that was very legally valid and 
legi t.ir.-.a te. 
'MR. COOK: Judge, may I make~ statement. 
THE CO!JRT: Sure. 
MR. COOK: Thank you. Just briefly, Judge. I would 
assert, your Honor, having 41 years of practice in the field, 
that the system would fail in its entirety if we weren't in a 
position where the vast, vast majority of the time the Courts 
follow the re•:::ommer1dations that are jointly made, especially a 
recommend.~tion made by a prosecu:or. 
It is the no~m, it is just simply good practice for 
Counsel in the defense ~ndustry to assume that prosecutorial 
recom.'Tlenclations are going to be highly pers1..1as.ive to the Court. 
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We always know a Court can change its mind and can deviace. 
We recognize that; but a vast, vast majority of the time we 
are entitled to rely upon the expectation that the Court will 
follow the recommendation made by the prosecution. That's all 
I have to say. Thanks. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I really dislike delaying this 
any further, because this has been a substantial delay which 
has been extremely frustrati~g to the Court. However, I'm 
goi~g to take the matter under advisement. I will give you 
another date. My hope is to issue a written ruling. In the 
mean~irne -- but if not, we'll call it a ruling/sentencing 
hearing. So depending on what the ~uling is, ~here will also 
be a sentencing. TJ, how many do we have on May 11 th ? 
COU~T CLERK: It's nOL too bad. 
THE COURT: Okay, we'll have you back on May 11:h on the 
9 o'clock law and mot~on calendar. 
MR. COOK: May I inquire, your Honor, what will occur 
precisely on that date? 
THE COURT: Well, if I don't issue a wri:ten ruling in 
between, I will give my ruling. 
MR. COOK: At that time? 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. COOK: In the alternative, if ycu have given a 
written ruling, will that be a continuation of the sentencing 
process? 
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THE COURT: Even ii -- I will either rule previously, 
and it will be then a sentencing or a scheduling conference, 
depending on what the ruling is. Otherwise, you'll come that 
day and it will be a ruling, and it will in turn lead into a 
scheduling conference or a sentencing, okay? 
MR. COOK: Yes, ma'am. Thank you. 
THE COURT: So -- anj the State's clear on that as 
well? 
MR. ~AY: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. COOK: A: 9 a.m., your Hono!? 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. COOK: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All ri,Jht, so I ~-1ill see, then, 9 a.m. on 
the 11";.t. of May. Okay, thank you. 
MR. ~~.Z:..Y: Thank you. 
MR. COOK: That's all we have. May we be excused, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, thank you, and I do believe that 
concludes our afternoon calendar. 
(Hearing concluded) 
-23-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATE OF UTAH 





I, Wendy Ha~s, a Not6ry Public in and for the State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my direction 
from the transmitter records made of these proceedings. 
That I have been authorized by Beverly Lowe to prepare said 
transcript, as an independent contractor working under her 
license as a certified court reporter appropriately authorized 
under Utah statutes. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and contains 
all of the evidence and all matters to which the same related 
which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the outcome 
thereof. 
That certain oarties were not identified in the record, and 
the:refore, the name associated with the statement may not be 
the correct name as to the S?eaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 21~r day of May 2015. 
My conuniss ion expires: 




Residing in Utah County 
-24-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Keyword Index 
1 adamantly 111 a:21 analysis (2110:22 11: 1 attorney 141 5: 1 7:9 12:1 
1 [3] 11:1812:8 20:21 
add (1117:18 another (615:3 8:1 o 9:4 17:24 
10th 1116:24 
addition 11113:12 13:1818:1 22:11 attorney's (1J 4:3 
11th f3122:14, 16 23:16 
additional 11120:18 any 10113:1, 115:15 16:5 audible 11124: 15 
12 [1) 24:23 
address 11112: 18 18:14 19:13 21:8 22:8 authorized [2J 24:9,11 
12th 1113:17 
adequately r119:15 anybody 11114:6 aware [SJ 11:20,21 12:9,16 
1stltJ6:15 
admitted 11115:6 anything 1318:215:10 20: 20:21 
adult (2114:8, 1 o 17 
2 advisement 11122:1 o anyway 1113:9 B 
215)3:7,711:19 20:22 21:6 affected 11117:13 ap&p lSJ 6:2,6 14:7 18:4, 
back 14119:11 21:12, 14 22: 
2012 (1) 3:17 affidavit 11115:14 25 16 
2013 [1] 3:22 affidavits [313: 11,23 15: appears [3113:2,4 14: 15 
bad 11122:15 
2014 (1)4:19 18 approached r214:3 5:7 bargain 1s19:1,23 10:10, 
2015 14) 5:4 6:5, 15 24:21 affirmatively r2111:14 12: appropriately (11 24:11 
1514:16 
2016 [1] 24:23 3 april 1213:17 6:24 
bargaining £1117:7 
21st 11124:21 after 1316:5 8:4 19:9 are [13J 3:13 4:610:1711: 
based 11214:9,13 5:176:9, 
3 
afternoon r1123:21 10,1814:12,1315:14,18 21: 20,24 8:12, 15 9: 14 13:14 
again [6J 5:3,7, 12 8:8 16: 13,22 22:1,4 19:4,24 
3(1121:7 1317:7 argues 1118:18 basically r111 3:7, 15 4:21 
4 agree (1J 12: 1 argument {219:1710:8 
5:23 6:11,17,25 7:310:8 
agreed (1J 5:23 articulate (2114: 1, 1 16:15 17:20 
412) 11:816:17 agreement 1a14:17 5:18 as 13013:6, 14, 15,23,25 5:14, basis 12110:9 20:3 
4111)21:19 8:611:3,5,1013:21 20:5 20,20 8:14 9:2110:5,911: be [33J 3: 14, 15 4:6, 14 5:8 6: 
5 agreements [1J 11: 1 o 17,2412:21,2514:415:15, 19 7:12,23 8:16 9:9,11,19 
5th r1119:11 
agrees r1111 :13 21,2116:517:2319:7,18 10:7 11:21,22,23 13:5,8,10 
ahead 111 21 :9 21:1,123:824:10,11,20 15:1717:4,24,25 20:10,10 
6 alcohol r116:1 ascertain r2112:20 14:20 21:1122:1,14,2523:3,5,18 
6 11] 3:22 all [2413:12 4:23 5:4,23 7:3 ascertaining (1J 14:25 
24:19 
8:5,7,11,1110:1615:1017: aside l4J 6:2417:8,1618: because 11914:23 7:16,20 
7 1918:8,12,1419:3,9 21:9 10 8:3,510:1,6, 14 12:1913: 
77-13-6 (1] 9:18 22:5 23:11,15,18 24:14,14 ask (SI 13:2314:3,1018:1, 24,2514:21 15:20 18:319: 
9 alleged 111 3:20 1 20:21,23 21 :5 
13,23 20:12 21:12 22:8 
allow r2118:8,8 asked r115:16 been 1913:8 5:25 6:1 7:24 
9 (3) 22:17 23:12,15 allowed 11120: 18 asking 12110:23 16:2 10:6 16:12 22:8,9 24:9 
90 {1] 20:2 along r1118:14 assault 1113:20 before [715:6 6:3 14:2115: 
A already 1414:22,22.23 a: assert 11121:19 1,317:11 21:4 
21 associated (1124:19 began 1113:21 
a.m 12123:12, 15 also 11113:7, 12 14:9, 19 17: assume (413:12 18:23,25 begin 111 7: 18 
ability 1117:20 2,922:13 21:25 beginning r216:20 12:21 
able [613:8 7:23 8:3 9:10 alternative 111 22:24 assumed [21 3:15 5:21 behavior 1219:9 12:4 
10:712:19 although [3112: 13, 14 18: assumption l315:10 8:8, being 111 5:3 
about (614:24 5:16 7:4 9: 22 12 belief 111 20:9 
21 18:3 21:1 always 1216:19 22:2 at 12113:7.7,23 5:7,9 6:9 8: believe {917:6 10:2 13:19 
absolutely 11115:1 am 12110:19 24:16 2010:22 11:1,3,4,8,22 12: 17:20,2118:6 21:1,13 23: 
accurate 11116:14 an 1101 3: 19 5:6 7:7, 13 8:7, 1716:16,25 20:4,11 21:2 20 
actually [SJ 9:12,2310:13 25 9:22 11:2217:24 24:10 22:22 23:12 believed [516:12 9:610:1 
15:16,18 analogy 1118:25 attempt 1111 s:3 13:1516:16 
adamant 12117:4 20:5 
www.protext.com 
Sheet 1 1 - believed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Keyword Index 
believes [1113:14 certified 11124:11 conditioned 1118:19 2,6,9,10,1815:10,1917:19 
beneficial f1J 21:13 certify r2124:6,16 conduct 11117:16 18:11,12,1719:9,18,23 20: 
benefit 12110:15 14:16 chance 12120:14, 15 conference 121 23:3,6 8,11,15,16,17,21,22 21:3,7, 
between [31 5: 15 11 :3 22: change l6J 4:12 a:1 a,20, confident (215:13 8:15 17 22: 1,2.4,7,9, 15, 16,20,23 
21 20 9:5 22:2 conflict 1116:22 23:2,8, 11, 13, 15,20 24:11 
beverly [2J 24:9,28 changing 1118:23 confused r1116:12 courts r1121 :21 
bility r11 20:4 . charge r1118:8 consequences r1115:9 court's [4118:1419:12,15, 
bind t1116:5 chose (414:1210:1115:4 contact 12112:20 15:2 24 
blame (1114:20 21:9 contacted (116:16 craig 1113:4 
bottom !1111 :8 chronological 1113:16 contacting (2112:1614: critical 1217:23 9:9 
bound 1a116:3 18:14,23, cited 1119:25 24 cross [313:24 4:11 7:20 
25 19:2, 13, 15 21 :8 civil !117:9 contained 11111:10 D brady [2J 7:9,9 civility 1117:5 contains l1J 24:13 
brief 11115: 12 claim Pl 10:25 continuation 111 22:25 date 12122:11, 19 
briefly 11121 :18 claimant 11119:7 continue 12118:9 20:13 day 12123:5 24:21 
but 12213:9, 14 5:1 6:19 7:3, clarified 11111 :24 contractor 111 24: 1 o dead 111 20:11 
6,118:2,20 9:3,1713:18 clarify 11116:15 contradict 11115:18 deal (315:8 10:6 20: 11 
15:1416:22 18:21,25 19:2, clear 110111:1813:14,19 contradicted 11118:5 decided [5J 3: 14 4:4,8 8: 
9 20:1,9 22:3,12 14:4,2115:119:11.19 21:3 contrary (3113:2416:10 22,24 
buyer's Pl 21: 12 23:8 21:7 decision 11114:1 
by 12013: 11 5:22 6:3 9:6 11: clearly (313:1 7:13 19:19 conver 1116:21 decisions 11115:9 
25 12:1815:14 17:12 18: clerk 111 22: 15 conversation 11116:11 defend 1117:7 
14,23,25 19:2, 13, 15 20:8, client 1217:719:19 conveyed 1117:16 defendant 12s1 3:4,21 4:4, 
16 21 :8,23 22:5 24:9 co-counsel 111 5:8 cook 11a13:3,4 15:10.1218: 5,8 5:11,23 7:23 9:5,9,12, 
C colloquy 1415:15 15:19 18: 16,2019:17,22 20:1 21:16, 2510:4,2211:4,7,21,2512: 
18 19:10 18 22:18,22,24 23:7, 12, 14, 1814:4,15,19,2419:3 20: 
calculated (4114:16 15:4, combine 11119:3 18 20 21:8 
8 21 :10 come 110111:1912:8 13: cooperative 1216:4 19:8 defendant's £313:1811: 
calendar 12122:17 23:21 22 14:2, 18 20:21,22 21 :3,5 correct l6J 15:25 19: 18 22: 1212:4 
call 13112:24 13:2 22:12 23:4 23 23:13 24:13,20 defense 11016:13,23 7:17 
calling [2117:23,24 comes 1116:6 correctly [119: 15 8:8 9:14 17: 14,23 19: 14 20: 
came 11112:10 commission 11124:22 cost Pl 17:14 18 21:25 
can [814:6 9:19,2214:715: commitment (3J 11:15 12: could (914:12 5:8 8:18,19 defenses [118:7 
17 19:6 22:2,2 4 13:13 14:6,22 15:13 17:4 21:6 defense's r11 18: 13 
cannot (1120:8 communicated r2113:7, counsel (71 5: 15 7:5 11 :8 degree 11114: 17 
capable 11114:24 12 15:14,2116:1221:25 delay 11122:8 
case (1413:16 4:10 5:2 7:1, company 121 6:3,3 counseling 1215:25 6:1 delaying 111 22:7 
6,12,17,20 8:13,1714:15 complainant r1213:18,24 counter (113:11 depending 12122:13 23:4 
15:1717:14,24 4:4,10,20 5:20 6:8, 16 7:21 counting r1120:2 depth 111 3:9 
cases {219:8,21 8:1310:4 20:5 county 12124:4,26 deserved [1J 17:1 
causes 1119:25 complaining 111 20:25 couple [313:5 6:5 12:18 desires Pl 6:14 14:12 17: 
ccr/cct Pl 24:28 complete r119:5 course (413:13 7:6 18:10. 25 
cct 11124:24 completely 1517:14 B:23 11 despite 11119:9 
certain {2118:22 24: 18 18:4 20:4,6 court [66J 3: 1,3,6,8 4:24 5: determine c1115:3 
certainly l313:1 8:2 18:21 concern 12113:4,8 4,6,15,16 6:23 8:16,24 9:21 deviate c1122:2 
certif r1111 :7 concluded 11123:22 10:5,11,16,19,23,2411:19 did !1314: 14 5: 11,20,22 6:2 
certificate c1124:1 concludes £1123:21 12:8,10,22,2513:17,2314: 10:511:212:20 16:19,25, 
www.protext.com 
Sheet 2 believes ~ did 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 18:319:10 entire 1217: 1 11 :9 february (116:5 given [3J 3:15 8:5 22:24 
didn't [1216:18 8:2,9 9:13 entirety (11 21 :20 feeling 11110:12 go [2014:5, 14,24 5:10, 11, 12, 
10:1,2512:1413:1516:18, entitled l1J 22:4 felony [315:10 8:1514:17 17,21,22 6:7,8, 18,20 8:22 
1917:21 20:12 especially Pl 21 :22 felt (1117:1 10:7 13:24 16:17,20,2317: 
difference c1120:1 essentially (41 7:2 9:4 12: field [1121 :19 1,3,518:2,8 20:8, 12, 13 21: 
different [515:5 9:1111:3 113:17 file (116:17 9 
19:6 20:6 even 11113:5 19:5 20:15, filed (413:11 4:16, 17 6:24 goal (1113:10 
difficulty c1112: 15 24 21 :1,4 23:2 final (1117:6 goes (319:14 16:6 17:15 
direction [11 24:7 event 11111:13 finally 1115:4 going [1513: 16 4:2 5: 1,25 
disclose 1117:8 everyl3l6:48:1119:13 finals r21 9:2,4 8:9 10:4 13:23 16:9 18:24 
disclosing 1117:10 everybody 13119:11.15, find [514:20 7:15,21 9:13 19:1,4,24 20:5 22:1,10 
discovery (318:5, 11 18:9 19 17:24 good 12115:14 21 :24 
discretion [11 20:15 everybody's 11119:16 fine [313:2,3 15:14 got r1114:16 
discussed [1119:23 everyone 1215:22 8:24 first (416: 12 7:3 11 :6 18:7 grant [1118: 11 
discussion l1J 10:21 evidence (414: 18, 18 7: 1 o flater (3110:17.20 20:19 granted 111 20:e 
dislike r1122:7 24:14 focus [3112:1113:10 17:8 gross [317:14 9:7 12:23 
disposition r114:12 evidentiary 1115:6 focusing [1117:9 ground 1117:3 
dispute 12113:1,3 exactly I3J 4:20 13:19,21 follow (3110: 11 21 :22 22:5 grounds r217:2 18:7 
district (214:3 s: 1 examine [31 3:24 4:11 7: for (3013:12 4:17 5:2,3 6:11 guess (317:212:1715:13 
dna 1114:18 20 7:23,24 8:4 9:910:17,23, guilt {1115:6 
do r1a13:8 4:9,23 7:11,24 exchange c1111:12 2311:12 12:4,2313:3,23 guilty 11113:5 4:23 5:24 6: 
13:2514:6,7,7,8 16:9 19:6, excused 11123:18 14:315:7,1316:217:7,23 25,25 10:24 11 :7, 13 12:22 
24,24 21 :4 22: 14 23:20 24: expectation 11122:4 18:1,10 20:21,23 21:5,24 15:2017:8,11,16,17,1818: 
6 expected 11i 10:15 24:5 2,10 
document r21 11 :8,9 expecting r1118:22 foremost 1111:3 gun r219:12, 13 
does [714:511:1416:517: experience (114:9 forgiving r1119:8 H 13 I 21 20: 15 I 17 expires t1124:22 form 11112:6 
doesn't l4l 5:12, 17 19: 15 explain 11112:23 forth 11118:8 had [1 BJ 3:9,9,25 6:9, 12, 13, 
21:12 explained [3112:11. 14 19: found l319:12,13,13 18 7:24 8:7,21,24 9:11,13 
done [3J 6:12 1:12 20:11 19 frequently r1114:11 10:3 12:2, 15,25 15:2 
don't [615:113:1 15:1717: extremely (11 22:9 friends 1117:22 hadn't [219:12 12:13 
3 21 :1 22:20 F from 11s13:6 6:20,2111:18 hand r1124:21 drinking (113: 19 12:2113:1514:5,5,615:16, happen 11119:4 
during [414:1612:1315: face Pl 15:9 1617:8,16 20:14 24:8 happened rs1 4: 1 7:21 9:5 
19,20 fact 11118:6,1911:2,2212: front [1117:19 10:2211:2 
duty Pl7:8 8,20 13:7 14:7 18:17 20:11, frustrating 11122:9 hard 11119:21 
E 24 fulfilling 1119:23 has [814:4 7:8, 12 14:2415: facts (713:13,14 9:613:1 full r1124:13 9 21 :2 22:8,9 
effect 1118:7 18:1,24 19:5 fully (2111:1013:11 hasn't 11120:24 
effort 1117:14 fail 11121 :20 further 1s112:10 15:11 20: hate Pl 7:11 
efforts r11 B:4 failing (2112:23 14:20 17 22:8 24:16 have (34J 3:8,12, 15 4:9,13, 
either [217:13 23:2 fairly c117:5 G 23 6:17 7:2,7,25,25 8:1,7, element !117:18 far 12117:23 21: 1 25 9:1,2110:613:9,11,11, 
else l2J a:12 14:6 favorable [614:10 18:24 get l1110:10 18 15:14 16: 12 19:7, 18 20: 
enter (3110:25 11 :2 21 :9 19: 1 20: 10 I 10 21: 11 girlfriend f1J 3:25 15,17,19 22:6,14,16,24 23: 
entered 1518:6 10:23 15:3, favorably t11 8:9 give 161a:1010:13, 14 19:1 18 24:9 
5 21:4 feature 1117:19 22:10,21 having (3118:1319:2021: 
www.protext.com 
Sheet 3 did ~ having 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Keyword Index 
19 I informed (119:11 jazz 1119:2 haws r21 24:5,24 ingly (1115:8 jointly l1J 21 :22 
he 14513:21 4:21 5:9,9,12, i [65)3:7,10,11,14 4:22,22, initially 11112:14 judge (2121:16,18 
16 6:2,2,4,12 10:25 11:2 23,23 5:1 7:2,9 8:25 9:810: inquire 12118:3 22:1 a judicial r1114: 1 o 
12:13,15,15,1913:5,8,9,11, 19,2012:17,1713:1,3,10, insist r1111 :14 june 1213:22 19: 11 
14,15,21,25,2514:1615:1, 16,1914:10,1915:13,17,19 integrity l1J 9:10 jury (2J 5:24 s:11 
2,3,3,5,8,22 16:6,7, 12, 15, 16: 18, 19, 19,20,21,22,23 17: intent r117:15 just [1713:5,6 6:5 9:20 10:7, 
2517:119:13 21:4,10,12, 1,3,7,23,2518:18,20,20 19: intentional r217:1312:22 11,2112:11,17 14:5,1515: 
12, 13 11,12,14 20:18,19,25 21:1, interested r11 24: 16 1216:819:11 21:2,18,24 
hearing r1s13:22 4:2,7,9, 1, 16, 18 22:6,7, 10, 18,20,21 interesting 11118:18 K 11,13 5:6 7:1912:1313:3 23:2,15,20 24:5,9,16,16 interview 1216:2 17:3 
16:1617:9,1518:8 22:13 icate 11111 :8 interviewing 11114:25 kane 1114:19,25 6:15 12: 
23:22 identified 11124: 18 into (514:2 8:6 9:18 18:2 25 13:5 16:14, 18 
he'd [1J 4:22 if [22] 3:3 4:9, 10 8:25 9:2,3, 23:5 kind t21 8:25,25 
her (2313:24 4:20 6:12, 14, 3. 19,2110:11 13:7, 16 14: investigator [314:19 6:15 knew (118:18 
14,16,218:2010:512:15, 18,22,22 15:1 16:2 21 :20 12:19 know [2213:8 5:1 6:4,11,21 
16,1613:4,8,914:25,2515: 22:12,20,24 23:2 involving Pl 3:18 7:7,8,118:1,1910:1115:7 
3 16:4,7 19:2 21:3 24:10 illusory (1J 9:22 is (4SJJ:9,10,10,11,194:24 17:2,6,20,21 18:21 19:2,5 
here (SJ 9:5 10:3,9,22 17:6 i'm [SJ 3:3 5:1218:13 19:20 7:3,19,23 8:2,13 9:9,15,17, 20:9 21:1 22:2 
18:13 22:9 18,1810:9,22,2511:1,612: knowing [2J 18:14 21:9 
hereby [11 24:6 important 1113:1 o 7:19 2215:2016:1,3,8,12,13,17 knowingly r219:20 10:25 
he's {715:25 6:110:23 13: 10:22 11: 1 15:20 16:20,22 17:6,8,12,1218:7,14,14,21, knowledge 111 5:2 
23 14:24 16:21 18:24 impossibilities t1110:2 25 19:3,4 20: 1,4 21 :24,24 known [21 B:2 10:3 
high (217:8 20:2 impression 11119:1 22:11,13 23:4 24:13 knows r113:6 
higher (118:14 in [70J 3:4, 16, 18,23 4: 1 o. 11, isn't (211 s:20 19:5 L 
highly l1l 22:1 19 5:4,14 6:4,5,6,10,17,22, issue (21 22: 11,20 
him l27J3:22 4:14 s:12,11, 22 7:6,6, 12, 19 8:13 9:21,25 issues [2118:13 20:20 language r2117:17, 18 
21,22 6:8,8, 18, 19,20 8: 10, 11 :2,3,7,8, 10, 12, 13, 17, 17, it (67)3:3,7,9,17,19 4:22 5:2, later r1116:25 
2213:10,1215:716:19,22, 22,25 12:8,20,24 13:7, 12 2,6,19,216:77:11,23,24,25 
law Pl 22:17 
2317:1,3,5,13 20:5,12,13 14:1,7,15,2015:17,18,19 8:12,18,19,19,22,23123 9:7, 
lawyers r117:5 
21 :13 16:5, 14, 14 17:19,24 18:4,6, 10,14,1910:111:9,12,22 
lead (1123:5 
hired (213:21 6:3 17 20: 11,22,24 21: 5, 19,20, 13:2,2,3,4,17,2214:1,4,6,7, least [216:9 11 :3 
his (2314:19 6:2,23 8:11 10: 20,25 22:11,20,24 23:5 24: 15,21 15: 1,20 16:8,9 17:2,4 leave (1110:23 
23,24,25,25 11 :2,25,25 12: 5, 16, 18,26 18:2,21 19:3, 15, 15,24 20:9, 
legal (2J 3:13 15:6 
1915:3,5,6,7,9,16,1619:10, incident (113:17 11,11,12 21:3,11,24,24 22: legally (2115:6 21: 14 
1021:4,10 including [118:24 12 23:3,5,5 legitimate 111 21: 15 license Pl 24: 11 history 1117:21 independent (3114:12, 13 its (2121 :20 22:2 like (713:7 4:10, 18 7:20 a: home 1113:-18 24:10 it's l14J 6:6,22 7:3, 12 9:20 
honor (1613:10 9:810:18, indica 111 s: 12 13:14 15:22 16:20 17:23 1316:2121:11 
2012:1115:12,2516:118: indicate (1112:7 18:1,119:6 21:2 22:15 list (216:19 16:24 
6 20:19 21:19 22:18 23:10, indicated (5J 11:5 12:1,3, itself l219:18 11:10 list.' r1116:21 
12,14,19 2113:4 i've (11 8:25 little l1J 3:8 
hope [1J 22: 11 indicates [2J 11:9 12:19 J 
long 11113:21,23 4:4,8,17 5: 
hoping {2114:17 21:10 industry Pl 21 :25 7,20,23 6:3 7:17 17:11 
how [213:9 22:14 influence (1120:16 jail 11116:5 long's [114:9 
however £314:2 9:7 22:9 info (1119:25 january 1414:16, 19 5:4 24: look (1111:1 
information r217: 16 8:1 23 lose r1110:7 
lost c21 9:2 20: 15 
www.protext.com 
Sheet 4 having - lost 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Keyword Index 
lot (2110:21 20:25 10 norm 11121 :24 opposite t11 8:23 
lowe 121 24:9,28 mistaken 111 20:9 not (5514:5,7,13,13,14 5:2, optimistic c214:6 19:4 
M misunderstanding [31 11,20,22 7:9, 10,24,25 8:2,9, or (2214:16:257:13 8:9,20 
ma'am 11123:7 
13:16,17 17:4 22 9:19,2210:6,711:14,20 9:6, 13,20 10:2,4 12:23,23 
misunderstood 12113: 12:9 13:11,2315:4 16:3,3, 13:1,1116:1318:219:820: 
made 12514:17 a:10.21 9: 11, 18 4,4,5, 7,8,8,9, 13, 13, 16, 19 3,5,8 23:3,6 
20 10:5,6 14:1,9 15:4,5,7, modified 1117:17 17:13,21 18:14,23,25 19:2, orally 11111 :24 
1417:1918:4,1819:13,14 moment 11112:17 13,15 20:9 21:8,11 22:12, order 1113:16 
20:4,24 21: 1,3,22,23 22:5 months 1116:5 15 24:16,18,19 original 11118:7 
24:8 more [3J 3:916:20,22 notary 121 24:5,25 other (3J 3:25 6:2,3 
magness r215:25 6:7 morning 1213:19 4:1 notice (3114:10 19:16,20 otherwise 111 23:4 
main (217:18,18 most 11111 :1 now 1114:24 8:2 15:5,8 17: our 1913:12, 13 5:14 7:3,7 
majority r21 21 :21 22:3 motion l313:12 6:24 22:17 620:321:12 10:815:2519:19 23:21 
make [9114:11,1315:118: motions [SJ 4:17 5:3,5,5 8: 0 out [814:20 7:15,2111:11 24 19:3, 11 20:3 21 :7, 16 4 10:14 16:1317:25 21:12,14 
making r119:23 motivation 111 a:10 obligate 11113:23 outcome l1J 24:16 
many [1122:14 mr [57J 3:3,21,23 4:3,4,8,9, obligated l1J 9:15 over [213:16 4:22 
march 1116:15 17,19,25 5:7,7,23,25 6:3,7, obligation (117:7 overcoming r1119:21 
matter 1s13:4 8:22,23 18:9 15,22 7:14,17 8:1610:17, obtain 1118:2 overnight r11 3: 19 
19:15 22:10 2012:21,2513:5},18,19 obtained (217:25 8: 1 overturned 1119:19 
matters r213:5 24:14 15:10,12,15,21,22,2516:14, obviously 1116:22 own 1s110:11, 12 11:2512: 
may [3713:8 4:3 5:7 6:22 7: 1818:5,16,2019:10,17,18, occur 1419:22 10:1, 1 22: 114:13 
148:7,2011:1912:8,2113: 22 20:1,19 21:16,18 22:18, 18 p 
7,9, 11,11, 18, 18, 19,22,25 22,24 23:7,10,12,14,17,18 occurred (61 3: 17 .1 a,20 9: 
15:15,2516:12,1518:519: much 1218:13 10:7 6 15:16 17:11 page 12111:a 16:17 
10 21:4,5,16 22:14,16,18 muddies (1J 10:21 occurring 11120:3 parole 12114:8, 11 
23:10,16,17,18 24:19,21 my [aJ 5:2 13: 1 o, 1 o 22: 11, o'clock 1213:7 22:17 parsons [3115:21,22 19: 
maybe (117:8 21 24:7,21,22 offender {3J 13:6,8, 10 18 
may's [1) 8: 16 N offender's r2116:21,23 part [317:14 9:1718:17 me r2116:20,23 office 1114:3 particular c11 7:6 
mean (317:9 13:9 17:8 name r21 24: 19,20 okay 1s13:310:2016:19 parties 11124: 1 a 
meantime r1122:12 nba [219:2,4 22:16 23:6, 16 party Pl 3: 19 
memo (113:6 nebulous 11115:21 omitted 11118:9 people 11111:20 
memorandum 1215:14 need 1114:25 on f52J 3:2,5, 11,22 4:1,9, 11 persuasive c11 22: 1 
11:17 negative 1116:6 5:1,3,6, 10, 14 6:15, 16, 19,21, phone rsi 6:16,21 12:24 
mendations (1J 21:11 negligence (319:7 12:23 23,24 7:14 8:7,8,12,1411:4, 13:2 16:11 
ment r2111:112:2 14:19 6,8,24 13:5,8, 10, 14, 15, 19, picking c11 3:2 
met (1112: 15 negligent 1117:14 2116:6,17,21,2319:10,11, plea [31J 3:5 4: 17 5: 1 a 6:25 
might 1317: 11 20:21,22 never r11 6:18 16,19,24 20:2 22:13,14,16, 8:6 9:1,1910:23,24,2511: 
mind r21 a:20 22:2 nevertheless 11118:21 16,19 23:4,8,15 2,7,10,1214:21 15:3,5,7,7, 
mis 11117:15 news 1114:7 once 1115:11 20 17:8, 11, 16, 17, 18 18:3, 
misconduct 1117:4 next r113:19 one [813:7 9:213:1818:1, 10 20:3 21:4,10, 14 
misrepresentation {3J 7: night {214:1 7:22 12,12,1819:8 plead r115:24 
13 9:6 12:22 no [23J 3:11 4:17 8:14, 14 9: ongoing l1117:24 please r113:3 
misrepresentations r11 1111:16,18,1912:5,815:6, only [219:3 18:3 pied r114:23 
10:2 14,2316:1817:2118:2,2, opportunity 12114:2 15:2 point f4J 5:9 12: 17 15:16 
misrepresenting r117: 18 20:14,21,22 21:6,7 opposed r218:14 19:7 21:2 
www.protext.com 
Sheet 5 lot - point 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Keyword Index 
pointed 12111:1716:13 prosecutorial 1317:4 17: regards 11112:18 s position 1s111 :20.22,23 15 21:25 registry 1416:19 13:6,9, 11 
12:16,24 21 :21 prosecutor's (3113:14 rehabilitation 1116:1 said r1s14:4,21,25 5: 12. 16 
possibly r113:25 18:23 20:16 reinstate 11118:7 6:17,18,22 9:21 10:915:22 
powerful c1116:10 protect r1114:2 related r213:4 24:14 16:20,2119:12 24:9,15 
practice 12121 :19,24 provided 12111:2512:25 relevant 11118:21 same (1417:3 9:20 10:312: 
precisely [1122:19 public 12124:5,25 rely r219:10 22:4 1,1,2,7,7,13 20:19,19,20,20 
preliminary [913:22 4:2,8, purposes r213:12 13:3 remainder 1114:16 24:14 
11,13 7:1917:9,1518:8 put [314:1011:4,6 reminded 11119:14 sation r1 I 6:22 
prepare 11124:9 putting 11119:1 o remorse 11121:12 say (917:11 9:3,7 15:13.21 
prepared r113:24 Q reopen (116:25 16:18,1917:21 22:6 present r1119:5 repeatedly r1117:2 saying [319:1 16:1217:20 
presented 111 5:4 question 1317:4 17:6, 16 reply 1213:915:12 says r1116:7 9:19 11:1215: 
pre-sentence 1316:10 14: questioning f1J 16:14 report 1616:6.10 9:1614:8 2516:7,14,18,18,19,2517: 
8 21:6 quite rs115:2116:9,1317: 18:4 21:6 2 
previously (1 J 23:2 4,23 reporter (11 24: 11 scenario [215:2119:6 
primary f3112: 11 13:4,8 quotation 111 s:10 reporter's [1124:1 scheduled [11 3:22 
prior [114:2 quoted f3J 5:14 9:8 15:22 reports r1114:11 scheduling {21 23:3,6 
prison 1s214:5, 15 5: 11.13, R repre 12119:13 20:6 seal 11124:21 
17,21,22 6:7,8, 18,20 8:9, 14. 
raised 11112:18 represent r115:19 
second 1319: 17 10:814: 
14.22 10:411:15,16,1912: 
raises 1117:4 representation 1a14:14 
16 
4,5,9, 15,21 13: 13,23 14:3,9, 
ramifications 1113:13 5:18 6:14 7:24 8:16,2117: 
second-degree 1215:10 
18,22 15:23 16:2,3,4,8, 13, 
read 1113:7 7,12 
8:15 
17,20,22 17: 1,2,3,5, 13,22 
ready 11110:11 representations 1s16:23 
secondly [318:4 15:1916: 
20:6,13,13,22,23,23 21:5 15:1318:4 19:2,14 11 
private r116:3 really [SJ 7:2 9:17 15:1716: represented 111 5:9 see 11123:15 
proba 11120:3 13 22:7 representing (2] 3:4,21 seeking (3111:1416:4,8 
reason 12115:7 18:3 probability 1218: 14 20:2 
received 1113:6 request [7111:1912:8,10, 
seems [2117:4 21 :11 
probably 11113:3 
recognize c1122:3 15 16:4,7 18:13 
sent r1117:13 
probation r121 5:20 9:2,3 requests 11112:3 sentation 11119:14 
10:10, 1311:1612:614:8, 
recom [2110:11 21 :10 
residing 111 24:26 sented r11 20:7 
recommend r1s1 s:20 6:7 
1115:2417:1318:11 8:99:1,310:4,1011:1512: 
resolved 1114:6 sentence [411 o: 13 16:2,4, 
problem 1216:13 20:20 respect (116:4 8 
procedural r113:5 5,5 14:18,22 15:23,23 16:3 response Pl 10:17 sentencing [714:24 15:1 
20:23 proceeded [117:25 
recommendation r111 revenge 1116:11 
20:24 22:14,25 23:3,6 
proceeding r11 24:7 
10:1214:5,916:1,518:15, 
right (8110:1615:2,1017: seriously c117:17 
proceedings 11124:8 10,1918:12 23:11,15 serve [21 6:9 16 :22 
process 11123:1 23,24 20:10, 14, 16.25 21:2, rights {315:24 8:1114:2 set [416:24 18:9, 10 19:5 
programs (11 6:2 3,7,23 22:5 risk rs114:1615:4,5,8 21: several 1219:21,25 
promise [1J 9:22 recommendations 1a1 10 sex [416:19 13:6,8,10 
promises r1111 :9 14:11,13,14 20:8 21:8,13, risky (2117:23,25 sexual (2116:21,23 22 22:1 prosecution [7J 9:10,15 
record [91 3:2 5: 14 11 :4,6, robe rt r1116: 16 
shares 11114:19 
11:13,1512:2,5 22:5 rule (211:10 23:2 shaun [114:19 
prosecutor {13J 5: 19 7:7 24 13:15,22 19:10 24:18 ruling [7122:11,13,20,21. she [48)4:5,7,14,14,215: 
9:1,1110:1211:14,2012: 
recording 11124:15 25 23:4,5 12.22 6:9,11,12,17,18,18, 
10,1415:2316:16 20:14 
records 111 24:8 
ruling/sentencing r11 18,19 8:8,20,21,2210:5,5 
reference r1118:19 
21:23 
regard 11118: 13 22:12 
12: 10,20,21 13:5, 11, 12, 15, 
www.protext.com 
Sheet6 pointed - she 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Keyword Index 
25 16:8, 12, 13, 18, 19 17:2,3, story 1114:21 1917:418:6 20:14 22:13 took 12114:15 21:10 
4,12,12,13,20,21,2518:2 struck 1215:8,18 therefore 1218:6 24:19 transcribed r1124:7 
20:12,12 21:4,4 submit 12113:1614:19 thereof 11124:17 transcript [SJ 6: 17 11 :25 
she's 1214:5 16:9 submitted 11114:9 there's 1418:1311:1715:6 16: 11 24: 1 0 I 1 3 
show 11114:17 substantial r1122:8 18:2 transcription r2112:24 
shown 11114:24 substantially 11117:14 these [71 s:s 8:7 10:14 15: 13:2 
shows i119:B such 11114: 1 15 I 18 19: 3 24: 8 transmitter r11 24:8 
side 1117:5 suddenly 1116:6 they 12s14:12, 16 5:9 6:7 7: treating 1117:5 
signed r2120:12 24:27 suffered 1116:9 16,24,25 8:1,2,3,15,18 9:3, trial 1s1 5:24 8: 11 10:7 17: 
simply l3J 8:1216:1 21:24 sufficient 12115:618:7 3,12,12,13,1310:314:13 10 18:10 
since r1120: 17 suggested 1115:8 15:1516:1517:2118:319: true [313:13 18:16 24:13 
situation 12110:3 19:20 summary 11118:6 520:4,921:11 try (1) 10:10 
so [38] 3:2,8, 11, 16 4:12,25 support r1111 :7 they're 12120:2,25 turn 12120:22 23:5 
5:2,14,21 6:5,10,12,15,21 7: suppositions 11115:17 thing 11013: 1 o 7:23 a: 12 9: two 1317:211:3, 1a 
2, 11 8:10,22 9:8, 13 10:8 suppress r115:5 2,4,2016:2318:1,1,21 type 1119:9 
11:113:2516:7,817:3,15 suppression 1214:18 8:5 things [814:18 5:6 7:8,10 u 18:619:3,15,18,19,20 20: supreme r119:21 12:18 18:22 19:3 21:9 
13 21:13 22:13 23:8,15 sure {515:12 16:9 19:11 20: think (13J 3: 1 o, 11, 14 9:8 uh-huh r2119:17,22 
some rs13:2512:614:20, 1 21: 17 10:2015:17,1917:3.23,25 unclear 11113:25 
2017:1 switched r1120:4 18:20,20 20:25 under (715:21 18:23 20:9 
somehow (1J 12:22 system r1121 :20 thinking 1119:14 22:10 24:7,10,12 
something [514:61:12 9: T third t1110:9 undergoing 1116:1 
22 10:119:4 20:2 this (53) 3:4,5, 16.17 4:10, understand [2112:23 19: 
sort [314:5 10:21 18:22 take [3112:1714:10 22:10 18 5:7,13 6:3,6,12,13 7:6, 12 
speaker r11 24:20 taken r1115:17 12,15,15,16,17,20,24 8:10, understanding 12112:2.7 
speaking r1113:5 talk r214:24,25 13, 16,21 9:6,9, 18 10:6,21 understandings 11111: 
specific [1118: 17 talking 111 9:20 12:17 13:3 14:1515:17 16: 18 
specifically [315:16 16:7 team r119:14 17,2517:3,12,13,14,15,19 understood [3113:9 14:4 
19:23 thad r1116:15 18:9,1519:6,13,24 20:4 21: 15:22 
spoke [214:19 6:16 than (219:11 20:6 2 22:7,8 24:7.13,21 unknown r1111:22 
stand r114: 11 thank 1~2110:16,20 15:10 thoroughly r113:24 unless 12112:3 18:10 
starters (1115:13 18:11,12 21:18 22:7 23:7, those {4111:1812:7 21:8,9 up [413:28:5,1014:17 
state r2013:6, 11, 14 7:4 8: 14, 16, 17,20 though [2119:5 20:15 upon [1214:7, 13 5:18 6:9 8: 
189:2410:1011:4,612:9 thanks t11 22:6 thought (314:22,22 18:18 15,19 9:10,1411:1417:9 
13:2414:5,22 16:5 19:12 that's [2713:1,2,9 5:1,22 9: three 1116:9 19:4 22:4 
20:17,22,24 24:2,5 2,4,4 10:3,8 13:9, 10, 19,21, through 11124:15 us [1)10:14 
stated l4J 3:23 5:1913:21, 24 14:22,22 15:25 16:4,7 throughout Pl 17:2 utah rs1 24:2,4,6, 12,26 
22 18:16,17,2019:18.20 22:5 tied [119:18 V 
statement [Gl 6:2110:6 23:18 time r2113:9,23 5:7 8:21 10: 
11: 1116: 10 21: 16 24: 19 their [214:12 14:13 2211:4,2212:5,1515:23 valid 11121:14 
statements [3113:1515: them 1s1 3: 14 4: 1 o, 11,24 16:22,25 17:2,22 19:13,21 valuable r11 a: 1 
1517:19 17:14 20:4,12 21:21 22:3,22 various [SJ 4: 17 5:3,5 6:2, 
state's 1s112:1114:13 11: then 11413: 13 5:4.25 6:15 tion 111 6:13 23 8:4,7 10:2 
821:123:8 9:2210:8,13,13,1415:25 tj [1] 22:14 vast 14121:21,21 22:3,3 
statute 1119: 18 16:6,25 23:3,15 today l2J 3:7, 12 vehemently 11110:s 
statutes (1124:12 there 11313:11 4:16 5:15 6: told 1214:21,23 verdict 1116:25 
still {2119:4 21 :9 13 7:1210:611:213:1614: too 1414:6 8:5 10:7 22: 15 version 1114:20 
very [2315:13 6:4,6, 10,207: 
www.protext.com 
Sheet 7 she ~ very 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-~ 
Keyword Index 
8,19,23 8:8,15,20 9:1410:5 5 will (1713:14 11:15 12:5,5 25 19:2 
13:9 15:20 16: 10, 10 17:25, ways (1111:3 15:23,23 22:4, 10, 13, 18,21, 
2519:7,7,8 21:14 we (3713:6,8,9, 12. 14 4:6 5: 25 23:2,3,5,5, 15 
victim 127)5:11,16,1711: 14 6:17,24 7:2,6,7, 11 9:8, willing 111 s:10 
13, 19,23 12:3,8,9, 14,20,25 2010:2,9,13,1515:13,14 win 1119:4 
13:4,18,20,2214:6,17,23, 16:117:6,7,20,2118:6 19: wish Pl5:20 
2515:2 16:2,3 18:25 20:5, 18,23 20:15 21 :20 22:2,3,3, wishes [6112:12 13:24 14: 
21 21 :2 14 23:18,18 21,2515:316:2 
victim's f9J 11:20,2112:12, we'd [114:22 with 11315:3 6: 13, 16,22 7:5, 
2413:2414:2,12,2016:1 well (1814:12,21,25 5:17 8: 18 9:23 12: 15, 18,25 15:8 
view 11115:16 1811:24 13:1,914:415:12 18:13 24:19 
vindictive 1414:7 6:11 8: 16:9,12,2018:2019:10,12 withdraw (3110:14,24 15: 
1319:7 22:20 23:9 7 
voluntarily [319:1911:1 we'll i2122:12, 16 without (1110:12 
15:8 wendy 12124:5,24 witness 131 7: 15 17:24 24: 
w went [415:3,25 6:2 19:11 21 
were r1s1 5:6 8:8, 15 9:6,20 witnesses 1113:25 
waive 1214:8 5:23 11:214:2116:2 17:6,7,19 won't 11113:3 
waived 1217:25 B:8 20:9 21: 11 24: 15, 18 words 12111:1812:7 
waiver 1117:18 we're [713:1 5:13 10:9 16: working 11124:10 
waiving 12117:10. 10 3,9 17:9 20:1 would [35J 3:14 4:14,23 5: 
want (2014:5, 14 5:11, 12, 17, weren't 1218:3 21 :20 19,19 7:9,24,25 8:1,16 9:1, 
22 6:18 8:9 9:7 12:20 13: we've 1119:25 3,1110:1,6,13,1411:21,22, 
10,16,2516:16, 19,25 17:1, what (40J 3:25 4:20 6:9, 11, 2312:10,1713:1614:10 
13,21 20:13 22 7:21 8:24 9:5,5, 15 10:9, 15:2116:117:2518:11 20: 
wanted i1s1 6:8,8, 11.1 e,20 22 11 :2,5,20,21,23 12:9, 16, 10,10,13 21:6,11,18,20 
8:22 13:12,20 14:7,2315:1 2313:19,2514:12, 12,20,22, wouldn't [3114:17,18,18 
16:13, 15,22,23 17:3,5 20: 2315:15,1816:917:6,7,25 written [31 22:11,20,25 
12 18:219:20 20:6,25 22:13, y 
wanting 11111:12 18 23:4 
wants {5114:7 18:2 19:24 whatever 141 8:20 14:6,7 year r115:3 
21:12,14 19:24 years (216:9 21:19 
was [89J 3:17, 19,22,23 4:7, what's 111 5: 1 yes [815:12 10:19 15:12 17: 
17,21,21,22,23 5:2,7,9,15, when [1313:17,20 8:12 10: 118:20 23:7,10,20 
18,19,216:4,10,12,137:12, 5 11:2 12:10,1513:517:18 yet PJ 20:25 
18 8:5,6,9, 10, 12, 19,21,22, 18:2 19:6,6,9 you 1s213:2,8 4:9, 10,25 6:4, 
23,23 9:1910:4,7, 10 11:4,5, where 1415:18 16:12 17:18 11,217:6,8,11,11,258:19, 
6, 18,20,22,24 12:2,9, 11, 16, 21:21 25 9:3,7,2110:11,16,17,20 
19,24,25 13:2,5,5,7,8, 16, 17, whether 1318:115:1516: 15:1016:16,2517:1,2,6,18, 
22,2514:4,5,9, 17, 19,2115: 15 20 18:11, 12,21,22,23,25 19: 
7 16:8,9,21,23 18:3,9, 18 19: which f1SJ 7:6, 17 8:7, 10 9: 2,5,6, 7, 12 20:9 21: 18 22:7, 
11, 19,20 20:5,6,6, 11, 11.12, 17,18,18,2511:3,517:8 20: 10,16,24 23:7,14,16,17,20 
14,20 21:3,7,14 24:7 6 22:8 24:14,15 you'll Pl 23:4 
wasn't {3J 11:2112:1613: who [2J 4:20 15:22 your (16JJ:10 9:810:11,12, 
19 whole [317:9,2119:6 17,20 15:12,2518:6 20:19 
water l1J 10:21 wholly 11114:12 21:19 22:18 23:10,12,14,18 
way [4J 11 :6 13:22 14:1 16: why 1315:23 13:19,21 you're [619:22,23 18:22.22, 
www.protext.com 
Sheet 8 very - you're 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum F 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 0 6 2015 
Salt Lake County .,,("J 
By: I 
------~--Deputy Clerk 
IN THE TffiRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 131903746 
Judge Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills 
Before the Court is Defendant's Amended Motion for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 
Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and Requests ("Motion"). 
The Court has reviewed the moving, opposition, and reply papers. A hearing was held on April 
27, 2015. Having considered the briefing and arguments of counsel, the Court now rules as 
follows. 
On April 12, 2012, Defendant was charged with ~pe, a first degree felony. On January 
5, 2015, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second degree 
felony. With the advice of counsel, Defendant signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Cotmsel ("Statement") confirming that his plea was volW1tary. 
That Statement was also signed by his counsel confirming that the Defendant had read or was 
read and understood the contents of that Statement and that the confirmations by the Defendant 
in the Statement were true. The bottom of page four of the Statement reads as follows: 
All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained 
in this statement, including those explained below: In exchange for the Defendant's plea 
of guilty the prosecution agrees that in the event the victim does not affirmatively insist 
upon the prosecutor seeking a prison commitment that the prosecutor will recommend 
probation and no prison. 
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Before signing the Statement, the prosecution had represented to the Defendant that, as of 
the time of initial intake, the victim's impression was that she would not seek prison time. 
Defendant was aware that the prosecution had not communicated with the victim since getting 
her initial impression. At an evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2015, the prosecution explained 
that the State's "recommendation is simply that we would honor the victim's wishes." On March 
2, 2015, the victim appeared in court and, in part, made the following statement: 
As far as what I believe should be dealt to you, I'm asking the Judge to sentence you two-
and-a-half years in prison, the same sentence you've dealt me. A prison I've been in, 
waiting for this to be over. I also want you to be on the sexual offenders list. 
Defendant contends that the prosecution made a material misrepresentation when it stated 
that the victim did not want Defendant to go to prison. According to Defendant, this material 
misrepresentation, which allegedly induced Defendant to accept the guilty plea, amounted to 
prosecutorial misconduct which violated the Defendant's due process rights and caused him to 
forego his right to a jury trial. The Court disagrees. Based on the record, the Court cannot 
conclude that the prosecutor made "affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be the 
truth." United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1961). Nor has the prosecutor 
intentionally made knowing use of false evidence by misrepresenting the nature of the victim's 
wishes. Rather, the prosecutor represented that, at the time he spoke with the victim, she was not 
seeking prison time. There is no evidence that these representations were contrary to what the 
prosecutor knew to be true. 
Next, Defendant contends that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code 
Ann.§ 77 .. 13-6(2)(A) because the plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Court respectfully 
disagrees. Contemplating voluntariness, the Utah Supreme Court recognized: 
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the 
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats ( or promises to discontinue improper 
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or 
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to 
the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes). 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 1988). Based on the record, the Court cannot 
characterize the prosecutor's statements as misrepresentations, unfulfilled, or unfulfillable 
promises. All of the statements on the record made by the prosecution were some version of an 
2 
00340 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
explanation that the victim initially did not appear to want the Defendant to go to prison, but the 
prosecution's recommendation remained consistently contingent on whatever the victim wanted. 
Importantly, Counsel for the Defendant, after the Court found that the Defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily entered into the plea, further represented to the Court that his client knew that the 
Court was not bound by the recommendation made by the prosecution. 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has explained: 
In order to assist courts in determining whether a plea is knowingly and voluntarily made, 
we created rule 11. Rule 11 highlights important rights that defendants must understand 
in order for their pleas to be valid. By addressing those rights with the defendant in the 
plea hearing, district courts can test the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea and 
create a record of their inquiry. Indeed, where a district court complies with all the 
provisions of rule 11, the court forecloses many potential arguments that the defendant's 
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27,124, 279 P.3d 371, 378. Here, there are no allegations that Rule 
11 was violated. The Court is satisfied that there was compliance with Rule and that Defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily entered into a guilty plea, particularly where "both the plea colloquy 
and the plea agreement, which was incorporated into the plea hearing record, clearly set forth the 
charges and the alleged conduct by [Defendant] that corresponded with the elements of the 
charges, in compliance with rule 11." State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55,118,309 P.3d 230. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Amended Motion 
for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed 
Motions and Requests is DENIED, consistent with the Court's Ruling above. The Court 
anticipates sentencing the Defendant at the date previously set, May 11, 2015. 
This Ruling and Order is the order of the Court, and no additional order is required to be 
prepared in this matter . 
DATED this~ day of May, 2015. 
3 
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713 
CRAIG S. COOK, PC 
3645 East Cascade Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Phone: (801) 485-8123 
E-mai I: k iskaar@.att.net 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III (#2535) 
P.O. Box 22626 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84122 
Phone: (801) 272-3905 
Facsimile: (80 I) 273-3906 
LARRY LONG (#1989) 
L. LONG LA WYER, INC. 
341 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801)322-4666 
E-mail: llon~ra;Jlonglawyer.corn 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, 
Defendant. 
1 
MOTION TO CLARIFY THE RULING 
AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA, REINSTATE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING, AND REINSTATE ALL 
PRIOR FILED MOTIONS AND 
REQUESTS 
CASE No. 131903746 
JUDGE: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS 
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COMES NOW, the Defendant, ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, by and through his 
counsel of record, Craig S. Cook, William B. Parsons and Larry Long, and hereby respectfully 
moves this Court for a clarification of the Ruling and Order ("Ruling and Order") issued by this 
Cou11 on May 6, 2015, in conjunction with the Defendant's Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 
Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate all Prior Filed Motions and Requests. The Ruling. 
and Order contains no specified Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law. Further, in a plain 
reading of the Ruling and Order it is not clear where the Court relied on factual determinations 
and where the Court made legal conclusions. 
Moreover, it is entirely unclear the basis for the Court's apparent factual determinations. 
The only affidavits or other factual evidence presented to the Court in the pleadings on this issue 
came from the Defendant. The Prosecution failed to provide any affidavit, transcript, recording, 
or other evidence as to any prior statements the alleged victim made to the police, the 
Prosecution, or any other party concerning her desire to have the Defendant sentenced to prison. 
All such information was duly requested by the Defendant during discovery and should have 
already been provided to the Defendant's legal counsel. But for reasons unknown to the 
Defendant this information was intentionally withheld. Critically, in spite of the lack of evidence 
presented by the Prosecution, the Court made a determination that the Prosecution did not make 
a material misrepresentation. 
The Defendant is entitled to a clear and unambiguous ruling on his Motion. In order to 
apply the proper standard of review, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Comt of Appeals 
require a clear delineation between the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusions. This 
Court did not make such delineation in its Ruling and Order. Accordingly, the Defendant 
2 
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respectfully requests the Court clarify the basis for its denial of the Defendant's Motions to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and 
Requests; make c)ear and unambiguous Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in conjunction 
with the Ruling and Order; and clarify the basis for the Court's factual determinations. 
DATED this 11111 day of May, 2015. 
Isl Larry Long 
Larry Long for 
L. LONG LA WYER, INC. 
Attorney for Defendant 
3 
00350 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 11 th day of May, 2015, I caused to be served via e-mai 1/e-
fil ing/fax/mai l/delivery a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO CLARIFY THE 
RULING AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO WITHDRAW GUILTY 
PLEA, REINSTATE PRELIMINARY HEARING, AND REINSTATE ALL PRIOR 
FILED MOTIONS AND REQUESTS to the following: 
Salt Lake District Court 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Salt Lake County District Attorney Offices 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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t.iJ· 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ORJGl,~AL 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Electronically Recorded on 
May 11, 201S 
BE:FORE: THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS 
Third District Court J~dge 
APPEARANCES 
for the State: Aaron Flater 
JUN - 1 2015 
lt;,\LT LAKii 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
lll East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (385) 468-7600 
For the Defendant: 
Transcribed by: Wendy Haws, CCT 
William B. Parsons III 
Larry N. Lona 
1 Lakeview 
Stansbury Park, Utah 84074 
Telephone: (801) 466-6311 
1771 South California Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 377-2927 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on May 11, 2015) 
THE COURT: All right, so Mr. Magness. This matter is 
131903746; and we're set for sentencing today? 
MR. LONG: Yes, your Ho~or. Although apparently the 
ruling was entered with the Court on che 6th , which was Wednes-
day, but no electronic notification was ever sent to Mr. Flater 
at the DA's office or Mr. ?arsons, me, nor Mr. Cook. I got a 
call on Friday afternoon from Mr. Cook that the ruling was to 
deny tr.emotion. 
So I called Or. Mahea, trying to get a hold of him. 
I haven't received any return calls from him. We expected him 
to be here to testify in terms of he'd been in treatment for 
the last two-and-a-half years with Dr. Mahea. We wanted your 
Honor to have the input on that. We had about over 30 people 
that were scheduled to show up, but we didn't have the time to 
contact them. 
THE COURT: I specifically asked if anyone thought we 
needed a special setting, and I was told no by both sides. 
MR. LONG: Well, that may have been the case at the 
time, but I think it would certainly be advisable if we could 
have one. We did file this morning a motion to clarify ~he 
ruling, because we thought it was rather ambiguous and we know 
that the Court of Appeals as well as the Supreme Court wants a 
clear record for review. 
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Also we filed the motion to continue the sentencing 
based on the fact that we needed to get Dr. Maheas here to 
testify, as well as the 30 supporters that we were trying 
to have show up in his behalf. He went through 220 hours of 
training and bonded with a lot of people over there. So we 
thought that would be significant for the Court. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. FLATER: Your Honor, I object to the request for a 
continuance. I'd ask -- I would ask the Court to go forward 
with sentencing today for a number of reasons. As the Court is 
well aware, this has been previously scheduled for sentencing 
at least twice. That sentencing had been delayed at the request 
of the defendant. 
At the motion, the evidentiary hearing, the argument 
that we had when the Court took the matter under advisement, 
the Court informed all parties that you would have a decision 
by today's date, and that it would either be a sentencing or a 
scheduling conference based on your ruling. 
So the defendant was on notice that today may -- may 
in fact be a sentencing. He had ample time to contact all of 
the witnesses and get them here if he thought that he needed 
people to testify. He's previously submitted quite a few 
documents in preparation, anticipation of sentencing, and has 
had multiple opportunities to present whatever information he 
wanted to to the Court and/er was under notice that today would 
-3-
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1 be set for scheduling if the Court denied the -- I mean, excuse 




The Court gave no indication of whether that wo~ld 
5 be in advance at the hearing or at the hearing itself. The 
6 Court said, ''I may come to the bench on this day a~d deny your 
7 motion; and if that's the case, then we will go forward with 
8 sentencing.u So based on that procedural history, I strongly 

















ask the Court to go forward. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Anything further? 
MR. LONG: Did your Honor have an opportunity to read 
our written motion to continue? 
THE COURT: I did. I took a brief break --
MR. LONG: Oh, okay. 
THE COURT: from the bench and I read that. Thank 
you. Anything else I should know? 
MR. LONG: I don't believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, I am -- I have reviewed those 
documents that were filed this norning, and I am denying the 
motions to co~tinue the sentence, and to clarify the ruling 
further. I did nake it clear at that oral argument on the --
on the last motion that I would likely even issue the ruling 
t~is morning. So the fact that you got it earlier should just 
give you additional time. 
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I also indicated, as the State has indicated as well, 
that I would -- today we were going forward either with the 
sentencing or with a scheduling confere~ce, depending on how I 
ruled. I've ~ade that ruling, and so I'm ready to proceed with 
sentencing. 
I knew we have been set for sentencing several times 
on this matter, and I would note we've heard from the victim in 
the case. However, I'm not sure whether we've ever gotten to 
the point of any errors or omissions in the pre-sentence report 
that need to be addressed. 
MR. PARSONS: We have not actually had the opportunity 
-- if it please the Court, William Parsons, your ~onor, on 
behalf of the defendant we have not had the opportunity 
of making the statement in behalf of the defendant. At this 
par~icular point in time I would like to have the opportunity 
to do so. 
THE COURT: All right, chank you, but any errors or 
omissions that you were (inaudible) --
MR. PARSONS: There are a couple of minor errors, but 
nothing of significance in the pre-sentence report that we wish 
to address. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. PARSONS: I would inquire of the Court, has the 
Court had the opportu~ity of the reviewing the defense based 
report that we have produced? 
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THE COURT: I have. 
MR. PARSONS: Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 MR. PARSONS: With that in mind, your Honor, if I may 
5 proceed? 




















MR. PARSONS: Thank you. The defendant is 55 years 
of age, your Honor. He was born and raised in the Salt Lake 
valley. He's been a welder all of his life. He owns his own 
home. He has two children. He has three grand children. He 
has no prior felonies. He has no assault or sex offense record 
of any character whatsoever. 
Since this offense occurred, he has completed two-and-
a-half years of therapy with Dr. Mahea, who is a qualified sex 
therapist in the community. He, in addition to that, has 220 
hours of Great Life Training and has been an instructor himself 
in the Great Life program. 
He has completed psycho-sexual evaluations including 
the plethysmograph and the polygraph, and all tests at the 
behest and under the direction of Dr. Mahea indicate that he 
has no~ only interested in only sexually appropriate behavior, 
bo:h age and sexually context, with no apparent in:erest in 
deviation of any character. 
Alcohol testing monitor has been on this g€ntleman 
fer over two-and-a-half years, and there have been no alcohol 
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consumed by him since the date of the inc~dent, which was 
almosc three years ago. As both reports produced indicate, 
~he~e are alcohol circumstances associated with this incident, 
and r.is alcohol-free status is very telling of his commitment 
to not engage in any misconduct of any character in the future. 
The defense based sentencing report gives a recommend-
ation cf 36 mon~hs of probation, 270 days of County Jail time, 
with 6 days credit. As indicated in our sentencing report, 
it is incredibly likely that this defendant will never appear 
before the Court again with regards co anything of this char-
acter. He has practically no risk of a repeat offense, accord-
ing to Dr. Mahea's report. 
Now, of course, those are not words not Dr. Mahea's 
specifically, but th~ report essentially suggests exactly as 
I've indicated. The point is, your Honor, is is that we find 
before you a young man who has -- who has engaged in misconduct 
that is egregious, significantly egregious, and yet he has 
taken full responsibilicy for it, has acknowledge his role, 
has acknowledged his culpability, has acknowledged that it 
was wrong, and has assumed the necessary steps for purposes 
of changing all of his lifestyle behavior that would prevent 
him from engaging in anything of this character in the future. 
I heartily recommend that the Court consider the 270 
days of jail time tha: is involved in the defense based sent-
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encing report, with credit fer the 6 days. I recognize that 
the AP& P report recommends a comrr1i tmcnt of a 1 to 15, second-
degree felony. 
I also recognize that both the defense based and the 
AP&P reports indicate thac he is in the moderate risk category; 
but the extenuating circums:ances that we have suggested to the 
Court would tend to appropriately sway the Court toward the 
probation. With that we would submit. Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. LONG: If I might just add, your Honor, :hat I've 
known Bob for the last two-and-a-half years. When I first 
met him it had been about a year, I think, since the incident 
happened. r rec -- he said he hadn't had a drink since then. 
So I suggested he put on a scram device, which he did, and he's 
been wearing that for I guess in excess of two years. 
We sent him up and he did a whole sexual -- psycho-
sexual evaluation with Dr. Mahea and has followed the treatment 
regimen for the last two-plus years. Is that right? 
MR. MAGNESS: Almost two-and-a-half years. 
MR. LONG: So he's been very compliant. He went through 
his Great Life training and bonded with a lot of people over 
there, 220 hours. I think he'd like to say something to your 
Honor before sentencing. 
THE COURT: All right, do you want to do that now or 
after the Sta~e? 
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MR. LONG: Go ahead and let the State --
THE COURT: Whatever -- whatever (inaudible). 
MR. LONG: Let him go ahead. 
MR. FLATER: Than% you, your Honor. I think the pre-
sentence report does a good job of identifying some of the 
things that are very concerning in this case. The fact that 
the defendant did not know the victim prior to this crime is 
indicating as an aggravating factor and circumstance. 
The fact that he took advantage of an unconscious and 
particularly vulnerable individual and used that vulnerability 
to satisfy his own sexual desire I think is significant and 
extremely aggravating circumstances in this particular case. 
The Court is aware and it's been the subject of much 
discussion that the victim is requesting prison. Her request I 
think is significant that she wants him to be in prison for as 
long as she's really kind of suffered through and dealt with 
the consequences of his actions; a~d suggested tha~ a minimum 
of two years of prison would be appropriate for what he did to 
her is essentially the price to pay for the egregious behavior 
that he engaged in. 
I don't disagree with the pre-sentence report or the 
victim. I think their .recommendations are a9propriate. I knm•1 
that there were initial negotiations that didn't involve me. 
As the party I do believe that I am bound to honor the request, 
but the Sta=e's prior position was we want to -- we want to 
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honor the wishes of the victim in this particular case. So I 
think her recor.1.mendat.ions and t.he recomrnendations in the pre-
sentence ~eport are appropriate. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. LONG: I j~st might add that although she requested 
two-and-a-half years in prison, the information we have on the 
analysis is that the average first offender served 91 months on 
a sex offense (inaudible} prison. But Mr. Magness would like 
to say something on his 01,-m behalf. 
TH8 COURT: All right, thank you. 
MR. MAGNESS: I'm accountable, your Honor. I can't 
believe I did such a stupid thing. I've been through 120 hours 
of Great Life training. I realize I've given up all power 
because I was pretending I was a victim. I'm compelled to do 
well for family which I love, and they love me, and a career 
as a welder that I've had since I was 12. If your Honor will 
trust me, the results will speak for themselves. 
THE COURT: Okay, that quote that you just used is 
also in the pre-sentence report. Could you let me know what 
that means? ''I have thrcwn away all my power because I was 
pretending I was a victim." I'm not exactly sure I understand. 
MR. MAGNESS: I've given up all my power because I was 
pretending I was a victim. I'm not 
MR. PARSONS: Simply assuming -- if I may, your Honor, 
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THE COURT: So just initially -- I guess I'm not under-
stand:ng. 
MR. PARSONS: If the Court had the -- should the Court 
have had the privilege of receiving testimony, the Court would 
have determined that at the time of the initial interviews by 
the au~horities there were conflicting statements made. 
THE COURT: I'm aware of that. We accually had 
MR. ?ARSONS: That's what he's suggesting is --
THE COURT: All right, that he did take responsibility. 
MR. ?ARSONS: He's taking -- yes, he's acknowledging 
full responsibility at this time. Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: All right, tha~k you. Anything -- anything 
more I should know? 
MR. MAGNESS: Nothing. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MAGNESS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, well, we've met a number of 
times through this. As you recall, the victim did testify at 
a the :wo hearings previously when we were -- one of the times 
that we were set for sentencing. 
At that time (inaudible) numerous references to her 
statements today that she wants Mr. Magness to go to prison 
for the amount of ti~e that she has suffered. I think the part 
that we all need to keep in pe=spective and that she will learn 
likely as well, that she likely will suffer a lot more than che 
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two-and-a-half years that she has suffered ~o date. So I think 
using the two-and-a-half year number is really not helpful. 
I appreciate all the hard work that you have committed 
yourself to during this time pericd. ~owever, I'm -- this is 
unacce~table conduct, and the victim in this case has suffered 
and will continue to suffer a great deal. So, sir, you are 
before me on a second-degree felony, and for that you will be 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for 1 to 15 years. 
Restitutio~ is ordered. I don't know if we have 
f~nal ~estitution numbers. I know there's two different claim 
numbers, but is that something that the State --
MR. FLATER: I'm not prepared to address a final amount 
of restitution today. ! would just ask the Cour: to keep that 
matter open for a pe~iod of time so we can --
THE COURT: All right, we can try to address it here or 
we can have the board address it. So I don't do --
MR. FLATER: I would just ask the Court to order resti-
tution as a condition of his sentence. Then we will submit all 
of the information tha: we --
THE COURT: All right, thank you. So restitution is 
ordered as well. A~ything further? 
KR. PARSONS: May Mr. Magness self-report on Friday at 
5 o'clock? 
THE COURT: No, he'll be taken into custody now. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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RE?ORTE~'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 




I, Wendy Haws, a Notary Public in and for the State of 
Lltah, do hereby certi~y: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my direction 
from the transmitter records made of t~ese proceedings. 
That I have been authorized by Beverly Lowe to prepare said 
:ranscript, as an independent contractor working under her 
license as a certified court reporter appropriately authorized 
ur.der Utah statutes. 
That this transcrict is full, true, correct, and contains 
all of the evidence an~ all matters to which the same related 
which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the ouccome 
~hereof. 
That certain oarties wAre not id~ntified in the record, and 
::herefore, ::he naii-,e associated with the statement may not be 
th-e ,:or rec:: nami::: as to the speat:er. 
WITNESS MY ~AND AND SEAL this 21~l day of May 2015. 
1·1y commissicn ex?ires: 
January 12, 2016 
S.1.gned: 
Wendy Ha~ CCT 
NOTARY !?UBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
.:-·(:V;'~;-. ''!•I!?"~ :i y HAW s 
-ti),-;, {;r · ,l~'\1\ N(:;i:f•'.:' ;:·,r;;_:~,• :· ;,~'r. U· fJiAH 
\~ • ~f.?,• -St ~, ...... ~ ... , ..• ~ .. 
~- M'/j CO.,,M,::.:,,•.•!'.•i ·;..,. ,, 13 
'-!.!.!.Y,,. COMM. EXP. 01-12-2016 
Ee~erlf Low~, CCR/CCT 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
. 3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
lsALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MINUTES 
RULING/SENTENCING_ 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. Case No: 131903746 FS 





Prosecutor: FLATER, AARON Wi 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LONG, ~-~Y N 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION I 
Date of birth: August 2, 1959 
I 
Sheriff Office#: 92630 
Audio I l 
Tape Number: W35 Tapel Count: 10:43-58 
CHARGES 
l. FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Judge: 
Date: 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/05/2015 Guilty 
I 
HEARING 
TIME: 10:43 AM 
ELIZABETH A HRUBY-MILLS 
May 11, 2015 
Defense addresses the Court! regarding the ruling and possibly needing a special set 
sentencing and gives basis.' State objects to a continuance and gives basis. Court 
denies the motion to continhe the sentencing and clarify the ruling entered by the 
I 
court on May 6, 2015, Mr. Parsons addresses the Court regarding the presentence report 
and gives a statement on beralf of the defendant. Mr. Long addresses the Court on 
behalf of the defendant. State addresses the Court. Defendant addresses the Court. 
Court admonishes the Defendtnt for his actions and behaviors. Court orders the 
defendant to serve 1-15 yeats prison forthwith. Court orders restitution with the 
I 
amount to be determined. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's 
defendant is sentenced to 
conviction of FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE a 2nd Degree Felony, the 
I 
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Case No: 131903746 Date: May 11, 2015 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for 
transportation to the Utah.State Prison where the defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 




Paqe qoi'F 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
